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Thomas Jefferson and Spanish America: The Southwestern explorations

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In May 1804 Meriwether Lewis and William Clark set off to explore the unknown areas of the northern Louisiana Purchase. President Thomas Jefferson instructed them to explore the Missouri River and the water communication with the Pacific, to map and describe geographical features, to catalog the flora and the fauna, and to establish relations with the Indians they encountered. Since the return of Lewis and Clark to St. Louis two years later, interest in the expedition – notably over the past century – has vastly overshadowed the southwestern explorations Jefferson organized during the same period. And yet he had also imagined an exploratory venture along the Red and Arkansas Rivers, “next to the Missouri, the most interesting water of the Mississippi,” which would rival the Lewis and Clark exploration.¹

There are several reasons why the Dunbar-Hunter (1804-5), the Freeman-Custis (1806), and the Zebulon Pike (1806-7) expeditions have been neglected. Firstly, the southwestern expeditions were shorter in time and thus less eventful and spectacular. Secondly, Lewis and Clark departed with less knowledge and even certain misconceptions about the regions they would be traveling through. The southwest explorers, on the contrary, were better informed. They had gleaned more information from Spanish, French, Indian and American local

residents on the southern Louisiana territory; their accounts therefore lacked the novelty of those of Lewis and Clark.

But most important of all, the southern counterpart to the Lewis and Clark expedition did not achieve its aim. In fact, it ended in failure, which was by and large the result of Spanish intervention. Dunbar and Hunter explored the Washita River instead of the Red River for fear of being intercepted by the Spaniards. Freeman and Custis sailed up the Red River but a Spanish detachment of mounted soldiers and infantry turned them back. Zebulon Pike and his men were arrested and escorted back to the U.S. boundary between Nacogdoches and Natchitoches by a Spanish patrol. The Spaniards then detained five of Pike's followers for two years.

Jefferson was fully aware of the diplomatic frictions his southwest explorations could cause, yet he tried no less than three times before finally giving up. However, Jefferson's main reason for not pursuing the southwestern exploration project was probably not so much due to the firm Spanish opposition to American trespassing as it was to the Burr conspiracy of 1805-6. Jefferson's former vice-president Aaron Burr had schemed to separate the West from the rest of the United States and thus march into the Spanish southwest and parts of Mexico. General James Wilkinson, who had organized the Pike expedition with Jefferson's approval, was Burr's most important co-conspirator.² Understandably, Jefferson was only too willing to forget the murky and frustrating southwest to happily turn his attention to the glorious achievements of Lewis and Clark.

Bringing the forgotten southwest explorations back into the limelight and putting them on the same footing as the Lewis and Clark expedition is not the aim of this paper. My interest in these failed attempts to explore southern Louisiana during Jefferson's terms in office is to assess how these expeditions worked into relations between the United States and the Spanish empire. What information did Jefferson have about Spanish military positions and strength in

the southwest? Why did he insist on organizing these expeditions when he knew about the potentially dangerous diplomatic conflicts they could bring on? Did Jefferson perceive Spain as a real impediment and/or threat to U.S. expansionist thrust? These are some of the questions these expeditions raise, to which I will be offering tentative answers as I focus on the Dunbar-Hunter expedition of 1804-5 and the preparations of the Freeman and Custis expedition in 1805.

Relations Between the United States and the Spanish Empire, 1785-1804

On January 25, 1786, in a letter to the young member of the Virginia legislature Archibald Stuart, Thomas Jefferson reflected, rather vaguely, on expansion toward the territories still under Spanish control. He believed that the United States should be viewed as a “nest,” from which all America, North and South, would be peopled. He pointed out, however, that it was not in the interest of the United States to press the Spaniards too soon, despite his fear that Spain might prove too weak to hold her territories until the U.S. population settled them sufficiently. In fact, in the treaty of Paris of 1783, the United States had been granted possession of eastern Louisiana, that is the territory between the Appalachians and the Mississippi. Thus the river became the boundary between the United States and Spanish Louisiana. Henceforth the eastern bank of the river belonged to the United States and the western bank to Spain, and both nations had free access to the waterway. Yet in the last two hundred miles to the sea, Spain controlled both banks as she claimed possession of the eastern bank to the confluence of the Ohio and the Mississippi. Therefore nobody could navigate the lower Mississippi, nor travel across Spanish territory, without permission from Spain. Finally, in 1784, Spanish officials at New Orleans, acting on express instructions, decided to close the lower Mississippi to American shipping.³

Jefferson insisted strongly that the United States had to ensure the free navigation of the full length of the Mississippi.⁴ In 1791, during his tenure as Secretary of State, Jefferson claimed in a report on the negotiations with Spain to secure free navigation of the Mississippi, that the United States had an 'inherent' right to it. Hence it was incumbent on Spain to recognize, and not grant, this right.⁵ Yet navigating the Mississippi could only be profitable with free use of an entrepôt to exchange loads from the river to the sea. In other words, to accept the navigation of the river without an entrepôt in New Orleans, free of Spanish control, would not only be useless but could also heighten already smoldering tension with Spain.⁶ And Jefferson warned that the United States would stand firm, notwithstanding the risk of war.⁷

Indeed, he accused Spain of "unquestionably picking a quarrel with us."⁸ He was rather alarmed at the reports published in British newspapers about the United States and Spain preparing for an "inevitable" war. Jefferson strongly denied that such preparations were taking place in the United States.⁹ He was, however, rather wary of Spanish intentions. When Spain expressed her desire to open talks, Jefferson suspected that, in fact, she intended to lull the United States into accepting the situation while she continued strengthening her position on the Mississippi.¹⁰ The fact that the Spanish kept agents with the Indian nations was proof enough, for Jefferson, of Spain's deviousness.¹¹ He held Spanish officers on the U.S. southwestern frontier and the Spanish Governor of New Orleans, Baron de Carondelet, responsible for providing the southern Indians, notably the Creeks, with arms and ammunition to fight against the United States. The continuous murders and depredations by the Indians in U.S. territory had turned peace with them into a state of "unequivocal" war. Jefferson also suspected that the Spanish were extending their troublemaking to the northern Indians.¹²

But despite his fears and suspicions, Jefferson had no desire for a confrontation with Spain, all the more so as he was fully aware of her "particular

good understanding with England, our [the United States] other neighbor.”¹³ Indeed, he knew that in Europe, Spain had gone to war against France, and consequently the Spanish had drawn nearer to Great Britain. They were expecting the British would somehow help them stop French forces from invading the peninsula. And the Spanish were also counting on Great Britain to support Spain’s effort to counter any possible American and/or French attack on Louisiana.¹⁴ “That Spain and Great Britain may understand one another on our frontiers is very possible”, Jefferson wrote President Washington, in 1792.¹⁵ Thus his reading of the geopolitical situation in the early 1790s was not only that Spain posed a threat to the United States on the southern border, but that Great Britain and the Southern Indians did as well – and probably a more serious one.

Tension between the United States and Spain eased, though temporarily, with the signing of the Pinckney Treaty (1795). It defined the U.S.-Spanish empire boundaries. Spain recognized the boundary of 31° north latitude, today one of the borders between Louisiana and Mississippi. The treaty also guaranteed the United States the right of navigation on all the Mississippi and of depot in New Orleans, free of tax for three years. At the end of the three-year arrangement, this right could be renewed or the King of Spain could assign another place as depot. Finally, both nations agreed to restrain the Indians in their respective territories from cross-border raids.¹⁶ Yet this understanding did not prevent the Spanish from agitating the Indians against the United States.

Soon after he became president, in 1800, Jefferson was informed that Spain had secretly ceded the Louisiana territory to France. In a letter to Robert Livingston, the U.S. Minister to France, Jefferson drew a rather bleak picture of future relations with the French. Despite the long-lasting “natural” friendship between the United States and France, the nation that controlled New Orleans – through which three-eighths of U.S. produce passed – would be considered an enemy of the United States. France was clearly defying the United States by “placing herself in that door.” He concluded that these circumstances made it

impossible for the two nations to maintain friendly relations. Moreover, French possession of New Orleans would enable France to strengthen her position in the Atlantic. The United States would then have to look for the support of the British fleet, a prospect Jefferson certainly did not relish.¹⁷

On the contrary, if Spain retained New Orleans, her feeble grasp would allow Americans to increase their presence there, and some day they would take over from the Spaniards.¹⁸ Yet what Jefferson did not anticipate was that Spanish officials (who still controlled New Orleans) decided, in 1802, to cancel the right of depot, thus closing the port and the Mississippi to U.S. trade. Because Spain had become an ally of France in her war with Great Britain¹⁹, rumors circulated that Spain would soon transfer the city to the French. To forestall such a move, Jefferson sent a delegation to France with an offer to buy New Orleans and the Floridas for the United States. The president pointed out that if the mission failed, there was a risk of war with the French and the United States would have to look for British aid. And if this were the case Jefferson feared: "We shall get entangled in European politics, and figuring more, be much less happy and prosperous."²⁰

Yet it turned out that Jefferson was to be happier than he ever expected. In 1803 Napoleon decided to sell the whole Louisiana Territory to the United States for \$15 million, thus ending French ambitions in North America. Spain, however, considered the purchase invalid because she had ceded Louisiana to France with the guarantee that the territory could not be transferred to a third nation.²¹ In his 1804 annual message to Congress, the president announced that Spain had finally recognized the U.S. title to Louisiana but with "its exact limits, however, remaining still to be settled between us."²² Thus the main purpose of the southwestern expeditions would be to reconnoiter the area and use the geographical information to define the U.S.-Spanish empire boundary. Yet experience had taught Jefferson that negotiations with a weakened Spain had to be conducted with care because of her oscillating relations with the European

nations, notably France and Great Britain, on the one hand, and the Indian nations, on the other. Spain could either turn for support to her European ally(ies) at the time or excite the Indian nations against the United States, or both.

The Dunbar-Hunter expedition

William Dunbar was born into a Scottish aristocratic family in Elgin, Morayshire, in 1749. He studied astronomy and mathematics in Glasgow and London and remained keenly interested in the sciences and all areas of discovery throughout his life. In 1771 he moved to Philadelphia, where he started up a trading business with the Indians of the Ohio River Valley in the Fort Pitt area. Two years later he moved to Richmond (present Baton Rouge), in then Spanish-held Louisiana. There he engaged in farming activities such as the growing of indigo. Yet after his home and farm were plundered by an American marauder and then by Spanish raiders he decided to settle near Natchez, Mississippi. On his property, The Forest, cotton was grown extensively. Dunbar promoted many uses of cottonseed oil and invented a screw press that created the first square bales. He also owned one of the first telescopes in the lower Mississippi Valley and built an observatory near his home. In 1800 Jefferson secured Dunbar's election to the American Philosophical Society and began a six-year correspondence with Dunbar the scientist. In 1803, Dunbar, with other local residents, founded the Mississippi Society for the Acquirement and Dissemination of Useful Knowledge, the aim of which was to collect relevant scientific information about the Mississippi area.²³

In 1798 the Spanish government commissioned Dunbar to determine the line of demarcation between Spanish West Florida and U.S. territory south of Natchez. He headed a joint American-Spanish commission, financed by the Spanish government, to survey the 31° latitude. After three months of work in

“uninterrupted harmony with every gentleman of both parties,” Dunbar went back to The Forest to take care of his business and write a report for the Spanish government on the location of the latitude, which he completed that same year.²⁴ The geographical information Dunbar collected would thus be available for both Spain and the United States, that is, it would be public and shared.

So when Jefferson decided to move speedily to determine borders after the Louisiana Purchase, he relied on Dunbar’s previous survey experience. In the summer of 1803 he sent Dunbar a series of queries concerning southern Louisiana. Dunbar answered that he could only provide approximate information. He suspected that no “tolerable” map of Louisiana could be obtained. Nevertheless, with both the information from Daniel Clark, the U.S. consul for New Orleans²⁵, and the material in his possession, Dunbar could prepare a sketch for Jefferson. Dunbar also added that the limits of Louisiana had not been defined in the treaty of cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, in 1800, but both governments had started preparations for running the line of demarcation between Louisiana and Texas, the latter belonging to Spain.²⁶

In fact, Jefferson wanted Dunbar to confirm that the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase ran to the Rio Bravo (today Rio Grande), and that West Florida to the River Perdido, and a large part of Texas were also part of Louisiana, hence an American possession.²⁷ This is what Jefferson claimed in the document he wrote on the limits of Louisiana, in 1803.²⁸ The Spanish obviously disagreed. For them, the Rio Grande was an untenable claim, whereas the Red River, a tributary of the Mississippi, was more acceptable—according to the boundary the French geographer Bourguignon d’Anville had drawn earlier in the eighteenth century. In 1804 the Spanish government decided that the western boundary started at the Gulf, between the rivers Calcasieu and Attoyac, before going north through Las Adaes to the Red River, which became the central point of interest in the Louisiana-Texas border dispute. If, as according to the Americans, all the tributaries of the Mississippi were part of Louisiana, a survey

of the Red River was necessary to determine the boundary. Yet Spain was not willing to allow the Americans on any Western river until the limits were definitively settled. In fact, because the mouth of the Red River was clearly in American territory and the source was in Spanish possession, any U.S. expedition up the Red River, would lead the Americans into Spanish territory, and probably into contact with two populous and powerful Indian nations, the Taovay-Wichitas and the Comanches. And this would certainly be against the interests of Spain.²⁹

On March 13, 1804, Jefferson wrote Dunbar that Congress authorized him to explore the rivers on the western side of the Mississippi and Missouri. The several surveys of these explorations would enable the U.S. government to prepare a map of Louisiana. He thus charged Dunbar with the task of directing the Grand Expedition, that is, the exploration of the Arkansas River (which was entirely in American territory) and the Red River. Jefferson also appointed George Hunter, a Philadelphia chemist-apothecary, as Dunbar's collaborator. Dunbar readily accepted leading the expedition but warned Jefferson about the Spaniards. He believed it would be wise to first determine in what light the neighboring Spanish government viewed such an expedition, as it would be taking place before a line of demarcation between the United States and the Spanish empire had been traced.

Indeed, Dunbar knew that the one-time Spanish governor of Louisiana and now Spain's Boundary Commissioner, the Marqués de Casa Calvo, based in New Orleans, had orders not to allow any American to pass beyond what Spain understood to be the limits of Louisiana. Given the Spanish "habitual jealousy," Dunbar supposed that the Spaniards would not allow a foreign expedition into a country they claimed as their own. Dunbar wrote rather defiantly, however, that it was improper condescension to have to ask permission to explore "our own rivers." Nonetheless, even if the American party managed to go up the Arkansas River and down the Red River undetected, there remained another problem.

Dunbar feared that the Osages, a warlike Indian nation according to him, would not be friendly towards them, unless guides, that is, old hunters acquainted with the Indians and their language, were part of the expedition. Still Dunbar was rather pessimistic about finding competent guides in time for departure.³⁰

Since the eighteenth century the Osage Indians had occupied the Arkansas River Valley, which extended east from the Rockies to the Mississippi. They also controlled large amounts of land to the north, near the Missouri river, trading peacefully furs for munitions with European traders. This allowed them to protect their lands aggressively against uninvited white and Indian intruders. Their neighbors, both white and Indian, resented the Osage violence and pride. According to Dunbar, they robbed and made war on everybody. Thus for the U.S. government, the Osages, and in particular the Arkansas Osages, were the most dangerous and the greatest challenge to the federal government in the region.³¹

Yet despite the potential dangers, Dunbar went ahead with preparations for an expedition. He asked a fellow American for precise information on the Red River, notably if the Indians dwelling up the river were inimical to white visitors.³² Jefferson took seriously the reports about the warring activities of the splinter group of the Osages in present Arkansas and Oklahoma. He feared that they would impede the expedition up the Arkansas River. Consequently, he postponed the trip. It is true that Jefferson and Dunbar also had some apprehensions about possible Spanish resistance, but the main reason for the postponement was the Indian danger.

Dunbar was not, however, to be deterred. He informed Jefferson he had decided instead to make an excursion up a tributary of the Red River, the Washita River, in American territory. His hope was that the party would meet hunters capable of providing useful information about the regions high up the western rivers. This would convince Congress to make liberal provisions for the Red and Arkansas Rivers expedition the following year.³³ Notwithstanding

rumors that the Indians were adopting a threatening posture at the instigation of officials at the Spanish post at Nacogdoches, on the Sabine River, Dunbar and Hunter set off on October 16, 1804. Rather surprisingly, Dunbar believed the rumor improbable "while the Marqués de Casa Calvo remains in New Orleans."³⁴ He definitively mistrusted the Marqués but was seemingly not suspicious of other Spanish officials stationed in other outposts of stirring trouble on the border. It remains unclear if Dunbar was being disbelieving, foolhardy or was just misinformed.

The exploration party returned to Natchez at the end of January 1805. Dunbar was rather disappointed with his trial run up the Washita. Still he did admit that the hot springs on the river, about which he had information before leaving, were indeed a great natural curiosity. Likewise, the discovery of a species of mountain dwarf cabbage was noteworthy.³⁵ Between February and July 1805, Dunbar wrote Jefferson a series of letters containing parts of his journal with above all calculations and maps. The president forwarded the information to other scientists and government officials. He also sent the Dunbar information, plus Captain Lewis's notes of the Missouri to Fort Mandan, and his map of the country watered by the Missouri and Columbia, to the cartographer Nicholas King, who would enter the data in a general map of the west.³⁶

Dunbar's finished journals arrived in Washington a year before Lewis and Clark ended their expedition, hence providing Jefferson with a first idea of the recently acquired territory. Besides completing the first scientific mapping of the Washita and its confluences, Dunbar and Hunter described the population of the region, which consisted of an active European and American presence. They also identified animal and plant life of the Washita River Valley. Even though the Dunbar-Hunter expedition in no way rivaled the scope and detail of the Lewis and Clark exploration, it resulted in the first complete account of a part of southwest Louisiana. And its major contribution was the astronomical and directional observations it collected which helped to draw accurate period maps.

The Freeman-Custis expedition: preparations

Dunbar knew that the Washita trial run was only the preparation for another exploration of much greater importance.³⁷ Because of his age and family engagements, Dunbar declined to lead the Grand Expedition up the Red and Arkansas Rivers.³⁸ Yet he was the main organizer of what is known as the Freeman-Custis expedition. As from July 1805, Dunbar and Jefferson corresponded copiously, notably on ways of improving the measurement of longitude. They wanted to experiment a method of ascertaining longitude with only one instrument, instead of two, without the aid of a time-keeper. The idea was to measure more rapidly and accurately.

Measuring longitudes, however, was not the main problem Dunbar and Jefferson had to resolve. Spanish hostile presence in the region was a more urgent issue. The first difficulty was the large settlement under Spanish jurisdiction at Bayou Pierre, 50 miles up the Red River. Dunbar feared that Spanish troops would be employed to oppose any public expedition. Yet he thought it probable that private adventurers could pass unnoticed.³⁹ Secondly, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn foresaw that if the expedition went to the source of the Red River, the exploration party would be at a small distance from the stronghold of the Spanish Provincias Internas at Santa Fe (in present New Mexico). He believed that the party risked being detained if they advanced too near the Spanish.⁴⁰

Contrary to what Dearborn assumed, the Red River would take the party nowhere near Santa Fe. And this was a major geographical misconception. Based on the cartography of the time, Jefferson presupposed that the Red River, like other rivers, had its headwaters in mountains, in this case the Southern Rockies. But the truth was that the Red River headed to a remote tableland known as El

Llano Estacado. The exploration party would have ended its journey in the middle of nowhere, instead of the Spanish Rockies and the heartland of trading possibilities with the Indians.⁴¹

Despite all these warnings, Jefferson was determined to go ahead. For him, the Red River exploration would allow the United States to contact the numerous Indian inhabitants in Spanish Louisiana, a first concrete step Americans would be taking to realize the president's ambition that "our multiplication will expand itself beyond those limits, and cover the whole northern, if not the southern continent."⁴² In other words, it would be a first move toward American settlement of the province.

Yet given the tension between the United States and Spain, Jefferson wanted to ensure that Americans could trade with the Indians of the Red River, notably the Arkansas and the Panis, with Spanish permission. So Jefferson wrote Governor Claiborne to ask the Marqués de Casa Calvo to issue a passport for the exploration team. In return Jefferson offered to allow a person or two appointed by the Marqués to join the party. This would be the proof that the expedition was merely scientific.⁴³ According to the president, the object of the expedition was to obtain geographical and other information, equally useful to the Spanish and American governments.⁴⁴

Surprisingly, Casa Calvo, acting on his own initiative, agreed to grant the passport. But under pressure from the Commandant of the Provincias Internas Nemecio Salcedo, Casa Calvo had to withdraw his offer.⁴⁵ Consequently, Dunbar suggested the government abandon the ascension of the Red River as the party would undoubtedly be stopped by the Spaniards. Instead he proposed that the expedition should go up the Arkansas River, but this was to be kept "a profound secret." In fact, Dunbar's plan was to make Spain believe the exploration was traveling up the Red River, when in fact the Americans would be ascending the Arkansas River unhindered as both the source and the mouth of the river lay in

the Louisiana territory. Of course, all this depended on the Americans' ability to conciliate the friendship of the Osages living on the Arkansas River.⁴⁶

Yet Jefferson took no heed. He decided to confine the expedition to the ascent of the Red River to its source, and to descend the same river again. And his main argument was that the portage from the head of the Red River to that of the Arkansas River was too difficult. Secondly, the seceding Osages posed a serious threat to exploration parties of white men up the Arkansas River.⁴⁷ The Red River expedition headed by young Irish-American surveyor Thomas Freeman and medical student Peter Custis set off in April 1806, without the passport. As Dunbar had predicted, the Spaniards intercepted them on July 29 at the "Spanish Bluff," a short distance from the present Oklahoma state line. The Americans were menaced but not injured. They turned back and headed to Fort Adams, from where they had departed.

It is clear that the Dunbar-Hunter expedition and the Freeman-Custis expedition were quite different from the Lewis and Clark exploration. Not only did they differ in length and amount of discoveries but most importantly they were distinct in their conception and hence their nature. When Jefferson referred to the exploration of the Red and Arkansas Rivers as being scientific endeavors, he was interested above all in the geographical discoveries the explorers would report back to him. Jefferson's expectations were focused on the useful geographical knowledge he needed to determine boundaries between the Spanish empire and the United States, notably to ascertain U.S. possession of the disputed territories such as West Florida and part of Texas.

Another distinct characteristic of these forgotten expeditions is the way geographical information was collected. The Spanish government paid Americans to survey regions of the southwest Louisiana territory. On the other hand, Jefferson offered the possibility of allowing Spaniards or persons named

by the Spanish government to be part of the American exploration team up the Red River. The aim of this cooperation on the ground was at best to make all geographical knowledge available to Spain and the United States. At worst cooperation turned to spying and collaborators became double agents. The best known was General James Wilkinson.

It is also worth making a point of the selective use Jefferson made of the information Dunbar and others provided him with. Despite Dunbar's warnings against the Spaniards, Jefferson took little notice, as the failure of the Freeman-Custis would seem to confirm. And further proof of his disregard for military and strategic information on the Spanish enemy is Jefferson's decision to allow General Wilkinson organize the Zebulon Pike expedition, which ran into deeper trouble with the Spaniards than the Freeman-Custis one did. This would seem to indicate that Jefferson did not perceive Spain as a real threat to his expansionist project.

Neither did Jefferson seem to believe that his southwest explorations would provoke a major diplomatic incident. He knew that Spain had become an ally of Napoleonic France in her war with Great Britain, and that in exchange, the Spaniards were counting on the French to defend them, notably against British naval power in the Atlantic. Consequently, Spain was in a rather weak position if she ever envisaged asking the British to support her claims in the American continent. In sum, this is no longer the alarmist Jefferson of the 1790s, who (genuinely) feared a war with Spain. Jefferson was, on the contrary, much more alarmed at the Indian threat. The Indian nations, more or less warlike, more or less united, could seriously jeopardize American territorial occupation and expansionist thrust. And this was certainly a scenario Jefferson wanted to avoid.

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NOTES

¹ Jefferson to Dunbar, May 25, 1805. *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*. Ed. Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh. Washington D. C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903, XI, 74.

² Flores, Dan L. Ed. *Southern Counterpart to Lewis & Clark. The Freeman & Custis Expedition of 1806*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984, 77-80.

³ DeConde, Alexander. *This Affair of Louisiana*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976, 38-40.

⁴ TJ to Stuart, January 25, 1786. *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, V, 259-60.

⁵ "Report relative to negotiations with Spain to secure free navigation of the Mississippi, and a port on the same". *Ibid.*, III, 187. In a letter to the American envoy to Madrid William Carmichael, Jefferson dismissed the idea of the Spanish envoy Gardoqui, who believed that the United States only demanded free navigation of the Mississippi to quiet the western settlers, whereas the Eastern states did not really desire it. TJ to Charmicael, April 11, 1791. *Ibid.*, VIII, 176.

⁶ TJ to William Short, March 19, 1791. *Ibid.*, III, 149-50.

⁷ TJ to William Carmichael, August 2, 1790. *Ibid.*, VIII, 73.

⁸ TJ to James Madison, June 23, 1793. *Ibid.*, XI, 139.

⁹ TJ to William Short, November 24, 1791. *Ibid.*, VIII, 258-9.

¹⁰ Negotiations between the Spanish envoy Diego de Gardoqui and Secretary of Foreign Affairs State John Jay to reach an agreement on navigation of the river had failed. In 1794 the United States and Great Britain signed a treaty - the Jay Treaty- by which the navigation of the whole Mississippi was declared free to the Americans and British. Both nations agreed to support each other in persuading Spain to recognize the free navigation of the river. Indeed, a year later, Spain did grant the United States the right to navigate freely the lower Mississippi when both nations signed the Pinckney Treaty. Bemis, Samuel Flagg. *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (1936). New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1955, 78, 102-4.

¹¹ TJ to George Washington, September 9, 1792. *Ibid.*, VIII, 394-5.

¹² TJ to Charmichael and Short, May 1, 1793. *Ibid.*, IX, 101-3.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ DeConde, Alexander. *This Affair of Louisiana*, 54, 59-60.

¹⁵ TJ to George Washington, September 9, 1792. *Writings*, VIII, 394-5.

¹⁶ Bemis, Samuel F. *The Diplomatic History*, 105-6.

¹⁷ TJ to Robert Livingston, April 18, 1802. *Writings*, X, 311-13.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ As early as 1794, the Spanish realized that Great Britain was unable or unwilling to help them defend both their nation in Europe and their North American possessions. On July 22, 1795, Spain signed a secret treaty with France by which the Spanish deserted the British and declared peace with France. And in August 1796, Spain and France allied in the Treaty of San Ildefonso against Great Britain. DeConde, Alexander. *This Affair of Louisiana*, 59-63.

²⁰ TJ to James Monroe, January 13, 1803. *Ibid.*, X, 344-5.

²¹ In exchange for Louisiana, Napoleon would deliver a kingdom in Italy for the duke of Parma. He also promised King Carlos IV, though not in writing, that France would neither sell, give or otherwise dispose of Louisiana. DeConde, Alexander. *This Affair of Louisiana*, 95.

²² Fourth Annual Message, November 8, 1804. *Ibid.*, III, 368.

²³ Berry, Trey, Beasley, Pam, Clements, Jeanne. *The Forgotten Expedition, 1804-1805. The Louisiana Purchase Journals of Dunbar and Hunter*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006, xvi-xx.

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- ²⁴ Dunbar Rowland, ed. *Life, Letters and Papers of William Dunbar*. Jackson: Press of the Mississippi Historical Society, 1930, 78-81, 132.
- ²⁵ Daniel Clark of New Orleans was a former clerk in the office of the Spanish governor and a long-time intermediary between Spain and the American general James Wilkinson. Flores, Dan L. Ed. *Southern Counterpart to Lewis & Clark. The Freeman & Custis Expedition of 1806*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984, 29.
- ²⁶ Dunbar Rowland. ed. *Life, Letters and Papers*, 123.
- ²⁷ TJ to Dunbar, March 18, 1804. *Writings*, IX, 23.
- ²⁸ *Documents Relating to The Purchase & Exploration of Louisiana*. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1904, 27, 37-9.
- ²⁹ Another reason the Spaniards were wary about Americans exploring the Red River was that if ever there was a war with the United States, Americans could go up the river to attack the Spanish Provincias Internas. Flores, Dan L. ed. *Southern Counterpart to Lewis and Clark*, 25-30.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 131-2
- ³¹ DuVal, Kathleen. "Debating Identity, Sovereignty, and Civilization. The Arkansas Valley after the Louisiana Purchase." *Journal of the Early Republic*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 26 (Spring 2006), 30-33.
- ³² Dunbar to Walker, June 10, 1804. *Writings*, 137.
- ³³ Dunbar to TJ, August 18, 1804. *Ibid.*, 139-40.
- ³⁴ Dunbar to TJ, October 14, 1804. *Ibid.*, 141.
- ³⁵ Dunbar to TJ, undated. *Ibid.*, 142.
- ³⁶ TJ to Dunbar, January 12, 1806. *Ibid.*, 188-9.
- ³⁷ Dunbar to TJ, March 16, 1805. *Ibid.*, 147.
- ³⁸ Dunbar to TJ, December 17, 1805. *Ibid.*, 187.
- ³⁹ Dunbar to Dearborn, May 4, 1805. *Ibid.*, 149-50.
- ⁴⁰ Dearborn to Dunbar, March 25, 1805. *Ibid.*, 151.
- ⁴¹ Flores, Dan L. ed. *Southern Counterpart to Lewis and Clark*, XV.
- ⁴² TJ to James Monroe, November 24, 1801. *Ibid.*, X, 296.
- ⁴³ TJ to Dunbar. May 25, 1805. Dunbar Rowland. *Life, Letters and Papers*, 175.
- ⁴⁴ Dearborn to Dunbar. May 24, 1805. *Ibid.*, 153.
- ⁴⁵ Flores, Dan L. ed. *Southern Counterpart to Lewis and Clark*, 72.
- ⁴⁶ Dunbar to Dearborn, February 25, 1806. *Ibid.*, 330.
- ⁴⁷ TJ to Dunbar, May 25, 1805. *Ibid.*, 174.