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**Empire & Globalisation: a “Cultural Economy” of the British World**

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I

Aspirations to empire appear to have been a constant of every period of human history. Much of our global past was forged in the crucible of the great ethno-cultural entities that we call empires—whether Asian or European. Indeed, the extraordinary empires carved out by the Manchus, the Mughals and the Ottomans, as well as the Spanish, the Dutch, the British and the French, profoundly altered the context in which those who inhabited the lands over which these powers ruled envisioned their societies, gauged political possibilities, shaped cultural practices, and marked out trade routes. Empires, upon which the sun did always eventually set, have thus been a central feature of our modern globalised world. Here, I want to take just one of those empires—the British—at its apogee or high point, the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, and to explore how the British Empire both influenced and was in turn influenced by the forces of “globalisation.”

Globalisation, of course, has become a very fashionable concept over recent years. By the beginning of the present century the study of globalisation had captured the imagination of academics working in the social sciences. Talk of a “global society,” “global economy,” “global warming” and “the global war against terror” was commonplace. “Globalisation” has conveyed a sense of living in an age

of transformation or unprecedented change—one in which little can be taken for granted, and no-one quite knows what the future might bring.

As a concept, globalisation speaks not only to the physical compression of the world, but also to the realm of perception and the imagination—to borrow the words of one commentator, “an intensification in the consciousness of the world as a whole.” In academia few disciplines have been left untouched by globalisation’s claims, or remained immune to its conceptual allure.

The view that globalisation deserves a prominent place on the agenda of historical research did not take long to establish itself. Historians came hard on the heels of social scientists in arguing that many of globalisation’s key features had long been a fact of life. To be sure, some of them questioned the concept’s novelty, or felt frustrated by its lack of specificity, or were critical of its Euro-centricity. But such scepticism has largely been offset by a strong sense that ‘globalisation’ might offer fruitful ways of conceptualising historical as well as contemporary change.

Perhaps not surprisingly, when delineating earlier periods or “eras” of globalisation, the “long” nineteenth century, from the 1780s to the outbreak of the First World War, with its striking growth and specialisation of world trade, has loomed large. This, moreover, was also a century in which Britain pursued a distinctively and expansively imperial vision of its place in the world order, which joined together a complex formal territorial empire, with an equally complex yet “informal” system of influence, interest and interference.

Which brings us to the relationship between empire and globalisation—for this is arguably the most widely discussed and debated aspect of globalisation’s past. On the face of it, the division of the world into rival empires, and the processes of closer international integration, would appear inherently to be in conflict. After all, rivalry between empires and violent oppression within them, have pitted cultures and peoples against each other. More than that, we are accustomed to perceive most political phenomena, including globalisation itself, through the framework of the nation-state. From such a perspective, closer integration is largely a product of the interplay of different international policies, and a society’s freedom to make its way

in the global marketplace is contingent upon a prior ability to gain and exert its independence.

However, as soon as one looks more closely at some of the key drivers for “contemporary” globalisation (or globalisation as it is experienced today), such as the international flows of people, capital and goods, it is clear that these flows not only occurred within, but were also significantly shaped by, the matrices of empire.

Empires, from this point of view, could be powerful sponsors of globalisation. Following this logic, much of the recent writing about the history of globalisation has devoted itself to periodising and pinning down the distinguishing characteristics of these earlier episodes of “global imperialisms.”

Yet some scholars have also begun to sound a note of caution. Our attention is drawn to the limitations of globalisation, particularly during the age of European empires—the fact that their penetration of, and control over, Asian and African economies was far from complete; the marked unevenness of globalisation, a process which advanced much more rapidly in some colonies than others; and the questioning of the assumption that globalisation was either linear or inevitable, when the evidence of the past suggests that it could clearly recede as well as advance.

When engaging with the debates about contemporary globalisation, therefore, historians have understandably been wary of some of its proponents’ more ambitious claims. This is especially true of globalisation’s supposed homogenising tendencies—by which I mean the idea that cultural fusion was a necessary consequence of economic integration—a point to which we shall later return in my conclusion.

In *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, from 1850 to 1914*<sup>2</sup> it is argued that it is as important for us to understand globalisation’s past as it is to understand its present—in fact, it goes further to try to show how some of the key characteristics and challenges of globalisation, as manifested today, have been inherited from earlier periods of “global imperialisms.”

We explore the social networks, migrational habits and shared material culture that bound together British communities at home and overseas during the half

century before the First World War. We see the “British World” of this period as a discrete historical phenomenon that profoundly altered the global landscape.

The central feature of the book is its examination of the relationship between cultural identity and economic behaviour. This relationship, we contend, has been left largely unexplored in the historiography. While there is certainly discussion by scholars of the role of co-ethnic networks and inter-personal connections in bringing people together, building trust, and facilitating the development of trade, in pre-modern and early modern contexts, from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth century, modern economies, by contrast, are typically held not to need such devices. Impersonal market institutions and profit maximisation are understood to have provided a more efficient solution.

Yet in our book evidence is presented to show that non-economic considerations (such as cultural identity) not only did not disappear, but in fact retained their significance into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Britain industrialised and developed a modern financial sector. Networks, far from being simply a relic of pre-modern contexts (or indeed a uniquely contemporary, grass-roots response to the pressures of globalisation) were at the heart of the rapidly developing “trans-nationalism” of the long nineteenth century – working alongside more formal institutions to break down barriers to longer-distance trade.

## II

We use the term “cultural economy” to highlight how cultural factors can influence economic behaviour. We begin with the idea that all economies function within cultural contexts. By creating a larger supply of, and market for, information, we show how migration transformed patterns of consumption, while also facilitating the adoption of technological and organisational innovations. Throughout the British imperial world, the consequences were profound and enduring. In the words of one reviewer of our book: “cultural reproduction and economic integration” were “mutually reinforcing.”<sup>3</sup>

Central to the creation of this British World was the emergence of a group of settler societies – Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. These hitherto

lightly populated regions occupied a privileged position in the first global economy wrought by British free-traders. By enticing large numbers of immigrants and large volumes of capital to their shores, by constructing modern infrastructure, and by exporting a narrow range of staples, they were able to achieve rapid rates of economic growth and offer their settler populations levels of per capita income that were impressively high.<sup>4</sup> In exploring the global development of settler capitalism, our book focuses on these neo-British societies, or “self-governing dominions,” as they are also called. But because of our emphasis on migration, it also pays attention to Britain’s relations with the United States of America, and to Latin America.

Our emphasis on migration is no accident. We argue that, integral to any proper analysis of globalisation, is a full understanding of the role played by the mass movement of people. The migrant as “everyman” is perhaps the defining feature of our own times. But migration, of course, is as old as humanity itself. In particular, it was during the nineteenth century, the most intensive period of migration in human history, that 100 million people moved around the world, with perhaps as many as one in every ten people affected by this experience. A quarter of these migrants were European, and the United Kingdom was the largest source of migrants within Europe, exporting on average around 2 million people per decade from the 1870s to the 1920s.

As prolific migrants, the British peoples settled across Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and the United States.<sup>5</sup> The consequences of this outflow of population were profound. On the one hand emigration was a force for global economic growth, integrating labour, commodity and capital markets to an extent never previously seen. Yet on the other hand, this industry of white settlement—for that it was it was—led to the widespread dispossession and delocalisation of indigenous peoples, the effects of which were felt powerfully at the time and still resonate today.

Such migration made trans-nationalism—by which we mean living in and identifying with more than one country or place at once—a normal way of life for many British people in the fifty years before 1914. In the eyes of many, those who had migrated to Britain’s settler colonies remained “British” in terms of their

identity. And being “British” had material and economic as well as social and cultural implications.

*Empire and Globalisation* seeks to show how migrants were key players in Britain’s exploitation of global resources by opening up a much-neglected dimension of their experience, namely the one-off and regular payments they made to support their families and communities “back home”—called remittances. Studies of contemporary remittance activity highlight the positive role such monetary transfers have played in alleviating poverty in recipient countries. Yet they also criticise remitters, like the Chinese in Australia, for not “making a life” in their adopted country, and for sending their earnings “home.”<sup>6</sup> By comparison, remittances have received much less attention from historians.

The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of an extensive remittance culture across the British imperial world. This remittance culture not only supported successive rounds of migration, it also generated streams of capital that provided vital support to British families literally stretched across the globe.

It was toward the end of the nineteenth century that the total volume of remittances rose rapidly. This was a product of the growing wealth and numbers of emigrants and the ease with which they could now transfer funds internationally<sup>7</sup> via the money and postal order systems operated by the British and Colonial post offices. From their inception in the early 1870s, these Post Office systems proved very popular, allowing as they did for small amounts of cash to be sent regularly through the mail. It is worth remembering how Post Office buildings in the colonies were often the grandest public edifices in town—such symbolic forms of authority helped to reinforce the confidence placed by colonists in money and postal orders.

From the 1870s to 1914, somewhere between £200m and £270m was remitted to and from the UK—a very significant sum of private capital. To give just one example: a significant source of remittances came from the Cornish mine workers who left Britain for the colonies, Latin America and the United States. These Cornish miners were a highly mobile workforce. On the Witwatersrand, the gold mining district in South Africa, for example, they formed a quarter of the white mine

workforce, some 10,000 miners in all.<sup>8</sup> Many of these miners travelled alone, and the families they left behind anxiously awaited the arrival of a regular remittance.<sup>9</sup> When the South African mail arrived, people would flock into the towns from the surrounding villages to collect their money, and business in local shops boomed.<sup>10</sup> Conversely, when what was then called the 'home pay' did not arrive, the county's churches and charitable institutions were left to pick up the pieces. The constant flow of remittances from South Africa provided a lifeline for the Cornish economy until at least the First World War.

The key point that I wish to make here is that, although separated from their family by great distances, many migrants clearly felt responsible, therefore, for the wives, children and dependent relatives they had left behind. Nor was the tenacity of these "old" world social ties confined to the British imperial world. Transatlantic remittance flows show how a sizeable proportion of British migrants in the United States displayed an ongoing psychological commitment to their "homeland." Whether migrants left for the settler colonies or for America, their departure was not so much a case of "cut and run," as of run, remit and later (perhaps) return.<sup>11</sup>

Europeans were not the only remitters, of course. The 14 million or so Indian and Chinese contract labourers who moved around the empire in search of employment were just as indispensable to the workings of global capitalism. And they likewise strove to save money to send to their family during indenture, or to take money back home with them after their term of indenture had ended.<sup>12</sup> These Indian and Chinese indentured migrants are a salutary reminder that not all the processes of globalisation were rooted in Europe. Much less has been written about the remitting behaviour of non-European migrants, however, raising the possibility of further and fruitful comparative study across the different ethnic diasporas that were partly the product of empire. What we do know is that in those regions where European and non-European migrants *did* mix the power of imperial networks to discriminate against Asian and African peoples, and to exclude them from "the privileges of responsibility and skill," was striking.<sup>13</sup>

British migrants, by contrast, enjoyed advantageous access to these networks and were adept at exploiting them for their own gain.<sup>14</sup> This is well illustrated, for

example, by the controversy over Chinese indentured labour in early-twentieth-century South Africa. Skilled workers from Britain (and Australia), who had migrated to Transvaal in South Africa invoked a doctrine of “white labourism” or “racial socialism.” In so doing, they challenged the presence of “ethnic outsiders” in the workplace who they accused of undercutting their wages. Understood in this way, remittances might be seen as part of a bigger push to shore up a separate racial status, including job security, better pay and welfare, for white *British* subjects.

### III

So far what I have been arguing, therefore, is that much can be learnt about the economy of the British imperial world by conceiving it as a species of global networking. Migrant networks connected private, unofficial and provincial interests in Britain with their overseas contacts and communities. It was through them that ideas and information were exchanged, trust was negotiated, goods were traded, and people travelled.

Yet, care is needed here. One should not assume that this process of network-sponsored economic growth was all rosy or uni-directional. The notion that networks always promote economic activity, simply because they did so for a while during the latter part of the nineteenth century, is an illusion. The harsher reality is that, when forcefully challenged in the inter-war period, the relative inclusiveness of these British World networks proved remarkably brittle.

Migrant networks that had formerly been at the forefront of globalisation could, when circumstances changed, and world economic conditions were no longer so favourable, become instruments of its rollback. Indeed, the common cultural identity these migrant networks had helped to foster now facilitated the transition to the more insular capitalism of the 1920s and the 1930s as ethnic, inter-racial and class tensions were parleyed into the protectionism, extreme nationalism and even xenophobia that marked the inter-war years.



#### IV

The “imperial” vision of globalisation pursued by the British through their empire can also be explored through the realm of material goods and consumption.

Recent scholarship has sought to show how group values and beliefs can influence levels of economic performance, and how trade can often develop more readily among people sharing a common identity, whether ethnic, religious or political in nature. Across an English-speaking world, it is clear that consumerism significantly intensified from the middle of the nineteenth century. The rise of bourgeois (or middle-class) society in Britain, the United States and the settler colonies saw a language of “needs” increasingly displaced by a language of “wants,” as the middle-classes sought to demonstrate their worth by what they consumed and how they consumed it.<sup>15</sup>

Probably the most widely discussed sphere of material culture is that of fashion. The trend toward greater uniformity in dress—which can be observed among the Chinese and Japanese as well as the English—has been noted by several leading historians, propelled as it was by the growth of overseas trade, by the development of advertising, and by a more general aspiration to modernity, in particular the spread of the idea of respectability.

As early as the 1830s, there is evidence to show that middle-class women in the colonies were already recreating changing metropolitan tastes in clothes.<sup>16</sup> Such consuming habits stemmed in part from the fear among migrants of sliding into mediocrity, or being considered “provincial,” “unfashionable” or “backward,” was widespread.<sup>17</sup>

Australia is a particularly interesting case, as it boasts some of the best research into clothing habits and fashion.<sup>18</sup> Much urban dress was modelled on British styles and either imported, or made up from overseas patterns. In their quest for respectability, the merchants and businessmen of Victoria and New South Wales adopted the British preference for dark-coloured outfits, consisting of frockcoats, trousers and waistcoats, often offset with a tall top hat. (Understandably, men in Queensland were reluctant to follow this sartorial trend, which was hardly suited to its tropical climate.) Meanwhile, the quality garments worn by middle-class women

were often imported. Those wishing to adopt a genteel lifestyle paid close attention to codes of social practice in Britain. For much of the nineteenth century what was on offer to them locally was limited and expensive. Australian department stores therefore tended to combine the retailing of imported British goods with local garment production.

Indigenous peoples also adopted British styles of clothing. But when they put on western garments they invested them with their own meanings.<sup>19</sup> Let us take the case of Southern Africa as an example. In Southern Africa, male converts to Christianity were among the first indigenous people to adopt European clothing in the 1860s and 1870s.<sup>20</sup> "Clothing was a morally charged medium for missionaries." The naked or semi-clad "native" body evoked degeneracy and disorder. For this reason, the campaign to clothe Africans is understood by scholars to have been inseparable from other aspects of Britain's "civilising mission."<sup>21</sup> Yet there were limits to what white settlers in South Africa felt to be acceptable, and Africans pushed right up against these limits. While missionaries saw clothing as a part of their civilising offensive on African manners and beliefs, they became increasingly concerned by Africans' use of Western dress, especially when they felt it was being worn immodestly, or to express opposition to settler rule.<sup>22</sup>

Probably the main item of imported clothing from Britain for indigenous Africans, however, was the woollen blanket.<sup>23</sup> Blankets were worn in both ritual and everyday contexts.<sup>24</sup> They were also very versatile, as they could be secured at the shoulder, pinned around the waist, cradle babies, or provide bedding. The demand from Basotho people for blankets was such that the Yorkshire firm Wormald & Walker of Dewsbury, began designing blankets for Basutoland (today's Lesotho) well before the end of the nineteenth century. The famous African trading firm, Fraser Limited, founded by two English immigrants, made a great deal of money from importing blankets into Southern Africa. Yet the company's products had to be designed to suit African tribal fabric and design preferences, rather than to reflect British ones. The "Victoria" line, depicting the British Queen, and produced during the Jubilee Year of 1897, was probably the best known. Sixty years later one of

Wormald & Walker's agents could still remark, "the Victoria is ... the hallmark of the well-dressed Basotho."<sup>25</sup>

Consumption, in truth, was a blunt tool of conquest. If Britain's so-called "civilising mission" in the settler colonies was partly predicated on an assumption that western commodities, especially clothing, could transform the habits of Africans, the reality proved different. Difficulties of access to such goods and the people who traded them, low purchasing power and the resilience of local costume—all these things stood in the way of implanting new cultures of consumption among indigenous peoples.

Among British migrants, by contrast, commodities, and the specific ways in which they were used, did play a role in forging a wider or pan-British culture. Significantly, this cross-fertilisation in consumption did not extend to nearly the same degree to the United States where the move from revenue-raising to protectionist tariffs, the rapid growth of domestic industries, and a far less homogenous consumer market (with migrants from Southern and Eastern Europe surpassing British arrivals by the close of the century), all acted as significant constraints on the development of a market for British manufactured goods.

By contrast, merchants and manufacturers from Britain were increasingly to seize upon the settler colonies to expand their markets. What we see is that, not only did the settler colonies consume comparatively high levels of British exports, the share of income they devoted to British goods also deepened relative to other parts of the developed and developing world over time. The main conclusion Gary Magee and I draw from this is that British industry possessed significant initial advantages in selling to these markets because of cultural affinity. However, British industry only held onto these advantages by remaining competitive in terms of price, product, distribution and marketing. In that sense, our findings contribute further to the rehabilitation of the once-maligned British manufacturing sector, especially as we reveal the great variety of products that Britain was supplying to distant British world markets.

## V

What I have been arguing is that migration, culture and deepening economic links between Britain and its settler colonies are the key to understanding both the immediate impact and the longer-term legacies of the British Empire at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth century.

By encouraging people to see themselves as part of a global chain of kith and kin, who shared common standards, forms of communication, and expectations, the mass migration of people from the British Isles at this time turned regional and national identities into trans-national ones.<sup>26</sup>

This migration, moreover, further promoted economic integration of a like hitherto not witnessed.<sup>27</sup> There was, in short, a quickening of economic relationships within the British imperial world—in particular, a more precise and intensive drawing together of the needs and interests of Britain and its settler colonies.

Almost by stealth, the workings of a multitude of trans-national networks bypassed national boundaries and unwittingly took large and historically-important steps toward the emergence of a truly global market.<sup>28</sup> While Britain was often the hub of these networks through which people, capital and goods moved, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were rapidly-evolving and maturing societies and economies in their own right, remarkably open to the world beyond their shores.

However, as well as understanding how this developing sense of imperial Britishness, among Britain and its settler colonies, aided their economic and social integration, we also need to be aware of the historical diversity of globalising forces—“the exceptionally complex ways in which past patterns of trade and conquest, migration and diaspora, have pushed and pulled distant regions together and shaped their cultures and politics.”

The impression conveyed by much of the recent literature on globalisation portrays the whole process as almost unstoppable: something akin to a massive computer algorithm slowly working itself out to some beautiful conclusion or cataclysmic event, depending on whether you are a globalisation optimist or pessimist, whether you feel excited or appalled by it.

But I have attempted to explain how a historical perspective on globalisation cautions us against conceiving of it as an all-encompassing planetary event, which has dramatically steamrollered (or crushed) diversity into oblivion. Rather, what we have seen is that the so-called first wave of modern globalisation pursued by the British peoples during the “long” nineteenth century, was nowhere near as simple as that: closer connections alone did not eliminate diversity and heterogeneity. Rather the integration of labour, capital and commodity markets happened in certain places and in certain ways, and it was marked by regional and ethnic biases and proclivities.

More than that, delving back into globalisation’s past reveals how several of the characteristics of the global economy and society talked about so frequently in our own times – which include “semi-globalisation,”<sup>29</sup> “regionalized globalisation,”<sup>30</sup> the notions of “network power” and the “networked society,”<sup>31</sup> and the centrality of international migration to the globalisation process – stem in part from the historical experience of the British imperial world. In fact, the reason why the above characteristics are so significant may be precisely because they are so deeply rooted.

I now want to finish by suggesting that two of the main contemporary challenges presented by globalisation, actually arise out of globalisation’s imperial past, and have their origins in the period we have been considering – the half century prior to the First World War.

The first of these challenges stems from the sheer scale of global mobility that we are witnessing today – and the resulting question of how to extend economic relations across cultural and ethnic boundaries. In short, how successfully can economic interdependence coexist with cultural diversity?

The second of these challenges arises from the contingent nature of globalization: its varying openness over time, and its almost self-destructive capacity to produce the very circumstances – economic nationalism, trade protection, and tight immigration controls – in which it is likely to break down.<sup>32</sup> This set of circumstances has been called by commentators the “globalisation backlash.”<sup>33</sup> Is such a backlash (and the de-globalisation that ensues) sooner or later inevitable, or can it be avoided?

In the media, as well as in universities, there has been much speculation as to whether an awareness of previous experiences of globalisation can help inform the way governments try to manage its consequences today. The “lessons” of history, of course, rarely present themselves in a neatly packaged form. Nonetheless, studying the British imperial world, as a discrete historical phenomenon, that profoundly altered the global landscape in the long nineteenth century, does highlight how, in the past, different parts of the world joined the global community in their own way and their own time.

An understanding of the workings of the British imperial world also suggests that maintaining the degree of openness and interconnectedness, widely felt to be the key to globalisation, requires us to be aware of its cultural as well as economic dynamic. Many of the trans-national migrant networks upon which the first wave of modern globalisation was built quickly turned in on themselves at the moment of diplomatic, economic and military crisis. In the wake of our own global financial crash, counteracting this tendency of networks to turn inwards when confronted by major economic challenges has been recognised as an important consideration for policy-makers. Globalisation works best, and proves most resilient, when its orientation is outward and inclusive and its benefits more widely shared. At a time when we are grappling with our own “global migration crisis,” and migrants are as likely to be regarded as a threat as an opportunity for receiving states,<sup>34</sup> this is something that the *Pax Americana*<sup>35</sup> – would do well to keep in mind.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Trevor Harris for inviting me to give a plenary lecture at the conference, and for his very helpful and interesting responses to my paper.

<sup>2</sup> Published in 2010 by Cambridge University Press, and co-authored with the economic historian Gary Magee (Monash University).

<sup>3</sup> Alan Lester.

<sup>4</sup> The pioneer of the comparative study of dominion economies is Donald Denoon. See: D. Denoon, “Understanding Settler Societies”, *Historical Studies* 18 (1979), pp. 511-27 and *Settler*

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*Capitalism: the Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983).

<sup>5</sup> At least fifty-two million migrants left Europe for overseas destinations between 1815 and 1930, with Britain supplying approximately a quarter of the total: see D.Baines, *Emigration from Europe, 1861-1900* (Cambridge, 1991), pp.9-11.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, *BME Remittance Survey. Research Report*, 27 July 2006, prepared for the Department of International Development by ICM.

<sup>7</sup> For a fuller account of migrant remittances in the English-speaking world, see G.B.Magee and A.S.Thompson, "Lines of Credit, Debts of Obligation: Migrant Remittances to Britain, c.1875-1913", *LIX ECHR* (2006), pp.539-77 and "The Global and the Local: Explaining Migrant Remittance Flows in the English-speaking World, 1880-1914", *JECH* Vol.66 (2006), pp.177-202.

<sup>8</sup> R. Dawe, *Cornish pioneers in South Africa. "Gold and diamonds, copper and blood"* (St Austell, 1998), pp. xv and 123.

<sup>9</sup> S. Schwartz and R. Parker, *Tin Mines and Miners of Lanner. The Heart of Cornish Tin* (Halsgrove, 2001), pp.157-58.

<sup>10</sup> Payton, *The Cornish Overseas*, p. 245.

<sup>11</sup> The nature of British emigration to United States did, however, result in distinctive patterns of remittance behaviour. Lower transport costs to America facilitated short-term, seasonal labour migration, so that a significant number of skilled workers who migrated across the Atlantic had no fixed intention of staying here.<sup>11</sup> Such migrants – or "birds of passage" – were rarely accompanied by their dependents, and tended to have relatively high rates of saving out of their earned income. Their aim was to build up a nest egg in America with a view to setting up in business or acquiring land on their return, or providing for their retirement. English bricklayers in New York, Welsh colliers in Pennsylvania, Aberdeen granite masons in New England, and Sheffield steel workers in Pittsburgh all fit this pattern.<sup>11</sup> They either remitted money in anticipation of their return, or returned home with their savings.

<sup>12</sup> D. Northrup, *Indentured Labour in the Age of Imperialism, 1834-1922* (Cambridge, 1995), pp.135-7 and "Migration from Africa, Asia and the South Pacific" in Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, pp.88-100; O. W. Parnaby, *Britain and the Labour Trade in the South-West Pacific* (Durham, NC, 1964); S. Marks and P. Richardson (eds.), *International Labour Migration: Historical Perspectives* (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1984); H. L. Wesseling, *The European Colonial Empires, 1815-1914* (Harlow, 2004), pp.18-19.

<sup>13</sup> Offer, *The First World War*, p.168.

<sup>14</sup> M. Boyd, 'Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent developments and New Agendas', *International Migration Review* (1989).

<sup>15</sup> P. N. Stearns, *Consumerism in World History. The Global Transformation of Desire* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn, 2006), pp.30, 47.

<sup>16</sup> A. Lester, *Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth-Century South Africa and Britain* (Routledge, 2001), p.74; M. Weidenhofer (ed.), *Colonial Ladies* (South Yarra, Vic., 1985), p.14.

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Russell, "The Brash Colonial", esp. pp.436, 453.

<sup>18</sup> See, especially, the seminal study by M. Maynard, *Fashioned from Penury. Dress as Cultural Practice in Colonial Australia* (Cambridge, 1994) from which the rest of this paragraph is drawn.

<sup>19</sup> H. Hendrickson, "Introduction" in Hendrickson (ed.), *Clothing and Difference: Embodied Identities in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa* (Durham, NC, 1996), p.2.

<sup>20</sup> See here Ross, "Cross-continental cross-fertilisation in clothing", and K.Ruether, "Heated Debates over Crinolines: European Clothing on Nineteenth-century Lutheran Mission Stations in the Transvaal", *JSAS* Vol.28 (2002), pp.359-78.

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<sup>21</sup> J. L. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution, Vol.2: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier* (University of Chicago Press, 1997), Ch.5 [quotations from p.229 and p.236].

<sup>22</sup> Subsequently, labour migrancy made European clothing even more widely available. On the diamond fields of Kimberley, the inflow of workers led to a rapid rise in purchasing power from the early 1880s. For black workers, clothing was a marker of their passage into a new community. Shops on the DuToitspan Road became emporia for imported goods, where migrants were introduced to the wonders of western consumerism.

<sup>23</sup> C. Danziger, *A Trader's Century. The Fortunes of Frasers* (Cape Town, 1979), pp.45-7.

<sup>24</sup> Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, pp.263-7.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p.46.

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, S. J. Potter, "Webs, Networks, and Systems: Globalization and Mass Media in the Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century British Empire", *Journal of British Studies* 46 (July 2007), pp. 621-2.

<sup>27</sup> For the argument that much of contemporary globalisation is regional rather than truly "global" in nature, see A. Rugman, *The End of Globalization: Why Global Strategy Is a Myth & How to Profit from the Realities of Regional Markets* (New York, 2001), pp. 1-12; U. Beck, *What is Globalization?* (Malden, MA, 2000), pp. 119-120.

<sup>28</sup> For an historical perspective on the trans-national networks forged by migrants, see S. Vertovec, "Transnationalism and Identity", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 27 (2001), pp.576-77.

<sup>29</sup> The emphasis here tends to be either on the fact that globalisation has advanced more rapidly in some sectors of the economy than others, or that even in those sectors where it has rapidly advanced (e.g. financial markets) it is still more unstable than commentators often assume. See Bisley, *Rethinking Globalization; Darwin, After Tamerlane*, pp.502-3; M. Veseth, *Selling Globalization: the Myth of the Global Economy* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

<sup>30</sup> As Patrick Manning asks, is what we are witnessing "a world-encompassing global economy or a global economy made up of distinct regional systems?", see P. Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (Basingstoke, 2003), p.19. For the debate surrounding "regionalised globalisation" - including the argument that what we have witnessed is "economic internationalisation, not globalisation" - see U. Beck, *What is Globalization?* (Cambridge, 2000), pp.119-121; F. Halliday, *The World at 2000. Perils and Promises* (Basingstoke, 2000), pp. 60-1; D. Held and A. McGrew, *The Global Transformations Reader. An Introduction to the Globalization Debate* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn, Cambridge, 2000), pp.4, 20-5, 39; and Rugman, *The End of Globalization*, pp.1-15.

<sup>31</sup> M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (2<sup>nd</sup> edn, Oxford, 2000); Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, pp.107-10; Potter, "Webs, Networks, and Systems", pp.621-46; G. F. Thompson, "Is all the world a complex network?", *Economy and Society* 33 (2004), pp.411-24.

<sup>32</sup> See, for example, Morowska's and Spohn's observations on the "discordant tendency" of past and contemporary phases of globalisation to produce, as a reaction to swelling migration, restrictive immigration policies by receiver countries "confronted with a deluge of foreign residents": "Moving Europeans in the Globalizing World", p.51. It is a moot point as to how far we today may be witnessing an era of resurgent nationalism, depending upon how one reads the complex and shifting political landscapes of Russia, China, the Indian subcontinent, and Latin America.

<sup>33</sup> O'Rourke and Williamson, *Globalization and History*, pp. 286-7.

<sup>34</sup> D. S. Massey et al, *Worlds in Motion. Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford, 1998), pp.6-7.

<sup>35</sup> For a leading example, see James C. Bennett, *The Anglosphere Challenge. Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century* (Paperback edn., Plymouth,



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2007). For another call for English-speaking peoples to join together, see Robert Conquest's *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (W. W. Norton, 1999). For an encomium to the history of the English-speaking world, see Andrew Roberts' *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2006).

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