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INTRODUCTION

Ungrateful offspring on one hand, unnatural and tyrannical parent on the other - the United States and Great Britain retain in their relationship something of the love/hate quality characteristic of family ties. In choosing as the topic of its 1985 colloquium (held at the Château de la Source on the 27th and 28th of September) "US and GB: How Far? How Close?" the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Culture Anglo-Américaine de l'Université d'Orléans was inviting the participants to analyze the nature of the "double bind" that has linked the two nations over the past two hundred years. The present publication, edited by the Groupe de Recherches Anglo-Américaines de Tours, contains a number of papers given on that occasion - marking in this manner the continuation of a policy of cooperation between (to extend the family metaphor) the two sister universities, a policy inaugurated by the establishment in 1985 of a doctoral program run jointly by Tours, Orléans and Le Mans.

How far? How close? But with what sort of a yardstick does one go about measuring the distance between two cultures? It would seem that three sorts of measuring are at work. The first is the very act of registering similarities and differences; before any explanatory schema comes into play the process of comparing and contrasting exercizes its fascination, each culture acquiring its distinctiveness by what it seems to have left out as well as by what it contains. This approach appeals to the eye (the cut of a figure, the lay of the land) and to the ear; its privileged locus is the voyage abroad. The second measuring attempts to weigh influence, to assign origins, to assess the degree of domination that one country exercizes over another. The issues in this case are those of relative strength, of precedence in chronological terms, of model and

imitation. The tone is more combative; imperialism and resistance are the opposing poles of the debate. The third aspect is more complex since it introduces the dimension of the collective imagination: the *idea* that one culture forms of another and the ways in which this image functions within the given society to reinforce the sense of its own identity. Here we deal with expectations, projections, and (inevitably) with misinterpretations - in short, with the ways in which differences are managed and lived. The papers in this volume, wide-ranging in terms of focus, touch on all three of these modes of taking stock of distance.

The first three contributions trace the relationship an individual figure (British in each case) and a culture (American). Richard Martin chronicles Matthew Arnold's aversion for the United States, the "immense Victorian condescension" with which he approached a nation mired (already) in a midriff culture. If Arnold's voyage to America did little to change his mind it is because of his prior assumption that democracy and culture were (in Martin's words) "antithetical elements in an unwilling dialogue." Not even Emerson escaped Arnold's strictures; yet in the very terms that the Englishman used to criticize the American thinker Martin detects a reluctant admission of likeness that belies the initial distaste. Jean-Paul Pichardie evokes quite a different America, D.H. Lawrence's "continent of the soul" that served as grounds for the projection of his many-sided desires. We are struck by the constantly shifting richness of these imaginary explorations in which intense internal struggle, utopian social currents, and religious imagery vie for ascendancy. The promise of the New World is incorporated into a highly complex mythology, at once cosmic and personal, a mythology of excess and hyperbole, a mythology to which Lawrence committed his whole being but which ended by terrifying him. Françoise Marquerlot's concerns are of another order; convinced of the underservedness of Herbert Spencer's reputation in the United States, she first challenges the very notion of "social darwinism" which cannot be considered as referring to a coherent body of doctrine since from the start it has been used in exclusively polemical terms; and she then invites us to set aside caricatural images of Spencer as the father of a philosophy of unbridled capitalism and to read his works with a new eye.

Jean-Claude Sergeant's paper, tracing the evolution of the Anglo-American dialogue in the domain of politics and defense serves as an excellent introduction to the contemporary problems that the major portion of this volume will deal with. His analysis lays bare the fragility of the concept of a "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain, concept that is repeatedly sacrificed once the political and military chips are down. Yet his reading of the Anglo-American dialogue also reveals the strategic uses to which this "convenient myth" is put, and its central role in the history of understanding - and misunderstanding - between the two nations. The two papers that follow deal with business and economic policy. Françoise Pavlopoulos ("Le Monde des Affaires au Royaume Uni et aux USA") finds that despite the apparent contrasts between American dynamism and British laggardness (contrasts, which, she points out, require considerable qualification) there exists an underlying "economic complicity" within which both systems operate, herald perhaps of a new world economic order. Christopher Leeds focuses on governmental policies, on those economic doctrines made up of right-wing belief in the virtues of market forces and the rationality of monetary theory personalized by political leaders in the two countries as Reagonomics and Thatcherism. Although more than aware of the differences in the political and social contexts in which these two doctrines evolved, he nonetheless argues their essential similarity, one proof of which he notes - with what an American would characterize as a British sense of irony - is that neither produced the expected results! The statistics that Robert Tatham brings to bear on the question of American influence on British broadcasting are all the more welcome in that he has first taken pains to distinguish three separate areas - broadcasting policy, financial investment, and programming. If his conclusions are guardedly optimistic (American interests have not swamped British broadcasting) it is not only because there exists in England a healthy preference for financial and cultural autonomy, but because, as his analysis brings out, safeguards against takeover were early on built into the system. The lesson is a timely one.

The examination of British-American crosscurrents ends on a comparative analysis of police practices. How were the guardians of order in the two countries to reply to the challenge of the 1960s characterized on both sides of the Atlantic by the emergence of militant ethnic urban communities intent on claiming their rights, and the demand from the majority for more crime repression? Roland Voize-Valayre analyzes how the British police, unwilling as yet to face up to changed conditions, have allowed professionalization and centralization to work to limit their community function, a function that paradoxically has been a traditional component of the bobby's performance. Outside pressures for reform will have little chance for success until the police themselves become convinced of the failure of their present policies. Laura Maslow-Armand is more sanguine about the American case. Black political strength in the cities has, after a period of hesitation, forced the choice of cooperation over that of confrontation; but the principle of local responsibility that has in recent years operated successfully to bring citizen and policeman together is not without its dangers. As public demands for reform ease off there may well remain within the country "an anarchical patchwork of varied police conduct."

How far? How close? The replies are as varied as the gamut of approaches here is broad. In the last analysis it is up to the reader to judge. Yet I think that throughout these papers we can detect - to twist a phrase used by Edmund Wilson as a title - the "shock of unrecognition." So much is assumed to be held in common by the two nations that share the same language and many of the same traditions, that the rifts when they do occur appear as sudden chasms. It is perhaps this passage from similarity taken for granted to startled awareness of difference (and back again) that best characterizes GB-US relations. (Are not family relations at once the most intimate and the most unstable?) Certainly the comparative perspective adopted in these papers enriches our understanding of what, for want of a better word, we could term the in-betweeness of two cultures. "Comparaison n'est pas raison," wrote Etiemble, but his is not the last word.

Following on "Protest and Punishment" and "Stratégies de la Métaphore," this volume is the third issue of the annual review G.R.A.A.T. launched in 1984 on the initiative of Pierre Gault. Our intention is to open our pages to a wider circle of participants - to encourage work on interdisciplinary topics and to serve as a sounding board for new themes and new approaches to the study of Anglo-American literature and culture. The next issue will be devoted to papers from the 1986 colloquium organized jointly by Tours and Orléans: "Le Sport en GB et aux USA: Faits, Signes et Métaphores."

In the preparation of this volume Ahmed Daraou, Maryvonne Menget, Andrée Shepherd and Jean-Paul Régis rendered valuable editorial assistance, and Annick Seigné has contributed bilingual typing skills - for all of which I am grateful.

John Atherton
Université de Tours

OPENING REMARKS

Dear friends and colleagues,

In the name of the ordeal our non-French-speaking foreign friends may possibly undergo in the following hours, I trust all present native academics will forgive me if I endeavor to address this meeting in English, and very briefly. These few words will be to welcome one and all in a city that was once famously freed from Great Britain by a diminutive and inspired virgin, and from which a much taller individual, but clearly no less imbued with a mystical sense of the hallowed nature of this land, of a bearing and disposition of mind no less heroic, saw fit to remove all remaining traces of American military presence in a period closer to this happy reunion. You may well think, of course, upon contemplating the center of our prospective interest for the coming two days, that all this goes to prove is that one, indeed, either never learns or never has enough. I would invite you rather to believe that a cordial disregard for boundaries and a craving for seamlessness is all that moved the collective responsible for this hopefully heated but altogether peaceful gathering.

You may recall that the original text announcing this colloquium - "The United States and Great Britain: How Far? How Close?" - voiced a genuine concern for such misunderstandings in such proximity. It may well be - and language here rears its fascinating and problematic mien once again - that my own difficulties with having been for years what has come to be called a "mid-atlantic" man, had something to do with such anxieties: a mere Frenchman trained in British English and dumped in the heart of the heart of the midwestern heartland at an eminently plastic age, I noticed that what twang it had

taken me all of two osmotic months to acquire had demanded six years of harrowing efforts to be gotten rid of; back on square one of British English with a view to meeting the requirements of the refined and excruciating rack we call Agrégation, I had no cease till I was in California and acquired yet another method for making myself misunderstood. Vituperated as a "Brit" or a "limey" as I taught in America, my masochism required that I should make all efforts to go back to England and become known to my Norfolk students as that "bloody Canadian." Happily, traces of seventeenth-century parlance left in these latter parts most recently helped me meet the challenge of Virginia mountains and backwoods speech. Due to the foreseeably renewed peregrinations I owe to an equal attachment to both strange places, the struggle, my friends, let me tell you, is far from over... "Franglais," compared with my predicament, is a problem solved.

The celebrated division of the United States from Great Britain by "a common ocean" has, therefore, more than a familiar ring to my sore ears and you may take this colloquium to be but quite a comprehensible expression of my desire not to remain too much alone for too long.

I hope, therefore, the following moments we shall have the pleasure to share with you, will make me understand either that I was all wrong and that what differences I had grown oversensitive to were pure paranoia on my part or that the basic schizophrenia of your traditional French "angliciste/americaniste" is indeed, and doubly, as one would naturally expect, "la chose du monde la mieux partagée" when it comes to making eagle's heads or lion's tails from cultures often considered as germane.

Bernard d'Hellencourt and Bernard Vincent, my very dear colleagues who helped make this meeting the unadulterated success it cannot fail to be, and myself, as well as the entirety of the English Department of this university welcome you and thank you for having found time in your busy schedules to prepare your thoughts, and more time, still, and energy, to come, sometimes from very far, and share them with us.

Even though most of the proposed papers are comparative in their structure, I hope we can concentrate our discussion of them somewhere on the space between two cultures which, by dint of some eerie continental drift of the mind, seem to grow every day further apart at the same time as their respective legacies get more intertwined. I mourn the absence of a British colleague who had every intention to deliver a paper explaining why there is no such thing as what we French are fond of calling an "anglo-saxon" but was unfortunately kept from coming over to enlighten us on this crucial issue.

Finally, I want to thank publicly the British Council, the University of Orléans and the Faculté des Lettres for the very kind support they gave us in this enterprise, a support without which you could not have come from *this far* to get *this close* and I could not have had the pleasure I now have in declaring this session open.

Marc Chenetier
Université d'Orléans

CULTURE AND DEMOCRACY
Matthew Arnold in America

RICHARD MARTIN

RHEINISCH-WESTFALISCHEN
TECHNISCHEN HOCHSCHULE (AACHEN)

"...one of the dudes of literature."
(Walt Whitman on Arnold[1])

When asked by his friend Traubel whether he considered using vellum as a material for the cover of his new book of poems, Walt Whitman is reported to have replied, "Vellum? pshaw! hangings, curtains, finger-bowls, chinaware, Matthew Arnold!"[2] The American poet's aversion to the English apostle of culture was deep-ingrained and of long standing; Traubel reported an earlier judgement,

> My own criticism of Arnold - the worst I could say of him - the severest... would be, that Arnold brings coals to Newcastle - that he brings to the world what the world already has a surfeit of: is rich, hefted, lousy, reeking, with delicacy, refinement, elegance, prettiness, propriety, criticism, analysis: all of them things which threaten to overwhelm us.[3]

If the American poet was deeply prejudiced against the English man of letters, so, too, had Arnold long made up his mind what was characteristic of America and the Americans. As early as 1848, he had remarked in connection with the Trafalgar Square riots of March of that year, that the behavior could be seen as a forewarning of "a wave of more than American vulgarity, moral, intellectual, and social, preparing to break over us."[4] Some years later, in a letter to his mother, Arnold reported with characteristic self-satisfaction and condescension:

> I have just seen an American, a great admirer of mine, who says that the three people he

> wanted to see in Europe were James Martineau, Herbert Spencer, and myself. His talk was not as our talk, but he was a good man.[5]

In the clash of cultures already indicated, Arnold plays the role of the prototype of the cultivated British visitor to the United States - the first in a long line of self-appointed cultural missionaries crossing the Atlantic out of a multitude of highly heterogeneous motives.

My title is a hardly disguised reference to Arnold's most famous prose work, *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), and it is in the preface to that volume that we find one of his favorite prejudices formulated, some fourteen years before he was to set foot on American soul. Referring to Ernest Renan, Arnold writes,

> When he says that America, that chosen home of newspapers and politics, is without general intelligence, we think it likely, from the circumstances of the case, that this is so; and that, in the things of the mind, and in culture and totality, America, instead of surpassing us all, falls short (*Culture and Anarchy*, p. 19).[6]

It is here sufficient to note the contrasting of journalism and intelligence, politics and culture to be aware of the parameters of Arnold's criticism of America. A nation producing the means to disseminate widely, to a vast public, the news and opinions of the day and possessing democratic institutions of government is unlikely to be in possession of that "sweetness and light" which Arnold so championed and advocated. Here the antithesis to Whitman becomes apparent and serves to illustrate my central thesis: for Arnold there existed an inevitable conflict between democratic principles in action and the equally active pursuit and progress of culture.

Although America was for him in 1882, a year before his first visit, still an uncivilized land - "as we in England have to transform our civilization, so America has hers still to make" (1953, 6) - Arnold formulated in his article, "A Word About America" the phrase that he was to repeat later to describe the people of the United States: "the English on the other side of the Atlantic" (1953, 2). This remarkable naiveté served as the facade for Arnold's immense Victorian condescension to a people about whom he felt he needed no further in-

formation to assist him in formulating judgements. As Lionel Trilling pointed out,

> Arnold had always been ready for America: almost too ready. America had been for him a symbol and at times an obsession [...] He knew what America was - raw and conceited and vulgar and grasping and dull and commercial and Philistine and prostrate before bunkum.[7]

The approaching encounter between Arnold and the New World was, however, not one-sidedly prepared for; as Trilling also observed, "America knew what Arnold was [...] He was culture and he was suspicion of democracy; he was amenity, urbanity, the Church of England and aristocratic manners."[8] The conflict of personalities and views was to symbolize, to a great extent, the imminent clash between the rights of the masses and the entrenched cultural privileges of the elite.

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Arnold arrived in New York with his wife and elder daughter in October 1883 to be met by Andrew Carnegie and immediately carried off, first to a hotel, then to clubs and homes, and so off on a commercially sponsored lecture tour which would last for the next four months. In his first letter home, Arnold noted "the blaring publicity of this place", which he found to be "beyond all that I had any idea of" (1901,258). From this first moment of arrival Arnold was to be involved in a running conflict with the American press - which, as the remark in the preface to *Culture and Anarchy* had indicated, he wholeheartedly despised. The *Inter-Ocean* of October 24, 1883 fired one of the earliest salvoes:

> Mr. Arnold is vastly over-rated. He is an example of that extremely intellectual culture which produces imitation rather than originality [...] He may be able to go back to England and tell them that that monarchical country is hundreds of years behind ours, and he will not overstep the truth.[9]

Arnold repeated three lectures during his tour: "Numbers" with which he opened in New York; "Literature and Science" - the only lecture he had previously given - and a

lecture on Emerson, which was written very largely on the voyage across the Atlantic and finished in New York. Arnold's first public appearance in Chickering Hall in New York was a dismal failure; he was not used to such large audiences, over 1200, nor was his voice trained to the situation, with the result that he was barely audible beyond the first five rows. As he himself wrote, with a mixture of wry acceptance and unshakeable composure: "I was badly heard, and many people were much disappointed; but they remained to the end, were perfectly civil and attentive, and applauded me when I had done" (1901, 264). The following weeks (November 5 to 27) were spent in New England, traveling from Boston to Newport, Dartmouth, Hartford, Worcester and back again to Boston for the first delivery of the Emerson lecture. Arnold soon expressed himself "bored by having to repeat my Literature and Science so often" (1901, 270), but on the whole he seemed satisfied both with himself and his audiences. His only criticisms were reserved for the American press and for the American devotion to activity and publicity. Of the latter he wrote, "I have seen no American yet, except Norton at Cambridge, who does not seem to desire constant publicity and to be on the go all day long." Whereas the excellence of his audiences are contrasted to the press which "seems to me at present an awful symptom" (1901, 267 & 271).

Since the lectures themselves will be discussed in some detail below, suffice it here to state that the initial delivery of the lecture on Emerson, on Emerson's home ground, in Boston, was to prove the touchstone of the whole tour. The lecture appeared, on the surface, to be a systematic demontage of the American writer, who was denied his claims to be a literary figure by the cultural apostle from England.

> The only event of great importance in Arnold's lecture tour of America was his lecture on Emerson in Boston [...] To the prejudiced Emersonian, Arnold's lecture must have seemed a process of whittling away all traces of Emerson's title to fame.[10]

Although there were those in Arnold's audience who were prepared to receive his remarks attentively and even sympathetically, the majority response was negative. Representative of

the reviews of the performance was the comment in the *Critic*: "His lecture on Emerson has utterly destroyed him in the sight of the good people of that quarter of the globe."[11] Although the *Boston Transcript* almost alone of the journals characterized the lecture as "an interesting and valuable piece of criticism," it modified this praise with the remark that it was "bereft of affectionate insight."[12] Arnold was to remain for the majority of Americans a cold fish, someone who did not and could not share in mass warmth, the democratic affection of the crowd. He himself accepted the resentment the lecture aroused, but defended himself in a letter to his sister Frances,

> Many here object to my not having praised Emerson all round, but that was impossible. I have given him praise which in England will be thought excessive, probably; but then I have a very, very deep feeling for him (1901, 277).

It is remarkable and worthy of note that Arnold was unable to convey this "deep feeling" to his audience - with, perhaps, characteristic Victorian distrust of revealing emotion? The contras between this private remark and the *Boston Transcript's* criticism of his public performance is indicative of the failure Arnold experienced in communicating to his American audience.

December was spent in a whirlwind round of engagements from Amherst, via Richmond, Virginia (the only part of the United States for which Arnold expressed wholehearted approval) to Washington, where he and his wife and daughter were presented to President Chester A. Arthur on Christmas Day; then back north to Philadelphia and Jersey City. If the itinerary alone is not sufficiently indicative of the rigours of Arnold's tour (in this, too, he was a staunch prototype of the European visiting lecturer to the United States), then maybe his own account of a typical stop on the way, his appearance at Andover, will serve to demonstrate the - in our times - recognizable pattern of the experiences of the European guest in American cultural circles.

> I was met at the station by a Professor Churchill, a very nice man, with whom I was to stay [...]

> At six we had tea - it was really dinner, only there were no liquors. Then I dressed, found the students waiting outside the door to escort me to the Lecture Hall [...] At the Hall I was again cheered, then I gave the lecture on Emerson, and was cheered again, then walked home, and a reception was held, with all Andover at it. "Glad to see you in our country sir, and to tell you how much I have enjoyed your works," is pretty much what everyone says. Scolloped oysters (with iced water and coffee) at eleven, when the people are gone; bed, called at seven, breakfast at eight with a party of professors and their wives - coffee, fruit, fish-balls, potatoes, hashed veal, and mince pies, with rolls and butter. Then I was driven to the station by Professor Churchill, introduced by him to a "leading citizen," who talked to me all the way to Boston, and am now writing to you (1901, 287).

The familiarity to late twentieth century ears lies in those stereotypical moments: the oft-heard remark, "Glad to see you in our country" coupled with the polite insincerity of "how much I have enjoyed your works;" and then the almost inevitable "leading citizen" whose impact upon the certainly exhausted Arnold is contained (in both senses of the word) in Arnold's unadorned statement, "talked to me all the way to Boston."

New Year 1884 found Arnold in upper New York State *en route* for Buffalo; his letter of January 18. to Miss Arnold records a significant moment which was to leave a lasting impression upon the English writer:

> I saw a sledge standing still on the snowy, frozen lake, with the horses half turned round, which struck me as the only picturesque thing I have seen in America; the people have even less of the artist feeling than we have (1901, 293).

Arnold's astonishing blindness to the natural beauties of America can only partially be accounted for by noting that he traveled much of the Eastern States in the depths of winter, often by train and, presumably, many times in the dark. Yet this singular impression of a lack of the "picturesque", which becomes synonymous with the interesting, was to remain with him in the years to come. One is tempted to speculate

that Arnold, who as we have seen had his opinion of cultural America well formed before his actual confrontation with the real thing, had also made up his mind that so vast a country either would be much more picturesque than he experienced it, or that it could not fail in this particular to be of less interest than his native England.

Nor did the cities fare any better under Arnold's scrutiny. Chicago, from which he wrote on January 23, was merely "a great uninteresting place of 600,000 inhabitants" (1901, 296); but then Chicago held a rather low opinion of Arnold, and its newspapers were to maintain a continual sniping action against him until after the termination of his visit. St Louis - the farthest point west that Arnold traveled - produced the smallest and least interested audiences that he was to experience, thus calling forth his reaction: "I begin to recognize the truth of what an American told the Bishop of Rochester, that 'Denver was not ripe for Mr. Arnold'" (1901, 298); suffice it here to note the sense of self-importance that Arnold innocently (?) injects into his observation. It was also during his stay in St. Louis that Arnold was to reduce the American city to a formula that he used several times in his accounts of the United States, which was to become a commonplace of his estimation of urban American civilization:

> St.Louis interests me very much; it is very dirty certainly, and in the buildings there is the want of anything beautiful which in all the American towns depresses me, but it is an old place, and a mixed place, and it looks like both of these, and escapes the profound *Gemeinheit* of the ordinary American city thereby (1901, 299).

The contrast between age and variety on the one hand and vulgarity (*Gemeinheit*) on the other is notable. Arnold demanded a Europeanization (tradition, history, a mixture of styles and cultures) that America was unable to offer; the result was a singular inflexibility and blindness on Arnold's part: a dismissal of scorn - *Gemeinheit*. Time and again in the letters from America the reader misses just that "affectionate insight" which the *Boston Transcript* had found lacking.

Arnold's stay in America came to an end at the beginning of March 1884; shortly before sailing from New York he

noted, "At the end of my stay in America [...] I feel myself utterly devoid of all disposition to write and publish my intuitions, clear or turbid" (1901, 307). Yet, as we shall see, it was not long before Arnold was putting pen to paper to do just this, to record not only his intuitions about the United States, but to express as well his severer judgements on that country.

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Before, however, passing on to Arnold's later publications on America, it is necessary to pay some regard to the lectures which he delivered there. In doing so, it will be my aim not so much to expose Arnold's thoughts as to see in the lectures an expression - which must have been clear to his audiences - of his natural predisposition to distrust democracy and thus to see culture in a democratic society as endangered.

Arnold's opening salvo in America was the lecture "Numbers; or, The Majority and the Remnant;"an essay which has been characterized by Howard Mumford Jones as "a pretty a piece of antidemocratic propaganda as one can possibly find, even today."[13] Arnold's basic thesis is that in any society the majority "lacks principle; it lacks persistence" (1885, 6-7). Thus, by extension, the hope for the survival of a society must be placed in the cultured minority, the remnant or elite. Arnold begins by examining Athenian society at the time of Plato and Israelite society at the time of Isaiah and comes to the conclusion that the minorities in those societies, themselves very small, were too small to achieve success. From this he develops his idiosyncratic political theory - already familiar from earlier essays such as "Equality" - concerning the qualities in a society which guarantee its survival: "Having in mind things true, things elevated, things just, things pure, things amiable [...] is what saves States" (1885, 32). This metaphorically framed conviction is coupled in Arnold's though with what he himself refers to as "the hard doctrine of the unsoundness of the majority" (1885, 56), which, if not resolutely

combated by the minority will result in the decay and destruction of society. Arnold's remarks then focus upon America:

> In a democratic community like this [...] the danger is in the absence of the discipline of respect; in hardness and materialism, exaggeration and boastfulness; in a false smartness, a false audacity, a want of soul and delicacy (1885, 68).

It is almost astonishing that Arnold's audiences did not walk out on him in protest for his patronizing condemnation of their society. That they did not is due to the fact that on the one hand his audiences were inured to the condemnations of evangelical preachers, and on the other that they were composed in the main of that very remnant, that elite, whose praises he was studiously singing.

In the closing paragraphs of "Numbers", Arnold reveals himself to be an early propounder of the 20th century doctrine of the supremacy of WASP-culture when he justifies his faith in the American minority. This he praises for its Anglo-German origins and its sound tradition of Puritan discipline. He concluded his lecture on the hopeful note that since America was such a large society, correspondingly it must have a large remnant and thus its hopes for future survival could be secure.

The second lecture, "Literature and Science", was the one his audiences liked best, but it was also the best known since it had been delivered at Cambridge University as the Rede Lecture and was given in America by popular request. Nor need it take up too much of our time here. In its defence of a humanistic education against the increased introduction of scientific and technological subjects into the broad educational curriculum, it is, of course, a subtle and concealed attack on the accomplishments of the newer democratic, practical society of the United States. The conclusion is well known but may be repeated here as illustrative of a general tendency in Arnold's thought.

> A poor humanist may possess his soul in patience, neither strive nor cry, admit the energy and brilliancy of the partisans of physical science, and their present favour with the public, to be far greater than his own, and still have a happy faith that the

> nature of things works silently on behalf of the studies which he loves, and that, while we shall all have to acquaint ourselves with the great results reached by modern science, and to give ourselves as much training in its disciplines as we can conveniently carry, yet the majority of men will always require humane letters (1885, 136-137).

Arnold, while appearing to admonish his audience, is in fact merely enunciating his own belief, the faith of the "poor humanist" ('poor' only as a rhetorical device), in the desire of the majority of men "for humane letters," that is, for literary culture. Two points may be made here: first, it is Arnold's despised majority that is shown with this saving hunger for a culture based traditionally upon literature; and second, Arnold's argument stands or falls on the subtle transformation of an article of faith into an observation of a true state of social affairs. It is this second feature that characterizes so much of Arnold's activity in America. He was possessed of the doubtful ability to transform personal belief into universal truth whenever it suited his own line of argument. It is this which convinces him that his pre-formed judgement of America rests on empirical foundations and which also informs the majority of his statements about his own conception of a probable democratic society.

The lecture on Emerson does not, at first reading, appear to fit into the pattern which emerges from an analysis of the other two pieces. Arnold would seem to be concerned to redraw the configurative lines of the traditional image of Emerson dominant in America at the time; what in fact emerges, however, apart from a further ambush of America's image of itself, is Arnold's (un?)conscious effort to justify his own position and to ally himself with the great American sage.

Arnold begins by recalling the great voices of his student days at Oxford: Newman, Carlyle, by way of Carlyle, Goethe, and, finally, Emerson. However, he announces the need to question youthful judgements and his own intention to attempt a revaluation of Emerson. He proceeds to quote an American critic, who had claimed for Emerson the distinction of having

contributed some fifty to sixty passages of poetry to the general fund of the English language in the form of memorable quotations. After citing the counter-examples of Shakespeare, Milton and Gray, Arnold opens up his "attack":

> And in truth, one of the legitimate poets, Emerson, in my opinion, is not. His poetry is interesting, it makes one think; but it is not the poetry of one of the born poets. [...] Emerson's poetry is seldom either simple, or sensuous, or impassioned. In general it lacks directness; it lacks concreteness; it lacks energy (1885, 153-154).

What is interesting about Arnold's final judgement is that he chooses those qualities of poetry most likely to appeal to a young, materialistic society: directness, concreteness, and energy, so that by showing their absence in Emerson he can at the same time as calling his qualities as a poet in question, more particularly throw doubts on his qualifications to be a significant American poet (in the sense, say, that Whitman was).

Arnold, having dismissed Emerson as a poet goes further, "I do not place him among the great writers, the great men of letters [...] writers whose prose is true and sound" (1885, 159-160). Once again it is those particularly puritanical and American qualities which are disallowed Emerson: truth and soundness. One might in addition note at this point the characteristically Victorian ring of that adjective 'sound;' it was typical of Victorians and twentieth century post-Victorians to label anything of which they disapproved, from religious doctrine or practice to politics or views on art, 'unsound' - lacking contact with the solidly real.

To the titles which are stripped from Emerson - poet, man of letters, great writer - is added, finally, that of "a great philosophical writer" (1885, 169). Arnold dismisses Emerson's *English Traits*, too, by comparing it to Montaigne, La Bruyère and Addison while citing Hawthorne as a truly first-rate American writer. What, may we (and no doubt Arnold's audience) ask, is left? It is at this point that the self-referential in Arnold's lecture becomes apparent.

We have not in Emerson a great poet, a great

> writer, a great philosophy-maker. His relation to us is not that of one of those personages; yet it is a relation of, I think, even superior importance. His relation to us is more like that of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius [...] he is the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit (1885, 178-179).

Arnold gives himself away in the brief parenthesis "I think", which retards the flow of his discourse and has the typical function of the rhetorical pause, or hesitation, of drawing particular attention to what follows, while at the same time indelibly linking the speaker to the opinion about to be articulated. For, on consideration, it is surely, Arnold himself who is characterized in the invocation of Marcus Aurelius; Arnold who is "the friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit;" Arnold it is, who throughout his life in his role of cultural critic was continually emphasizing "sweetness and light" and who emerges as the champion of the higher virtues. Arnold's demontage of Emerson, the hero of his own youth, becomes a reconstruction of Emerson, so that Arnold can finally praise him for resembling his maturer self.

In conclusion, Arnold invokes another American, Benjamin Franklin, whom he links to Emerson, seeing in the pair "the most distinctively and honourably American of your writers" (1885, 205). The reason given for this approval is that between them in their optimistic confidence, Franklin and Emerson support the twin ideologies of happiness through work and honesty, and happiness through the life in the spirit. For Arnold they appear to epitomize those twin poles of Christian doctrine: salvation through works and salvation through faith - so familiar to the Victorian consciousness and so embattled.

However much Arnold's lecture on Emerson may have enraged the Emersonians, it emerges as a true document of Victorian England and a piece of fascinatingly involved reasoning, in which Arnold finally justifies his own mission to America. He reveals his own view of himself as a traveller with an almost messianic vocation: the salvation of mass-society, democratic America by a recall to the traditional virtues and values of a cultured and temperate society. Yet, as

critics have noted[14] the missionary task remained largely unaccomplished, the messianic visitor unacknowledged. It was thus, perhaps, that Arnold's writings on America were to continue from a position of a certain bitterness.

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"A Word More About America" (1885), which, echoing the title of Arnold's 1882 essay, belies the impression Arnold gave on leaving the United States of an unwillingness to transform into print his intuitions, adds surprisingly little to the views expressed in the earlier piece. He reiterates his belief that Americans are "at bottom the same people as ourselves" and that they are "plain, decent middle class" in their ideas and morals (1953, 27 & 30). For all that is new in Arnold's critique, he might never have visited the country in the interim between the two essays.

It took a second look at the United States to prompt Arnold to more forthright statements and to further excursions into print. The second visit he paid to America in 1886, a visit of a brief and private nature to see his daughter Lucy who had married and settled down in Massachusetts, although outwardly calm and uneventful seemed to have served to reinforce many of Arnold's biasses. He writes of Carnegie, whose vast steel works in Pittsburgh he had visited in early July, that he

> and most Americans are simply unaware that nothing in the book [Carnegie's *Triumphant Democracy*] touches the capital defect of life over here: namely, that compared with life in England it is so uninteresting, so without savour and without depth. Do they think to prove that it must have savour and depth by pointing to the number of public libraries, schools and places of worship? (1901, 396).

We are reminded of Arnold's dismissal of the picturesque on the occasion of his earlier visit, but here his criticism goes deeper. It is, of course, significant that the object of his criticism is a book in praise of American democracy; this alone is Arnold's excuse for picking up once again the theme of

numbers. Mere quantity can never, for Arnold, be regarded as a justification in itself. Not a number of libraries, or schools, or churches is of interest to him but their excellence. It is this that is iterated in a letter to his friend Charles Eliot Norton towards the end of this second stay:

> *Das Gemeine* is the American danger, and a few and good secondary schools and universities, setting a high standard, are what you seem to me to want, rather than a multitude of institutions which their promoters delude themselves by taking seriously, but which no serious person can so take (1901, 403).

It is not a question of whether Arnold was right or wrong in his criticism (and who knows what sentiments he would have uttered if faced with the multiplication of institutions in present-day America); rather it is of importance to realize that all his negative observations of America have their root in a deep-seated distrust of what he felt democracy potentially to be: the rule of an uncultivated mass. Once again it is the vulgar (*das Gemeine*) which characterizes the threat to America - a principle which might also be expressed as the great levelling out, which must have been anathema to Arnold, who was unashamed in his propagation of the elite.

The product of this second visit and of Arnold's closing years was "Civilization in America" (1888). In summary this essay repeats most of Arnold's by now familiar charges: America is uninteresting, lacks distinguished men, its few cultivated individuals tend to ignore the true faults of their country, America is largely still lacking in civilization. Since so many of the criticisms are now familiar I shall forbear to quote them once again, even in the revised formulation. Rather, let us concentrate on Arnold's brief but summary diagnosis of the root of all the weaknesses of American society. He expresses it in a passage dealing with the lack of distinguished men in American public life:

> The Americans have produced plenty of men, strong, shrewd, upright, able, effective; very few who are highly distinguished [...] Lincoln is shrewd, sagacious, humourous, honest, courageous, firm; he is a man with qualities deserving the most sincere esteem and praise, but he has not distinction. In truth everything is against distinction in America [...] The glorification of 'the average man', who is quite a religion with statesmen and publicists there, is against it (1953, 56).

The condescension towards and the attack upon Lincoln is characteristic; not only does Arnold choose a "folk hero" to disprove the distinction of great Americans, but Lincoln is also quite clearly associated with the scorned "average man." Here then, in Arnold's eyes, is the root of all American evils. The basic principle of democracy, the assertion of equality, strikes at the very heart of Arnoldian cultural elitism. Thus, by the final phase of Arnold's dealings with the United States, culture and democracy have become antithetical elements in an unwilling dialogue. It is in this context that Arnold delights in quoting a favorite phrase from Michelet which appears in several places in his writings on America, "*la dure inintelligence des Américains du Nord*" (1953, 63).

Yet in spite of this totally negative view of America relieved only by his admission that there are plenty of "cultivated, judicious, delightful individuals there" (1953, 62) - Arnold, almost prophetically, points to the importance of the United States to England in the future:

> To us, too, the future of the United States is of incalculable importance. Already we feel their influence, and we shall feel it more. We have a good deal to learn from them; we shall find in them, also, many things to beware of, many points in which it is to be hoped our democracy may not be like theirs. As our country becomes more democratic, the malady here may no longer be that we have an upper class materialized, a middle class vulgarized, and a lower class brutalized. But he predominance of the common and ignoble, born of the predominance of the average man is a malady too (1953, 64).

The classification of the predominance of the average man as a malady of society reveals an alarming tendency in Arnold to generalize and polemicize. Having reiterated his familiar diagnosis of British society (first formulated in the lecture-essay on "Equality") with his characterization of the three

classes in a state of degeneracy, Arnold rightly, perhaps, states that such a society is sick. But to transfer this diagnosis unthinkingly to a different set of symptoms is at least unscientific and, for Arnold surely, illogical. This step in his reasoning reveals clearly the Arnoldian dilemma. He is aware of the development of nineteenth century English society in the direction of a form of democracy which, as a patriotic and sensitive Englishman, he feels bearable if dangerous. He has personally experienced another form of democracy, the American, where the process of establishment has been comparatively rapid and accompanied by unprecedented material growth and increase in wealth. Arnold detects many of the ingredients of the American context in English society and immediately jumps to the conclusion that England could easily develop in the same way as the United States. To link the futures of the two nations in such a way is typical of sets of attitudes developed in England and other European countries, where "American," "American English," or "Americanization" have long been negative concepts.

The final act of the shared drama of Arnold and America is composed of both a nostalgic and an enduring element. The nostalgic reveals an Arnold reminiscing half-regretfully over his time in America; clearly aware of his failure to have had any lasting impact on the New World, he projects a somewhat pathetic image of himself. First as related by Edmund Gosse:

> When I returnedfrom a tour in the United States in 1886, Matthew Arnold [...] asked me to come and talk with him about America. "Did you make them hear you?" he asked, and continued, "I couldn't. They did not like my manner. The Chicago newspapers said that I resembled an elderly macaw pecking at a trellis of grapes. How lively journalistic fancy is among the Americans. But they were very kind."[15]

That final wistful note is echoed in another incident related by one of Arnold's early biographers and critics, Herbert Paul:

> I remember the delight with which he told me of his invitation from Mr. Phineas Barnum, "the greatest showman on earth." "You, Mr. Arnold," wrote the great man, "are a celebrity, I am a notoriety; we ought to be acquainted." "I couldn't go," remarked Mr. Arnold, "but it was very nice of him".[16]

These two acknowledgements of personal kindness after the event show a more mellow and affectionate Arnold than the public persona revealed in his lectures and articles. Could those isolated incidents of acceptance, recognition and politeness have heightened the awareness of public rejection, or was Arnold simply representative of that particular brand of cultural showman who is stingingly critical on the platform and shyly grateful for small signs of kindness in private?

The enduring element in the Arnoldian experience of America is the attitude which he embodied of a fundamental unwillingness to believe that American culture is not a contradiction in terms. This was expressed, for example, in Arnold's comments on seeing an advertisement for *The Primer of American Literature*:

> Imagine the face of Philip or Alexander at hearing of a Primer of Macedonian Literature! Are we to have a Primer of Canadian Literature, too, a Primer of Australian? We are all contributors to one great literature - English Literature.[17]

This attitude was echoed by that most Arnoldian of English critics, F.R. Leavis, when, in the course of his Clarke lectures at Cambridge in 1967, he stated that "the general acceptance, in England, of Hemingway as a great writer [...] would have been possible only in a period marked by a collapse of standards."[18] But then, so much of Arnold is familiar in the twentieth century; his whole attitude to America as well as many of his experiences and most of his sayings have become stereotypes in the sphere of transatlantic cultural exchange. What is of major importance, however, is to realize that this stereotypical sense of European superiority and the smiling condescension to an America lacking in culture and civilization, was born of a fundamental distrust of the basic concepts of democracy.

Not that Matthew Arnold regarded democracy with com-

plete enmity. It is, however, important to realize that his political thinking was significantly colored by his elitist cultural theory and was marred by a certain contradictoriness in its expression. Although he quite clearly states, in the lecture-essay "Equality" (1878): "Certainly equality will never of itself alone give us a perfect civilization," Arnold is circumspect enough to modify this by adding "But with such inequality as ours, a perfect civilization is impossible" (1949, 606). This may be interpreted as a gesture of approval for democratic social principles; however, as always, Arnold in this lecture was still in the first instance a man of letters. Therefore, his final word on the subject here may be true of the deeper inner antithesis between Arnold's the theoretical social liberalism and his cultural convictions:

> A community having humane manners is a community of equals, and in such a community great social inequalities have really no meaning (1949, 588).

Whereas in Arnold's opinion the United States was, quite clearly, sadly lacking in "humane manners," it was undeniably a democracy - herein may have lain the cause for his continued irritation with that country; it would not be surprising.

NOTES

1. John Henry Raleigh, *Matthew Arnold and American Culture* (Berkeley University of California Press, 1961), p. 61.

2. Raleigh, p. 60.

3. Raleigh, p. 60.

4. Georges Saintsbury, *Matthew Arnold* (New York : Russel & Russel, 1967 [1899]), p. 45.

5. Herbert W. Paul, *Matthew Arnold* (London : Macmillan, English Men of Letters Series, 1902), p. 92.

6. Matthew Arnold, *Discourses in America* (London : Macmillan, 1885); *Letters of Matthew Arnold*, Georges W.E. Russel ed. (London : Macmillan, 1901), vol. 2; *The Essential Matthew Arnold*, Lionel Trilling ed. (London : Chatto & Windus, 1949); *Five Uncollected Essays of Matthew Arnold*, Kenneth Allott ed. (Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool, 1953); *Culture and Anarchy*, J. Dover Wilson ed. (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1966). References to Arnold's works are given in the text by date of publication, followed by page number.

7. Lionel Trilling, *Matthew Arnold* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949 [1939]), p. 392.

8. Trilling, p. 393.

9. James Dow McCallum, "The Apostle of Culture Meets America *New England Quarterly* 2 (1929), p. 377.

10. E.P. Lawrence, "An Apostle's Progress : Matthew Arnold in America," *Philological Quarterly* 10 (1931), pp. 67-68.

11. Lawrence, p. 69.

12. McCallum, p. 373.

13. Howard Mumford Jones, "Arnold, Aristocracy, and America," *American Historical Review* 49 (1944), p. 398.

14. See Lawrence, p. 63, for example.

15. McCallum, p. 367.

16. Paul, p. 155.

17. James Bentley Orrick, "Matthew Arnold and America," *London Mercury* 20 (1929), pp. 390-391.

18. F.R. Leavis, *English Literature in our Time and the University*, (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969), p. 56.

REAGANOMICS AND THATCHERISM
Origins, Similarities and Differences

CHRISTOPHER LEEDS
UNIVERSITE DE NANCY II

It seemed a remarkable coincidence that Britain and the United States should elect within the span of a year leaders who were both strongly anti-government, anti-Keynesian, and advocates of the private market sector and tax reductions. Both President Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher had the distinction of getting their names linked to a special line of thinking. This provides the opportunity to discover how close or how distant have been the economic policies of Britain and the United Statesunder their leadership until mid-1985, or in other words to study both the similarities and the differences regarding Reaganomics and Thatcherism.

In terms of the general thrust of their policies, both leaders tried to shift the centre of the political spectrum sharply to the Right. Reagan set about undoing a half-century of legislation which had built up the public sector while opening up America to expansion led by the private sector. Mrs. Thatcher busied herself with doing the same in Britain. Both leaders believed that government itself was partly the cause of their mutual economic problems, including high inflation and slow economic growth, the answer being less government. In contrast, all previous leaders since the 1930s had assumed that if things went wrong, the remedy would be government intervention or more government.

Judging by their public behaviour and speeches just before and just after coming to power, one would think that

both Reagan and Thatcher were about to undertake a radical break from the past. The press called it the 'Reagan Revolution' as the most pro-business administration since Calvin Coolidge took over the reins of power, while in Britain the press referred to the 'Thatcher experiment' as converts to monetarism gained control of the key government committees concerned with economic policies. In practice their policies were not so novel or so radical as both leaders tried to make the public believe. In the United States President Ford had reverted to traditional Republican economics in 1976, trying to balance the budget and controlling government spending at the cost of higher unemployment. Monetarist ideas influenced the American government in the 1970s when efforts were made to control inflation, while it was a Democratic President, Jimmie Carter, who conceived plans for deregulation and lower taxes. Likewise in Britain monetarism had been gaining ground at the expense of Keynesianism since the early 1970s and it had been a Labour prime minister, James Callaghan, who in 1976 started seriously to reduce government spending and to enforce strict controls of the money supply.

While this paper focuses on economic policies, it is important to note that Thatcherism signifies much more, and has become in part a mere euphemism for all the good and bad connected with recent Conservative policies, while the term Reaganism has been linked with all recent and past right-wing illiberal influences in the United States. In contrast Reaganomics has been more closely associated with recent Republican economic policies, and alternatively used as a synonym for 'supply side' economics.

Both leaders owed their accession to power partly to the remarkable resurgence of the New Right in both the United States and Britain. However the American New Right included the recent political influence of single issue lobby groups such as the American Moral Majority, founded by the Reverend Jerry Falwell in 1979. Unlike Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher did not have to contend with strong moral or religious lobbies. The New Right in Britain meant solely the ascendancy of the free market wing of the Conservative Party from 1974. Reaganomics

and Thatcherism have also been regarded less as a clear set of beliefs but rather as an expression of felt values by which ordinary citizens should order their lives. These included what Reagan called traditionally American and Thatcher Victorian values, namely such eternal verities as family, patriotism, honesty, hard work, independence. Thatcherism has also been associated with Mrs. Thatcher's intuitive personalised form of decision-making and style of government.[1]

Keynes had observed in his key work *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936) that the private market sector of the economy could not unaided reduce the high unemployment level of the inter-war depression years. The government should take responsibility for managing an economy and be prepared to unbalance the budget, expanding or reducing government spending (resulting in budget deficits or surpluses). Such countercyclical policies, accompanied by appropriate measures regarding interest rates, taxes and bank credit, would help ensure that total demand was sufficient to guarantee full employment. Just as one uses the rudder of a sailing vessel to help keep it on course, so Keynes believed that the government could manipulate the national budget to keep the ship of state on course. Not unsurprisingly his approach became known as 'demand side' economics.

From the time of the Second World War Keynesian ideas grew in influence among economists and his theories were put into practice by governments in both the United States and Britain. However Keynesianism never swept the Republican Party in the US as it did the Conservatives in Britain. Republican economics still stressed fiscal austerity, budget balancing and monetary restraint, and it was not until 1971 that a Republican president declared: "I am now a Keynesian."[2]

By the early 1970s Keynesian policies appeared to have grave short-comings, and seemed in no way capable any more of guaranteeing economic growth, low unemployment and price stability, or of arresting the growing de-industrialisation or decline of the manufacturing sector. Even more serious was the fact that Keynesian economists had no ready answers as to the causes or remedies for the new phenomenon of stagfla-

tion, rising inflation and rising unemployment at the same time, a situation affecting most western countries from the time of the world oil crisis of 1973-74.

The monetarists had been advocating an approach to economic policy-making since the late 1960s which differed radically from the Keynesian approach. John Milton Friedman, their main exponent, not only had the diagnosis for stagflation, poor growth rates and de-industrialisation, but also the prescription. First he rejected 'demand-management' and income policies as a means of controlling inflation and argued that only one thing caused inflation, namely excessive growth of the money supply in relation to the growth of national output. The main economic responsibility of governments should be strict control of the money supply which would eventually eliminate inflation.[3] Second, he argued that government intervention in an economy tended to have destabilising effects and created uncertainty in the business world, since enterpreneurs could not make long-term plans when governments were constantly switching from 'restraint' to 'stimulus' policies and back again (known as 'stop-go'). In addition monetarists argued that expanded government spending to spur growth and reduce unemployment often meant heavy borrowing, and that this led to the state pre-empting an undue share of the total funds available for investment at the expense of the private sector. Furthermore, the competitive bidding raised the cost of such funds through increases in interest rates.[14]

Monetarists criticised government intervention in an economy on various other grounds. First, too many regulations and laws had been passed in the 1970s in favour of consumers, workers or environmentalists which acted as a constraint on business. Also a wide range of welfare or social security benefits, coupled with high rates of taxation, provided a disincentive for some to work when they could survive on the dole and possibly also in the 'black' or 'underground' economy. Furthermore government reflationary policies of increased government spending to stimulate economic growth led first to the public anticipating price rises by accelerating their spending, and second to the trade unions demanding wage rises

above the expected inflation rate, even at the risk of greater unemployment for some workers. If the government demonstrated its determination to control the money supply, the monetarists argued, and published targets for lower planned growth in the future, this would help lower the expectations of consumers and workers, and trade union negotiators would moderate their wage demands accordingly.

Keynesianists assumed that most unemployment was involuntary, and that people would work if the right job came up. Monetarists put forward as part cause or explanation for the growth of the black economy and stagflation the idea that much unemployment represented a voluntary decision of somebody not to work. Once the point of high employment or the 'natural rate of unemployment' was reached, estimated to be about 6% in Britain and the US, the inflation rate would stabilise and no involuntary unemployed would remain. Monetarists argue that if unemployment is above this level, then the rate of increase of wages and prices will slow down, but that once this point of high employment is reached, there is no trade-off between inflation and unemployment as the Keynesians believed. The continuation of 'demand-management' policies results not in economic growth but in supply shortages, which drives up prices, increases imports and causes balance of payments problems. The result is higher inflation, with unemployment remaining static in the long run or possibly getting worse.

Monetarists suggest that the only route towards the goal of full employment is via focus on 'supply side' economics. Keynes was criticised by the monetarists for having given insufficient attention to supply factors in an economy such as wage levels, labour mobility, productivity, profitability and competitiveness. Monetarists argued, like the classical economists in the inter-war period, that rigidities or imperfections in the 'supply side' of the economy, such as the monopolistic practices of big businesses or powerful unions which led to prices and wages being too high, constituted a major cause of large-scale unemployment, and contributed

to slow growth rates. The government should also undertake measures to promote greater competitivity in the goods and labour markets, which would in the end help the consumer through lower prices and better service. Remedies lay in lowering wage levels and welfare benefits, and bringing down taxes. This wold give an added incentive to the unemployed to seek work, while the reduced costs of a business (following tax reductions) would act as an incentive for hiring more workers.

Apart from the monetarists, many others wondered during the 1970s whether the tax system itself in Britain and the United States was not itself a cause of the slow down in economic growth and of ever continuing wage demands. In its *Programme for Action* (1977) the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) recommended reduced taxes as the way to encourage work incentives. By early 1979, Mrs. Thatcher was determined to switch the emphasis in taxes so that the burden fell less on those who gained income from work (direct taxes) and more on those who spent rather than saved (indirect or sales taxes). The American academic, Arthur Laffer, tried to show by means of the Laffer Curve that at a certain point reduced taxes led to expanded investment in the private sector and increased government revenue. Jack Kemp and William Roth followed up this idea in their 1977 Senate tax proposal, a three year programme of successive 10% cuts in personal taxes, which gained the backing of Ronald Reagan.

Naturally monetarist theories appealed to many within the right-wing of the Republican and Conservative parties, and within industrial, financial and academic circles who had never accepted Keynes. Disillusioned Keynesians also joined the ranks of new converts to monetarism in the 1970s. The New Right in the Conservative Party embraced monetarism as an economic doctrine which reinforced their growing anti-Keynesianism and belief in free enterprise and limited government. The chief economic aims of both the British prime minister and the American president were remarkable similar, representing in each case a mixture of traditional free market right-wing beliefs and monetarist doctrine. Both leaders wanted to halt economic decline and to launch a strong recovery, and both made the mistake of trying to realise contradictory or conflicting objectives virtually simultaneously. Mrs. Thatcher could only blame herself and her economic advisers, since no strong lobbies existed for particular aspects of the monetarist package. In contrast influential Americans wanting to influence Ronald Reagan on economic matters were divided into three distinct groups.

The first and probably the most influential group were the supply-siders such as Arthur Laffer and David Stockman, who wanted to implement the Kemp-Roth tax cuts immediately as a means of getting economic growth and reduced unemployment, and to encourage greater savings and less spending. Supply-siders seemed less concerned about control of the money supply and budget deficits.[5] Strict monetarists, represented in Washington by influential persons such as Paul Volcker believed that the quantity of money and credit should expand no faster than the growth of the gross national product (GNP). For them defeat of inflation should be the first priority before the implementation of supply-side measures. The third group represented the traditional balanced-budget conservatives. They shared the preferences of the two other groups for less government and less regulations, but felt reduced government spending should precede any fall in taxes. Reagan, not the first president to be offered conflicting counsel by his supporters, endeavoured to put into practice the wishes of all three groups.

Broadly speaking, the economic strategy of Reagan and Thatcher covered the five following elements:

1. Reduce to eliminate inflation. This would involve a stricter monetary policy including slower growth of the money supply. The publication of targets for monetary expansion would help reduce people's expectations, and help moderate price and wage increases. Both leaders intended to take a tough stance towards pay rises, particularly in the public sector.
2. Reduce or slow down the growth rate of public spending. This was to be achieved in Britain largely through a progressive reduction in the level of public borrowing, which would alleviate any adverse 'crowding out' effect of go-

vernment borrowing on financial markets, and help achieve a balanced budget. Reagan also wanted in theory to move towards the ideal of a balanced budget, but while he promised spending cuts in the 1982 budget, his priorities were less to cut spending than to redirect public spending away from social programmes and towards defence expenditure.

3. Tax changes and reductions. Mrs. Thatcher wanted to reduce direct taxes, particularly the highest rates, and to increase indirect taxes. Reagan wanted to implement tax reductions over a three year period and to carry out comprehensive tax reform at some stage. Both leaders wanted the most benefits from tax cuts to go to higher income groups and businesses, so as to promote economic growth rather than the goal of greater equity. Reagan vaguely hoped that subsequent economic growth would increase tax revenue which would help pay for the tax cuts.
4. Reduce the scale and responsibilities of government. Both wanted to do this partly by staff reductions and fewer regulations. Reagan also wanted to give over certain responsibilities to the state governments (called 'New Federalism') while Mrs. Thatcher planned to denationalise or privatise certain state activities, to contract services out to the private sector, and to increase people's ability to look after themselves.
5. Expansion of the economy led by the private sector. Both hoped that control of inflation, less taxes and less government as well as government efforts to promote greater competitivity in the economy would help spark a supply-side response from private enterprise.

Reagan's economic objectives were spelt out in his State of the Union message to Congress on February 18, 1980. He promised that the magic of the market place would help slay both dragons of the economy, inflation and unemployment. To those who expressed opposition to his plans, the president replied: "Have they an alternative which offers a greater chance of balancing the budget, reducing and eliminating inflation, stimulating the creation of jobs and reducting the tax burden?"[6] While Reagan promised that his programme would add three million jobs to the economy, Mrs. Thatcher made no precise commitment though her government naturally hoped that its policies would reduce the unemployment level.

Both Reagan's and Thatcher's programmes appealed to the middle class, but many informed observers in the United States and Britain regarded the proposed measures as 'experiments' or 'gambles.' One congressman called the Reagan programme 'jellybean talk' while George Bush, vice-president, referred to 'voodoo economics.'[7] Mrs. Thatcher labelled the doubters in her new Cabinet 'Wets' for failing to give their complete confidence to the government programme. Why was there so much scepticism and doubt? First, as regards Britain many thought that a tight monetary policy together with plans to raise interest rates sharply, far from aiding economic growth, would reduce bank loans to industry, cause bankruptcies, increase unemployment and lead to a severe recession. Many also doubted whether some of the monetarist theories would work out in practice. Much depended on aspiration rather than on solid evidence based on the past - on trust, for example, that the publication of monetary targets might lower 'expectations' and that tax cuts would lead to more investment. Britain entered a severe recession in mid 1979, of which details will be given later. Surprisingly President Reagan seemed totally unaware that a similar package of monetary restraint combined with fiscal stimulus (through tax cuts) in early 1980 might eventually also send the United States into sharp economic downturn.

Probably both countries were heading for mild recessions in any case due to the impact of sharply increased oil prices following the troubles in Iran in 1978-79. However, the immediate cause of the recessions in each case was steeply rising interest rates. Paul Volcker, fearing the inflationary impact of tax cuts, increased interest rates, and this in turn confirmed the worst fears of Wall Street financiers, already worried over Reagan's policies and growing budget deficits. In late 1981, American shares started to fall sharply. Easier monetary policies and tighter fiscal policies in each country would have curbed interest rate rises and created fewer problems for in-

dustry.

How successful were Britain and the United States in achieving the first aim, the defeat of inflation? In the long run both governments managed to reduce inflation, but in the short run the inflation situation worsened in both countries, particularly in Britain.[9]

Eventually inflation in the US fell to 9.6% in 1981 and then to less than 4%, while inflation fell in Britain from 22% in 1980 to 12% in 1981, 5.4% in 1982 and then to under 4% in 1983-84. However, neither government deserves much credit for this since inflation fell in both countries partly because of high unemployment and recession, and because of lower prices of imported goods. Monetarists claimed that some credit was also attributable to the Federal Reserve's tight money policy and efforts to reduce people's inflationary expectations.[10] But Britain's experience in no way validated Friedman's thesis of a close link between changes in money supply growth and changes in inflation two years after. At first the government failed to control the money supply which increased at over 15% for most of 1980 and 1981, yet the country did not experience high inflation two years afterwards in 1983-84. Only after inflation had fallen markedly did the government gain control of the money supply in 1982.

In the United States Volcker eased off monetary pressure in mid-1982 to help economic recovery but this did not cause an increase in inflation in 1984. Instead inflation has remained below 4% during the period 1983-85. In Britain money supply growth well exceeded government targets from 1983 on, yet no one fears anymore that this is the harbinger of higher inflation. The persistence of higher interest rates and low inflation since 1982, followed by improved liquidity position of many companies, has led to increased funds being placed in interest-bearing accounts in the banks, with consequent expanded bank lending to the private sector. The popular view now is that the demand for money, rather than government attempts to control the supply, has been the main cause of expansion of the money supply.

Both Reagan and Thatcher failed to halt or reduce the growth in public expenditure due to public and legislative resistance to proposed cuts in sensitive areas such as welfare and social security, increased spending on unemployment (dole) payments and increased spending on defence. The only substantial decreases in federal spending came in programmes largely administered by states and localities - education, training and employment, transport - and in part these reductions reflected the president's commitment to federalization, to return powers to the states and local communities. Likewise in Britain major cuts were made in housing and lesser cuts in education, largely by means of reduced grants to local authorities which provided these services.

Both leaders made economies in central administration, and reduced the number of civil servants, and spending cuts tended to fall disproportionately on the less well-off, affecting particularly certain social services and welfare. In all, some 10% of federal spending on programmes for the poor were abandoned or reduced, including Aid for Families with Dependent Children, and food stamps. The British government did manage to reduce the level of public borrowing, an objective given priority over further tax cuts after 1979. In contrast Reagan gave priority to tax cuts and soon federal debt and budget deficits reached astronomical proportions. As a result Reagan had to abandon hope in 1982 of balancing the budget by 1984.

Both Reagan and Thatcher introduced tax cuts soon after entering office, the major beneficiaries being the rich and large businesses. For example, the top rates fell from 83% to 60% and the bottom rates from 33% to 30% in Britain. As the real value of various social security benefits declined in subsequent years and local taxes increased, with tax thresholds not being increased in line with inflation, many on less than average wages in Britain and the US saw their tax burdens rise during the period 1979-84. Both governments gave generous tax concessions to businesses, and tax relief on investment in small enterprises. From 1984 tax allowances and tax thresholds

have been raised considerably in Britain, and in 1985 the government promised tax cuts in 1986 and 1987.

Tax reform has now become the aim of second-term governments in both Britain and the United States. Both Reagan and Thatcher want to take the low-paid out of the tax net, and Reagan wants to reduce the top rate of income tax to 35%. To finance these changes both governments are looking for ways of doing away with some of the special tax exemptions and reliefs which tend, like mortgage tax relief benefits of private homeowners, to encourage people to put their money into property or other forms of expenditure rather than to save. As a result, funds are absorbed which could be invested in industry or, as Reagan wants, to help plug government deficits. Nigel Lawson, the British Chancellor, wants to abolish many tax exemptions as they distort free markets and discourage wider personal share ownership. In 1984 he abolished tax relief on life assurance premiums, but also increased tax privileges for a variety of schemes through which employees could purchase shares of companies they worked for so as to promote Mrs. Thatcher's goal of a 'property-owning democracy'.

Both Reagan and Thatcher have been subjected to heavy lobbying by groups campaigning against certain changes. Consequently, the British government abandoned any idea of abolishing pension fund tax privileges or mortgage tax relief, and has so far abandoned the attempt at any comprehensive tax reform.[11] In contrast President Reagan has been promoting comprehensive tax reform, called 'Treasury Two,' as the centrepiece of his second term, and sees the drive for tax fairness and simplification as a popular cause.

The Thatcher government had more success than the Reagan administration in the drive for deregulation and reducing the scope and responsibilities of government. Since 1979 state-owned assets have been sold to private companies, in an extensive privatisation or denationalisation programme. Private firms were allowed an opportunity to compete with former public monopolies, in certain areas or under certain conditions, and this has affected for example coach, bus and air transport. In addition local authorities and the National Health Service have

sub-contracted certain services out to private firms, such as school-cleaning and refuse disposal. The government reduced the commitments of the National Health Service by transferring responsibility for the handicapped, elderly and infirm from the hospitals to local communities. The government tried to reduce the burden of petty bureaucracy by reducing the number of forms, and simplifying and reducing the range of regulations affecting small businesses. It succeeded in removing certain regulations and restraints in the area of financial services since 1981, which has now permitted greater competition between commercial banks and building societies, and the entry of banks into a new range of services including the direct marketing of stocks and shares.

President Reagan had little success in his drive for deregulation, unleashing the economy from excessive bureaucracy as a prelude to economic growth. True he immediately abolished remaining controls on the price of oil on coming to power, which led in the long-run to lower prices, and continued the regulation of the domestic airline industry. In addition key agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health Agency (OSHA) have spent less time enforcing what they consider to be nitpicking rules. The deregulation policy eventually became so controversial that it had to be toned down to preserve peace and, in many cases, jobs. A striking example can be found in the banking industry. Major New York banks wanted the right to enter new markets and lines of business, but were vigorously opposed both by regional and small town banks which feared the competition, and by Wall Street investment firms which did not want banks in the securities business. As a result, major American banking law reform, desired by many banks and the Reagan administration, had to be shelved.

While Reagan failed to radically devolve federal responsibilities to the states, partly because state governors and others saw devolution as budget cutting in disguise, he did manage to obtain some devolution to lower levels of government and to the voluntary sector. However, some felt that the Federal government had not become any lighter under Reagan.[12]

Likewise in Britain it was argued that, despite the reduction of the size of the public sector since 1979, the burden of the state had by no means been reduced. The government felt obliged to intervene to ensure that no obstacles existed to its monetarist policies or to so-called marked forces, and one former Thatcher minister commented in 1984 that 'central government now exercices direct control over more and more aspects of our lives'.[13] This can be illustrated by the extensive government controls over the spending policies of local authorities since 1980.

Britain experienced a slow economic recovery from the end of 1981, and since then the average growth rate has been about 3% per year. The Americans experienced a faster growth rate from late 1982 but expansion slowed down considerably in 1985. Causes of both recoveries included lower interest rates, falling inflation and cheaper oil prices. Neither government can claim much success for helping the upturn in their economies. Tax cuts seemed to have played a very small part, since in the US many large firms engaged in a frantic merger or take-over activity rather than extensive investment, while in Britain many wealthy people continued to invest outside industry or abroad. In neither case could it be said that 'supply side' market forces provided the main momentum for economic development. Rather both recoveries appeared to have been powered by Keynesian 'demand side' forces such as greater consumer spending on cars, housing etc., with the tertiary sector, notably retailing, instead of manufacturing, leading the way, helped by the failure of both government to limit public spending as they had hoped. Massive budget deficits, caused partly by substantial defence spending, fuelled the stronger American recovery, which was threefifths financed by foreign investment attracted by high interest rates.

The greatest impact of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations has resulted from their pro-business orientation, the generous handing out of grants or tax privileges to industry, and efforts to remove unnecessary regulations and to promote greater competitivity. This impact has been felt most by small to medium-sized firms, which played an important role in

both economic recoveries, but many of their activities have been in services rather than in manufacturing.

Linked to their pro-business bias, both Reagan and Thatcher showed themselves anti-organised labour. In the United States as a result of recent enactments firms were allowed to cancel labour agreements simply by moving from union to non-union plants, and to declare themselves bankrupt to void labour contracts, and then reorganise on a non-union basis. American trades unions had never had the influence in American politics that the British trade unions enjoyed in Britain, and represented a far smaller proportion of the total working population. Thatcherites believed, as did the monetarists, that much unemployment resulted from monopolistic restrictions by trades unions which prevented real wages from falling. By means of three laws, the government sought to reduce the powers of the unions. The determined opposition of both leaders to strikes in favour of higher wages helped to moderate wage inflation. However, Mrs. Thatcher was not as successful in creating a losing psychology among the unions after the defeat of the year-long miner's strike in 1985 as was Reagan after his defeat of the strike of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organisations (PATCO) in 1981. While there have been signs of more constructive management-worker cooperation with less union resistance to changes in some large firms, the British government has so far failed to convince many workers that high wage claims can harm the economy. During the period 1984-85 wage settlements averaged 7 to 10%.

One reason for the continued bitterness of many lower-paid workers towards Reagan and Thatcher has been what they see as deliberate class-based policies designed to enrich the well-off and impoverish the poor. In both countries the real incomes of the less well-off fell between 1979 and 1984, while those with average or above average earnings saw their real incomes increase. The situation became particularly serious in Britain because the unemployment rate instead of going down during the recovery period, as in the United States, worsened. Reasons for this included the tighter monetary policies in Britain, greater labour mobility and greater predominance of the enterprise cul-

ture in the United States. However, the government launched numerous schemes to encourage employers to create jobs, and various training programmes for the unemployed, particularly the young.

At the height of their respective recessions in 1981 and 1982, Thatcher and Reagan and their parties had lost much of their original popularity. However, both Reagan and Thatcher were re-elected in 1983 and 1984 partly because first, both economies were in recovery at the time and second, no rival leader came forward of comparable stature or personality. All signs seem to indicate that the electorate voted for Reagan and Thatcher personally rather than their particular policies. To many ordinary people, both had achieved something in restoring national pride and individual self-respect after humiliations of the past.

In Britain the balance of payments has been in healthy surplus since 1980, thanks largely to revenues from North Sea oil, and the budget deficit in 1985 is much reduced. In contrast America's large budget and trade deficits undermined people's confidence in the economy and led in 1985 to a slowing down in the growth rate and a fall in the dollar. No other country could pile up such debts, as they would have been forced to rein in by the IMF and its creditors, as happened to Britain in 1976. The US is in a special position, because other nations' debts are calculated and payable in dollars, and only the US can print dollars to pay its bills. Britain's economic growth is forecasted to slow down in the next year or two. Both countries are still suffering from heavy import penetration and serious de-industrialisation. Many lack the confidence of the Thatcher government that somehow services will fill the gap left by the decline in North Sea oil revenues between 1985 and the year 2000 or that manufacturing will somehow rise again like a phoenix from the ashes. In fact many think Mrs. Thatcher's policies have only accelerated our industrial decline, and that despite her efforts to drag Britain into the age of information technology and science, through government support of the relevant industries, Britain may be proof that it is possible to go back in time 'to re-create the social order of

the Middle Ages behind the misleading appearance of a modern façade'.[14]

Despite the immense differences between the political, economic and social systems in Britain and America, and the circumstances and constraints under which both Reagan and Thatcher operate, similarities rather than differences characterise Reaganomics and Thatcherism if all the diverse broad threads are analysed. Despite this generalisation naturally differences characterise specific aspects, as in the case of the virtual fixation of the Thatcher government with the money supply and the level of public borrowing compared with the more relawed American approach to these aspects. Despite their radical intentions, observers have felt that both Reagan and Thatcher had to proceed slowly in practice. While Reagan had to contend with Congress and the Supreme Court, Mrs. Thatcher, though assured (unlike Reagan) of a majority in Parliament for her legislative measures, had to take into account stiff opposition at times within her own Cabinet and the civil service as well as possibly negative, public reaction reflected in the opinion polls. Lastly, both leaders differ considerably in personality and experience. While Mrs. Thatcher attracts enormous respect, she is not much liked. President Reagan, whatever his policies, attracts immense personal popularity because of his easy manner, charm, sense of humour and optimism. Both are arguably tough, populistic, 'conviction' conservative politicians, but, whereas Reagan is a natural conciliator, Thatcher is a confrontational politician, who distinguishes sharply between her dedicated supporters and the doubters in her party and tends to antagonise opponents such as the trade unions.

Mrs. Thatcher faces a 'Thatcher Must Go' movement by the Tory moderates or consolidators within her party, who feel that she must be replaced as leader with the government ditching monetarism and returning to modified Keynesianism if the Conservatives are to stand any chance of winning the 1988 election. In fact ever since 1980, Mrs. Thatcher has been pressurised by the left-wing of her party to revert to Keynesianism, but she has persistently refused to embark on any

U-Turn.[15] In contrast, Reagan has never experienced such pressure within his own party to change course. Though some Americans have argued since 1982 that 'Reaganomics' is dead, there is no movement within the Republican party working for a return to any form of up-dated Keynesianism.

NOTES

1. See Peter Ridell, *The Thatcher Government* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983), p. 7 and Robert Dallek, *Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p. 94.

2. Leonard and Mark Silk, *The American Establishment* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 252.

3. Milton and Rose Friedman, *Freedom to Choose* (London: Penguin, 1980), pp. 299-314.

4. This aspect of the 'crowding out' theory particularly impressed right-wing politicians in Britain and the United States. For reference see Robert Bacon and Walter Eltis, "Stop-Go and De-Industrialisation," *National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review* (Nov. 1975) and *Britain's Economic Problems - Too Few Producers* (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 17-18.

5. See for example George Gilder, *Wealth and Poverty* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 218-225.

6. Quoted in Dallek, p. 67.

7. Dallek, pp. 64-67.

8. The term 'Wet' was commonly applied in Public Schools to those who disliked physical sports.

9. In the US Inflation rose from about 7,6% in 1980 to 12,6% in 1980. In Britain inflation rose from 10% in 1979 to 22% in 1980.

10. Milton Friedman, *The Tyranny of the Status Quo* (London, Penguin, 1985), p. 89. Friedman takes evident pride in pointing out how his theory worked. Money growth declined from mid 1978 to be followed by inflation peaking nearly two years later at 12,6%

11. Sarah Hogg, "The Tax Muddle," *Time and Tide* (summer 1985), p. 34.

12. John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill, *The Reagan Record* (Cambridge [Mass.]: Ballinger, 1984), p. 23.

13. Francis Pym, *Sunday Times* (17 June 1984).

14. James Bellini, *Rule Britannia* (London: Sphere Books, 1982), p. 4.

15. When she remarked in October 1980 'the lady's not for turning,' she acquired the nickname TINA (acronym for 'There Is No Alternative').

THE EXTENT OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON BRITISH BROADCASTING

Policies, Business Interests and Programmes

ROBERT TATHAM

UNIVERSITE DE SAVOIE

Current media developments - the creation of new television services, broadcasting from satellites, the growth of local radio and so on - have revived fears of a 'cultural invasion' of Europe. The theory of media imperialism, with the 'media' largely meaning television and the 'imperialism' usually the United States of America, has already been expounded and discussed by various authors over the years.[1] However, many studies seem to neglect countries like Britain, which have built up their own broadcasting industries. Furthermore, much of the published data is now out of date and it was felt that a new study could clarify certain issues.

Three major questions will be examined here. The first was to determine how much influence America has had on British broadcasting policies. The second was to discover to what extent American firms have been able to acquire interests in British broadcasting companies. The last part is devoted to the question of programmes and seeks to find out how dependent British radio and television are on American programmes and how audiences react to them.

A. AMERICAN INFLUENCE ON BRITISH BROADCASTING POLICIES

A couple of received ideas permeate much historical analysis. Many authors have felt that the British and American

broadcasting systems have always been very different, Britain's based on the concept of a public service and America's fully integrated in the business system. They are then tempted to study the British media in a purely national context. On the other hand a small minority has argued that Britain is simply the junior partner in an American-dominated media world. This school often considers that the American technological lead enabled the United States to control broadcasting in the rest of the world, first by developing and exporting the hardware (studios, transmitters and receivers) which are then followed by the programmes, or software. Our aim here is to determine the real extent of American influence on broadcasting policies in the United Kingdom. Rather than try to follow all the ins and outs of the history of British broadcasting over the last 65 years, it seemed preferable to focus on three momentous periods when general policies have been widely debated and the major decisions taken.

1. The Founding of the BBC

During the early days the history of radio in Britain and America was very similar. European inventors and pioneers played a major role in developing and testing the new technology. The dominant organisation on both sides of the Atlantic was the Anglo-Italian Marconi group, at least until the "wireless telegraph" was taken over by both governments during the First World War. However, in 1920 the airwaves were deregulated in the United States whereas that very same year, broadcasting was completely banned by the Post Office in Great Britain.

The number of radio stations in the US grew rapidly and it is not surprising that in 1920 and 1921 British enthusiasts were inspired by American practice. Some experts, like Godfrey Isaacs, the managing director of the British branch of Marconis, were able to cross the Atlantic and returned convinced that commercial companies should develop the medium in Britain, too.

Amateur and business interests lobbied the government and when in 1922 broadcasting began again in Britain, it was organised on exactly the same basis as in the US with private companies producing their own programmes on local stations. It is often forgotten that the British government granted licences to Marconis (for stations at Chelmsford and later in London) to Metropolitan-Vickers (for station 2ZY in Manchester) and to Western Electric (which built station 2WP in London and then moved it to Birmingham).

It may also come as a surprise to learn that broadcast advertising was spurned on both sides of the Atlantic, even by businessmen such as David Sarnoff (who became commercial manager of RCA) or influential politicians. President Herbert Hoover declared: "I believe that the quickest way to kill broadcasting would be to use it for direct advertising."[2] Financial necessity dictated otherwise and by 1925 advertising was largely accepted in the United States. Various newspapers and magazines were also sponsoring concerts broadcast by the BBC.[3]

British and American broadcasting were by then moving apart, of course. Indeed from 1922 to 1927, American experience served more as a warning for the British. Another English observer, F.J. Brown, Assistant Secretary at the Post Office, returned from his American study trip convinced of the need for regulation to avoid "chaos." Few people could afford to cross the Atlantic to see - or listen - for themselves, so the concept of a public service monopoly was grudgingly conceded, though never fully accepted, by most interested parties. This led to the creation of one single organisation to take charge of radio, the British Broadcasting Company, or BBC.

Three years later the monopoly was reviewed by a committee of inquiry. After the "chaos" that supposedly reigned on the ether in the United States, a second American failing had been discovered and the "content" of American stations was criticised. Broadcaster Percy Scholes reported to the committee on his listening tour of American stations in these terms:

> It might be thought that the existence of a spirit of competition between stations would produce a constantly rising standard in the type of programme and the manner of performance, but experience shows that this is not so.[4]

Even the *Economist* accepted the case for a monopoly in Britain and the Crawford Committee accepted the Reithian ideal of a public service and reported in favour of the BBC severing its commercial links. In 1927 the BBC became a public corporation and was granted a royal charter.

2. The Advent of the Second Television Service (ITV), 1951-64

Television rather than radio finally breached the BBC's monopoly. In this field, Europeans again often showed the way. The first official British television service opened in 1936[5] and was technically stable by 1938. On the outbreak of hostilities, it was forced to "close for the duration." The US did not catch up until May 1941 when the 525 line, FM sound system was adopted. Work continued, in fits and starts, throughout the Second World War enabling the Americans to take the world lead by the end of the forties. However, it should be noted that most other countries subsequently rejected not only the 525 line standard, but also the NTSC colour system.

Meanwhile the Labour Government in Britain was vaguely worried about the concentration of power vested in the BBC and another committe (chaired by Lord Beveridge) was appointed in the 1940s. Of the eleven members, four visited the United States to watch American TV. Alderman Joseph Reeves (a Co-operative Labour MP) brought back the traditional idea. "American programmes," he said "do not compare with ours. They are positively ruined by obtrusive and objectionable advertising matter."[6]

Later events showed that the opinions of Selwyn Lloyd, then an obscure, backbench Conservative MP, were to be more important. He also crossed the Atlantic and, although he agreed on certain points with Joseph Reeves, he did not believe that the introduction of on-air advertising would have exactly the same results as in the US. He thus favoured the retention of the BBC, "to set the standards" but rejected the American model (which he feared might not cater adequately to minorities) and called for "independent competition" (that is commercial radio and television) to counter the BBC's "brute force of monopoly."[7] Selwyn Lloyd's minority report encouraged a rising group of

Conservatives who wanted to stimulate the growth of the electronics industry and to see a TV set in every British home.

America was of course to have more influence on the debate for and against the introduction of commercial television. Queen Elizabeth II's coronation in June 1953 illustrated both the power and some of the potential dangers of the medium. TV showed first that it was already an important force in Britain - the ceremony attracted an estimated 20 million viewers. However, delight was tempered by the American commercial networks' coverage. When the live commentary from Westminster Abbey faded, it had been replaced with a "graceless" interview with a chimpanzee called J. Fred. Muggs that appeared regularly on a breakfast programme. The *Daily Express* published a full report drawing attention to this outrageous treatment of a British monarch and other anti-commercial TV newspapers were quick to add their criticism. Even the *Financial Times* had to admit there would be a need for "safeguards."[8]

The second Conservative White Paper[9] proposed a typically British approach. A second broadcasting authority - the Independent Television Authority (ITA), now called the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) - would be established to supervise the commercial system along the same lines as the BBC. It would also own and operate the transmitters, renting the transmission facilities to programme contractors (an arrangement copied apparently from Chicago).

Partly to pacify Reith, who had forced the House of Lords to debate "sponsored" broadcasting, the companies would only sell advertising time and would make all the programmes themselves. Spot advertising was by then replacing sponsored programmes in the United States, too. The more detailed organisation was left to the ITA, and Independent Television evolved as a more decentralised kind of network than its American forerunners.

Once again American experience had influenced British policy makers but in the event Britain created a unique kind of authority (the ITA) to supervise a highly distinctive television system (ITV).

3. Competition in Radio

If Britain largely pioneered commercial television in Europe, the excitement generated contrasted sharply with the decline of British radio. Elsewhere, especially in North America and France, the sound of a second generation of radio stations had already been heard.

The new style of radio came dramatically to England. One March morning in 1964, a strange ship with a very tall mast anchored in the Thames Estuary and Radio Caroline shattered the BBC sound broadcasting monopoly. Caroline was an instant success, attracting seven million adult listeners in Southern and Eastern England in just three weeks. A couple of months later, Caroline acquired a second ship to serve the West and North and soon a fleet of pirates surrounded Britain. Raymond Williams remarked that:

> Young people all over Europe welcomed the pirate broadcasters, as an alternative to authorities they suspected or distrusted or were simply tired of. The irony was that what came free and easy was a planned operation by a distant and invisible authority - the American corporations.[10]

Our aim here is to see briefly whether this hypothesis can be proved.

In fact, the idea of Caroline came not from America but from a Dutch station, Radio Veronica, itself modelled on the Scandinavian pirates. To a certain extent it was an Anglo-Irish project with an Irish promoter and British, Irish and Swiss financing. Most programmes were produced on the ships and, of the disc jockeys, only two had any American experience - out of a total of 60.

Radio London, the only other offshore station to become as famous as Radio Caroline, did have some American links. It was the brainchild of Philip Birch, a Briton who had worked in American advertising. He also found some of his capital in the United States. Ben Toney, an American member of the original team, has explained how they were inspired by KLIF, then the most successful station in Texas, and how they introduced its top 40 programme

format to Europe. However, two years later the management team was all British.

These two stations were to dominate British offshore radio. It is true that they used methods that had been successfully applied to North American radio, such as the disc jockey working as a presenter in a "self-op" studio, playing records from a playlist and imbibing his programme with his personality. The pirates also used jingles (some of which were produced in the US to create an identity for their stations and interrupted the music shows every hour for short news bulletins. But just as Europe N°1 was almost the opposite of RTL, so the pirates also strived to be different from the BBC and created their own style, mixing both typically British presentation techniques with more modern ones and adding a maritime flavour. Later stations replaced the pop with other music formats (light music on Radio 390, for example) or specialised by area (Radio Essex or Radio Scotland). In fact most of these ideas had been used by other European stations before, and visiting Americans did not regard either Caroline or London as being truly commercial.

Research reveals that only one ship was American owned, backed and operated - at least when she anchored in the North Sea. This was the M.V. 'Laissez Faire,' which housed two stations: 'Swinging' Radio England and Britain Radio. Their brash, American style did not go down well with British listeners though and both went bankrupt[11] and were taken over by British and Dutch concerns.

When the pirates were outlawed in 1967, BBC radio had to be rejuvenated. The BBC was obliged to introduce a carbon copy of the pop pirates (Radio 1) and to modify the Light Programme to replace the easy listening stations and also to launch local radio.

The reorganisation of BBC services did not altogether satisfy listeners' demands and in 1970 a Swiss managed and

financed station, Radio NorthSea International (RNI), appeared off the coast of Essex. The ship drummed up support for the Conservatives who won the elections. As promised during the campaign, the new government set about introducing commercial radio and Chris Chataway, the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, made the customary trip to the United States.

In the event the British system of Independent Local Radio (ILR) is based more on the pirates (as far as music and its presentation is concerned) and on ITV, with which it shares the same broadcasting authority[12] and legislation.[13] Only two major ideas crossed the Atlantic during this period. Chris Chataway's visit to station WINS in New York resulted in the creation of LBC, the London all-news station. The commercial stations also exploited the 'phone-in' programme - which was being regularly featured on the BBC too by 1974.

British "Independent" Radio, just like Independent Television, is thus a typically British solution to the conflicting demands of listeners, government and business.

It is still a little early to comment on recent developments. In television, Channel Four apparently owes little to American models - and the Welsh version (Sianel Pedawar Cymru, or S4C) even less! Breakfast Television on the other hand is obviously a copy of American practice. The offshore stations, as well as spearheading the campaign for free radio in the United Kingdom, have also borrowed other formats from the US. Radio Caroline specialised in albums ("Adult Orientated Rock") from 1972 to 1980, and more recently Laser 558 pioneered the "All Hit Music" format in the UK.

To conclude, it would appear that neither of the assumptions about American influence on British broadcasting policies are entirely correct. At times Brit and American broadcasting seem to evolve in the same way, as for example in the early days of radio or when commercial television was being planned in the UK, or again, when the pirates sailed in with their American radio formats. But the final decisions led to peculiarly British systems - first a non-commercial BBC, financed by the

licence fee and very much aware of its mission to provide a public service, and then the hybrid "independent" sector with its supervisory body steering its contractors on a middle path between profit and perfection.

If American influence on British broadcasting policies seems relatively limited, the licensing of commercially financed stations has given American interests the possibility of investing in broadcasting companies.

B - FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN BRITISH BROADCASTING COMPANIES

The task here was not easy. It is difficult to find out exactly who controls the companies owing to the large number of shareholders (in several cases running into thousands), the complex relationships of holding companies, their subsidiaries and associated firms[14] and the changes in share ownership especial- especially when shares can be bought and sold on the Stock Exchange or the Unlisted Securities Market. Finally the secrecy that often shrouds the question made investigation even more difficult.

The various British Broadcasting Acts have not barred foreigners from buying shares in Independent Broadcasting, though people living outside the Common Market and firms operating or based outside the EEC are not allowed to control a programme contractor.[15] Legally, the IBA has a veto and history proves that this prerogative has been used from time to time.

1. Television

Some of the early ITV companies tested the authority on this point. Lord Derby's group, which as Television Wales and the West (TWW), was awarded the first contract to serve the Bristol Channel area, included the American network NBC as a small but significant shareholder. The ITA declared this holding undesirable. Tactfully, Robert Fraser, then Director-General of the ITA, went out of his way to point out that the Authority's action was no comment on NBC, for whom he had "nothing but respect and admiration."[16] The shareholding was replaced by a service agreement[17] and a senior NBC executive, Bob Myers, went over to Bristol for

two years to help the infant TWW. Similarly Scottish Television (STV) took on Rai Purdy, a CBS producer from New York, during its early days. However, these two appointments appear to be the exceptions that prove the rule. William Sendall, the ITA's historian, commented that "there was to be no mass importation of staff from across the Atlantic"[18] and that "the ITA [...] certainly had an aversion for any non-British elements."[19]

The Commonwealth fared better. The Canadian Roy Thomson set up Scottish Television in the Central Lowlands, though his holding was progressively eliminated in subsequent years.

Research into the ownership of the 18 television companies that make up Independent Television today reveals only two significant foreign holdings and both are Australian. Kerry Packer's Consolidated Press controls 25% of TV-am, and Rupert Murdoch's News International owns 11,8% of London Weekend Television (LWT). In the latter case Australo-American would perhaps be a better term, since although the holding company is still based in Australia and controlled by the Murdoch family, Rupert Murdoch himself took American citizenship last year.

The IBA still watches over its network as closely as ever. When the Associated Communications Corporation (ACC), the owner of 51% of Central TV, was taken over by Australian Ropert Holmes à Court's TVW Enterprises in 1982, the Authority intervened promptly to remove foreign control.[20]

Satellite television is still in its infancy but the seven services on the air were studied and four were found to have foreign shareholders. The oldest, Sky Channel, is controlled by the News International group, which owns 65% of the equity. The American ABC Network and its subsidiary, Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN), have minority holdings in the British Screensport service. American firms have significant but minority interests in movie channel Première. Its shareholders include Columbia Pictures,[21] Warner, CBS, Home Box Office and the latter's greatest rival, Showtime! Thorn-EMI Screen Entertainments dominates the consortium with a 41% stake and Twentieth Century Fox, recently taken over by Murdoch's News Group, is also a shareholder.[22] Finally there is of course one all-American TV channel, Ted Turner's Cable News Network (CNN) which is now

distributed throughout Europe.

2. Radio

The IBA also controls the Independent Local Radio stations and lists of the shareholders were also examined. There are few foreign holdings, though Commonwealth businessmen have been active. The Canadian firm Selkirk Communications Ltd. holds no less than 49,99% of the London Broadcasting Co. (LBC) and 31% of Beacon Radio (Wolverhampton). They also own Radio Sales and Marketing (RSM), one of the national advertising sales agencies. Another Canadian subsidiary, Standard Broadcasting Corporation (UK) Ltd. has shares in 13 radio companies. Holdings range from 24% of Capital Radio (London) to 5% of Plymouth Sound. A Canadian, Terry Bate, former marketing director of Radio Caroline, has small interests in half a dozen stations. Finally, we come to Rupert Murdoch's News International group. They originally subscribed 45% of the capital of Radio 210 (Reading) and 2% of BRMB, the Birmingham contractor, but both investments have been sold.[23]

It was difficult to find out who exactly was behind the offshore stations Laser 558 and Radio Caroline. Such activities are at best considered as "unauthorised" in the UK, and at worst are offences that could be punished by heavy fines or prison sentences - or both. The two stations have had spokesmen in the United States and channel much of their advertising through offices in New York. Laser 558 claimed to be an all-American organisation and there was a mainly American crew on board the ship. However, usually well-informed sources suspect that both Caroline and Laser were probably Anglo-Irish ventures.[24]

This leaves us with just one empire, Rupert Murdoch's, which although it spans three continents (Australia, Europe and America) and has embraced the press, radio, television and the cinema, has only a very small share of British broadcasting.

Perhaps we shall find more evidence of American cultural influence in Britain in that most easily accessible and visible of American exports, the television programme.

C. PROGRAMMES

Hardly any American programmes are broadcast on British radio, so here we shall study television, starting with programme flows and concluding with the way people react to the American television programmes that are screened in the UK.

1. Programme Flows

In the absence of up to date published data or of an international supervisory body, a research worker has to approach either the programme exporters or the purchasers, both of whom are reluctant to divulge information.[25] If and when they do, there is the problem of the units employed. Rather than hours of programmes, which would be the most useful yardstick for our purposes, most commercial organisations calculate in terms of income or expenditure, which the complexities of fluctuating exchange rates render a still more debatable parameter.

Programme flows were a thorny issue before the first Independent Television programmes had been transmitted. Fourteen organisations representing those who hoped to work for ITV founded a "Radio and Television Safeguards Committee" which pressed for a 20% limit to foreign material. The legislation passed only requires "that proper proportions of the recorded [...] programmes should be of British origin and of British performance,"[26] but negotiations between the 14 organisations, the ITA and the programme contractors resulted in a gentleman's agreement for a 14% limit.

It is also true that Great Britain rapidly became an important programme market for American producers who could offer products at a low price with high audience appeal at a time when the ITV contractors were suffering heavy initial losses and needed to pad out their schedules with ready-made programmes. And so from 1955 onwards, British viewers were able to watch programmes like "I Love Lucy," "Rin Tin Tin," "Wagon Train," "Wyatt Earp," "Maverick" and "Bonanza." In addition, these shows often filled the peak viewing hours of the late afternoon and early evening. The BBC retaliated by increasing broadcasting hours and apologised for buying "The Cisco Kid," "I Married Joan" and "Disneyland."

By the early sixties many felt that ITV had exaggerated. The Pilkington Committee criticised the commercial channel's "retreat from balance." The only organisation to submit evidence in favour of imported programmes was apparently the Scottish National Party which declared that: "If anything we approve of the amount of material from the United States. It at least gives our people a viewpoint other than that of London."[27] The ITA reacted by limiting American programmes in peak viewing hours, a move which infuriated the American government, which complained that it was contrary to the spirit of the GATT negotiations. They need not have worried - the BBC took over some of the displaced programmes!

The quota regulations have evolved over the years. Like all British Independent Broadcasting codes, the present (1983) quota regulations seem all embracing. 86% of all air time should be filled with material of British origin. There are some exceptions, for programmes from the EEC and Commonwealth countries,[28] for shorter items and very occasionally for "outstanding programmes." Scheduling of overseas programmes is limited to 5½ hours per week in peak time and no concentration is allowed at weekends. The code lays down that repeat broadcasts should be avoided for two years, with an even longer interval before further showings.

This quota is not to everybody's taste, mainly because it concentrates on quantity rather than quality and also because it could encourage insularity.[29]

Programme buying for British television is equally well organised. As the recent Dallas episode showed[30] the BBC and ITV do not normally compete for the same programmes and thus keep prices at a "reasonable" level. The ITV companies have a Central Purchasing System, which has been co-ordinated since 1968 by Leslie Halliwell. He freely comments on his preferences. He likes to buy "harmless action-type programmes with simple formats and simple stories..."[31] He claims to avoid "the worst of American television"[32] and also rejects spoofs, American style satire and anything (like half hour programmes) that British producers could supply themselves. Individual ITV

companies also buy about 900 hours annually for local off-peak use. The main suppliers are the USA, Canada and Australia.

Channel Four, which also uses Leslie Halliwell's service, has a different policy. They buy American light entertainment shows like "I Love Lucy," "Bewitched," "The Munsters" or "The Dick van Dyke Show" to complement the serious programmes in the schedule. They claim to be trying to promote a sense of television history but admit that these programmes were purchased because they were cheap! Channel Four also tends to screen more imported material than the other three channels.

Little information is published by the BBC. Nevertheless, Alan Howden, in charge or purchasing programmes, imposes roughly similar limits and follows much the same kind of policy as ITV. The BBC traditionally bought cinema films, leaving made-for-TV movies and crime series for ITV.[33]

The satellite services naturally depend more on American products during this early stage in their development. Data was made available by three stations and revealed that Sky Channel was already filling over half its schedule with British items.[34] Thorn-EMI bought about 35% of the programmes it shows on 'The Children's Channel' from foreign suppliers, the remainder coming from British firms such as Thames and Talbot. Screensport only managed to take 20% of its output from British suppliers and large amounts of programming came from ABC and ESPN. Programme statistics are much more difficult to calculate for the other channels, either because of the very short sequences (pop videos on Music Bos), the frequent rotation of full length feature films over four or five weeks (Première, TEN) or because of the experimental nature of the ventures. Finally, the Cable News Network is the only service that comes directly from the US, but European items may well be inserted in the future. Even if the cable networks report heavy viewing of the new channels at certain times[34] the four BBC and independent networks still attract the bulk of the British TV audience, and doubtless will do for some time to come.

Surveys confirm that the terrestrial services respect the quota agreements and that foreign programmes only represent about 12-15% of airtime. Slightly higher figures are sometimes quoted, either for Channel Four or if all output is considered. In the latter case, the totals can legitimately be increased at certain times by the inclusion of news items, reports on important American events (Presidential elections, space exploration) or sports coverage (e.g. the Olympic Games). Such retransmissions do not normally decrease domestic production and it is difficult to imagine for what reasons the British networks should deprive their viewers of programming with such intrinsic interest.

The programme trade can no longer be described as a one way flow, either. North America represents a lucrative market for British products. The BBC earns over £25 million per year from exports to the United States. The Corporation has recently bought an American programme distributor (Lionheart Television International) and has contracted to sell hundreds of hours of programmes to various stations on a regular basis.[35] ITV probably earns about £15 Million a year from its sales to the US. For independent production houses, the American market is crucial and Goldcrest, for example, hopes to sell everthing its produces on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus British experience shows that the trend can be reversed and that European producers can break into the American market.[36]

Incidentally, British programme makers note that typical British products generally sell better than shows made in an American style or format. Some programmes are still made for worldwide sale but nowadays the trend is to make two (or more) versions - one for the home market, the others for export - and thus satisfy the demands of both viewers and customers in different parts of the world. This brings us onto the next question - how indeed do the British viewers react to American programmes?

2. Audience Reactions

British broadcasting executives, trade unions and newspaper critics are almost unanimous in their critisism of

American programmes. Reviews (and previews in all newspapers) whether "haughty," "naughty" or alternative, are characterised by resignation, criticism or hostility. It is more difficult to assess the viewers' attitudes, since studies should take into account the effect of competition from other channels, the importance of scheduling, the promotion of the programme as well as the regional nature of much of British television. Some general conclusions can be drawn although very little is yet known about the different segments of the audience.

Geoffrey Lealand, for example, has studied London viewers.[37] With some exceptions, the majority of his respondents were able to correctly identify the country of origin of various programmes. Only about a quarter of the sample seemed to be dissatisfied with American programmes whilst nearly 60% either appreciated them or held no strong opinion:

OPINION OF CURRENT AMERICAN PROGRAMMES ON BRITISH TV

Strongly like	4,7%	Appreciate	31,2%
Like	26,5%		
Neither like nor dislike	32,8%		
Dislike	15,6%	Don't appreciate	22,5%
Strongly dislike	6,9%		
No reponse	12,9%		

Source: Geoffrey Lealand.

Asked about the amount of American television programmes broadcast, 40,6% thought there were too many, 43% enough and 3,6% would have liked more! Viewers were then asked a non-directive question to find out what they most enjoyed about American programmes. 8% particularly liked the locations and the scenery, 6% the quality of the production and 5% the action and adventure. American programmes are thus seen as an attractive alternative to domestic output. British viewers appreciated the fast moving American shows, even if they were less realistic than British ones. Finally, a point forgotten by the critics, viewers usually found the American products entertaining.

The least enjoyable feature of American imports was clearly violence, cited by 8,8% of respondents. Content analyses confirm that the American programmes shown on British TV are twice as violent as home produced ones.[38] Finally humour and glamour provoked mixed responses, with approximately equal numbers of viewers finding them either enjoyable or objectionable.

As far as the ratings are concerned, most American programmes attract millions of viewers, at least during the early episodes, but the exhaustion point is fairly rapidly reached and then the audience steadily drops off.[38] Research also shows that British serials like "Coronation Street" or "Crossroads" are still enormously popular, even after thirty years of competition from home and abroad.

To conclude, American television exporters may be imperialists but the United Kingdom would appear to be far enough away from the United States to have been able to choose its own broadcasting policies. British radio and television is largely run, managed and staffed by Britons even if Rupert Murdoch's empire includes some television interests. Finally, audience research confirms that the British (like other European viewers) enjoy American imports, but generally prefer local programmes.

NOTES

1. See in particular Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media are American* (London: Constable, 1977); Tapio Varis, *International Inventory of Television Programme Structure and the Flow of TV Programmes between Nations* (Tampere, [Finland]): Institute of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Tampere, 1973); Herbert Schiller, *Mass Communications and American Empire* (New York: Augustus Kelly, 1969); and Alan Wells, *Picture Tube Imperialism* (Maryknoll [N.Y.]: Orbis, 1972).
2. Quoted from a 1924 speech by Saundra Hybels & Dana Ulloth, *Broadcasting: An Introduction to Radio and Television* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1978), p. 60.
3. Including the *Evening Standard*, the *News of the World*, the *Daily Herald*, the *Daily Graphic*, the *Weekly Dispatch*, *Answers* and *Tibbiys*.

4. Quoted by Asa Briggs, *The BBC: The First Fifty Years* (Oxford: O.U.P., 1985), p. 89.
5. Baird had been experimenting with television broadcasts since 1929.
6. Quoted by Briggs, p. 259.
7. Reith's somewhat unfortunate phrase, use by Selwyn Lloyd.
8. See Briggs, p. 276.
9. Cmd 9005 of Nov. 13 1953.
10. *Television - Technology and Cultural Form* (London: Fontana/Collins 1974), p. 133.
11. Despite the £ 1½ million invested in the project.
12. The ITA was renamed the Independent Broadcasting Authority when it became responsible for radio in 1972.
13. THe Broadcasting Act of 1981.
14. In some cases there are also trustees, nominal holders and beneficiaries.
15. Broadcasting Act, 1981, Section 20.
16. Quoted by Bernard Sendall, *Independent Television in Britain*, vol. 1, (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 213.
17. Covering engineering, programmes, research, sales, advertising, promotion and management.
18. Sendall, p. 213.
19. Sendall, p. 213.
20. It is difficult to say whether an American shareholding would be countenanced today. Former CBS Chief Executive Bill Paley was interested in bailing out TV-am, the struggling breakfast TV contractor, during its November 1983 crisis but decided not to invest in the end.
21. Now owned by Coca Cola.
22. Première has recently merged with Mirror Vision and the channel is now controlled by Robert Maxwell.
23. The Radio 210 holding was criticised by the Annan Committee. See *Report of the Committe on the Future of Broadcasting* (London: HMM.S.O. [Cmnd 6753], 1977), p. 209 (§ 14.14).
24. Caroline is still broadcasting but Laser 558 was escorted into port by a government "spy" ship last autumn.
25. Salesmen regret that they sell for so little; purchasers feel they are buying too many programmes!
26. Broadcasting Act, 1981, Section 4.
27. Sendall, vol. 2, p. 112.
28. Particularly the countries of origin of the larger ethnic minorities that have now settled in the United Kingdom.
29. Both points are mentioned in the Annan Report, pp. 338-40.

30. In 1978 the BBC started showing Dallas, which became one of its most popular programmes. The Corporation had agreed to pay £ 29,000 for each episode of the latest series. Just over a year ago, Bryan Cowgill, managing director of Thames Television, secretly negotiated with the distributors (Worldvision) and clinched the deal by offering £ 55,000 per episode. The other ITV companies did not approve and several refused to screen the series. The IBA also criticised Thames and Cowgill was forced to resign. He subsequently joined the Mirror Group to develop their broadcasting activities.
31. Geoffrey Lealand, *American Television Programmes on British Screens* (London: Broadcasting Research Unit, 1984), p. 20.
32. Lealand, p. 20.
33. BBC-1 in particular is now more openly battling for viewers with ITV and finds many feature films too expensive considering the audience they attract. When ITV programmed "The Jewel in the Crown" the BBC retaliated with "The Thorn Birds" and, unworried by criticism of the quality of its programmes, proudly replied that it had attracted an audience of 15 million for a mere £ 600,000!
34. For example on Sunday mornings for instance.
35. The Arts and Entertainment Network has signed a contract to buy 200 hours of BBC programmes each year for example.
36. The three big networks do not need to import but the Public Broadcasting Service, pay-TV channels, the cable operators and the independent stations can all be good customers.
37. See Lealand Sections 2 and 3.
38. There are at least two exceptions to this rule. First American football, which over two seasons has attracted more and more appreciative viewers and secondly M.A.S.H., probably because of its unusual mixture of black humour and elaborate practical jokes.

URBAN POLICING: THE ANATOMY OF TWO REFORMS

2. USA: The velvet Glove

LAURA MASLOW-ARMAND

UNIVERSITE DE PARIS III

The role of police in urban cities has historically been to control those classes which society views as "suspicious" and "criminally-inclined" which is synonymous with the poor, black and Latinos.
M. McKeen, former lieutenant with the Los Angeles Police Department.

Although policing in the United States is a fragmented, thoroughly decentralized, governmental service, it has been almost uniformly resistant to various external pressures for reform. Except for the rare large city police force, American law enforcement agencies have barely responded to a century's efforts to professionalize their activities, to bureaucratize their structures and to remove them from the corrupting influence of local politics. Apart from the spotty improvement in the quality of police training and specialization, or the introduction of modern equipment, progressive "good government" crusades failed to reform the police. Efforts to increase police autonomy ran counter to widely held attitudes about the role of the state and its agents. "The characteristic of autonomy, the right to be relatively free from external influence and review is incompatible with democratic social contract theory."[1] Americans are unwilling to relinquish civilian control over law enforcement and prefer to keep the police, no matter how inefficient and corrupt, directly responsive to local government.

A second reform tradition tried, with even less success, to strengthen rather than weaken community supervision of the police. Populist reformers, in one period or another, attempted to bring policing closer to the citizenry, or at least to a varying segment of that citizenry. Without reviving the citizen-militia of the colonial past, the populists wanted police policy (like educational policy) to be directly formulated by local civilian boards and they wanted police officers to be disciplined for violating community norms. In the wake of each populist wave, paper mâché commissions and toothless external review boards were created but police practices remained unchanged. The law enforcement agencies became experts in manipulating public sentiment, using statistics and images to persuade the local population that disorder was rampant and that only the police possessed the special skills needed to combat it. Significant police discretion was maintained.

It is then all the more deserving of interest to note that urban policing, which stood firm during the hundred year reform war of progressives and populists, has been radically transformed over the past decade. Even more remarkable is the fact that the agenda for this recent transformation came from the black community which long had been the privileged victims of police malpractice and whose petitions for redress were completely ignored until the by no means accidental confluence of ghetto riots and rising crime rates.

Profound changes in the recruitment and training of police personnel and in the organization of city patrol have produced visible, easily measured, improvements in cities as varied as Detroit, Atlanta, Newark, Birmingham and Washington D.C.

-Citizen complaints against the police for verbal or physical abuse have decreased in every city under black governance. Measured against the level of 1975, the number of complaints registered in Detroit today is 64 percent lower.[2]

-The number of police homicides has been sharply reduced. Both locally and nationally blacks are still disproportionately the victims of police shootings and police killings, but in a growing number of cities the police have been effectively trained - and legally constrained - to use alternative methods of controlling or apprehending a suspect. In Atlanta, for example, there were 18 persons killed by the police in 1973 but no more than five in the years following 1977.[3]

-A dramatic modification of the attitude of black citizens towards their local police. Again in Atlanta, 50 percent of blacks questioned in 1970 thought that whites were treated more favorably than blacks, wheress our 1983 telephone poll revealed that the percentage holding this attitude had dropped to 17 percent.[4]

-More cooperation by ghetto residents in crime prevention and control. Information is provided more readily to the police, and black citizens, even in the most disadvantaged areas, have formed tenant patrols and neighborhood watch units that reportedly have decreased the incidence of certain forms of theft.

Why have these modifications of traditional police behavior taken place? It has been said that a society has the police it deserves. What societal changes have occurred in the United States over the past decade and a half that produced such transformations? These questions, which cannot be answered here in full, are of interest to a number of academic disciplines as well as to law enforcement practitioners. Insights may be gained as regards communal life in the ghetto, or the delivery of municipal services in declining cities under black executives. Transformations of certain police forces may encourage additional reform and the modification of organizational practice in other fields. Most important, as a growing body of literature attests, "studies of the police open a window on the 'nature' of the state."[5] Police agencies, as intermediaries between the state and the public, reflect prevailing public policy and public resistance to that policy. The police interact with both the state and the population they serve and control and therefore shed light on political processes that they also help to modify.

What is the black agenda for police reform and why was it finally given a hearing? How did the police themselves react to the aggressive implementation of this reform agenda? And finally, what were the legal changes in the context of policing that placed additional constraints on police brutality, use of

excessive force, and discriminatory police practice?

It is widely known that police forces, everywhere in the United States, were predictably discourteous, scornful, and violent towards black suspects and black citizens in general. We have ample documentation that police officers in the North and the South behaved like modern slave patrols. "It's like Harlem all of a sudden becomes their own private plantation and they are the overseers."[6] It is less widely known that the same police forces were generally indifferent to black calls for help, indifferent to pervasive lawlessness in the ghetto, and, in a large number of cases, actually protective of organized crime rackets.

Until the decade of reform, police response to calls for help from the nation's black ghettos was either too slow or simply nonexistent. In its 1967 report, the United States Commission on Civil Rights found that the Cleveland police took almost four times as long to respond to blacks reporting robberies as to whites.[7] Testimony gathered by the presidential commission investigating the riots insisted on the inadequacy of the police presence in the black neighborhoods or its perverse, harassing nature. White police officers would arrest ghetto blacks for minor violations that were routinely overlooked in white communities.

For most of the period following World War II and until the 1970s, the only institutional change that was prompted by these grievances was the formation of internal "community relations" units whose sole purpose was to improve the public image of the police. But the very marginality of these units, irrelevant, if not harmful, for promotion and prestige within the police department, led them to be scorned by both the police and the ghetto. The prevailing wisdom was that abusive police behavior, like police corruption, was a fact of life, rooted in an unchangeable police subculture; police brutality was considered a justified defense against the urban jungle. The police well knew that public interest in police malpractice was only a passing fashion, which would flare up from time to time but which was easily satisfied by the announcement of some insignificant departmental change, or the arrival of a new police chief.

In the decade of the 1970s, however, due to a number of parallel historical trends, the black agenda for reform was in fact imposed with surprising thoroughness in numerous large, heavily black, cities across the United States. Of the various factors pressing for change, the most essential was the black protest movement in its successive phases. It was the evolving nature of the black movement that created both the national receptiveness and the local channel for implementation.

Each phase led rapidly into the next without warning: civil rights marches, then ghetto riots, and then increased electoral participation. The civil rights phase contributed two elements. After the mass mobilization and the morally uplifting struggle, black Americans would no longer passively accept the perpetuation of systematic police abuse - being stopped for no reason, questioned with insults, being beaten, then unjustly accused and arrested on trumped up charges. Also, the public attention generated by the civil rights demonstrations meant that television viewers nationwide now witnessed what had previously been reserved for a circle of sympathetic Southern whites: uncontrollable police brutality against non-violent black and white marchers.

The next phase was the ghetto uprisings of the 1960s which left hundreds dead and extensive property damage. Although the political and economic consequences of the riots are still being evaluated, there is widespread agreement that the spontaneous explosions were directly responsible for the formulation and at least temporary implementation of various redistributive policies.[8] The riots also focused national attention on the need for police reform. The Kerner commission of inquiry persuasively linked police misconduct and ghetto rioting: "The abrasive relationship between the police and the minority communities has been a major - and explosive - source of grievance, tension and disorder."[9] Without reform, the riots would surely recur.

Had it not been for the third phase of the black movement, itself a consequence of the two previous phases, police reform would have been as ephemeral as the many other community improvement programs instituted in the late 1960s in the wake of the ghetto riots. It was, in fact, the electoral victories on the local level of new black mayors and black city councilmen in municipalities from Gary Indiana (1967) to Detroit (1973), from Birmingham (1979) to Chicago (1983) that provided the administrative mechanisms, the local political climate, necessary for the profound modification of police practice.

The major political forces were now arrayed on the side of the black reformers. Not only did this issue unite the middle class black and lower class black, both victims of police harassment and police inadequacy, but it also won the support of the local civic elites, the local business leaders and all those eager to quiet the angry black masses. Those who, on the contrary, opposed changes in the recruitment or "autonomy" (which meant autonomy to beat black suspects) of the local police forces were the Northern white ethnic working class communities who also lived in the riot-torn cities and who considered the precinct officers as the most respected and admired elements of the tightly-knit ethnic clan. The prestige of the Italian-American in Newark was linked to his domination of the city police force. In the South, lower class whites, aided by the Ku Klux Klan, protested vehemently and often violently against any change in the number of black patrolmen, in their ranking, or in the powers they were entitled to exercise.[10]

The urgency of police reform was lifted from its status as a simple race issue by the nationwide preoccupation with sharply rising crime rates: from 1952 to 1960 an 85 percent increase in serious crime; from 1961 to 1968 another 120 percent rise. Urban crime became the object of a new national crusade, launched in tandem with the War against Poverty. Under Presidents Johnson and Nixon three anti-crime strategies were applied: a massive infusion of federal funds into the criminal justice system and particularly for the police; a federally-financed and orchestrated examination of every facet of the law

enforcement process; the elaboration of two, antithetical, nationwide techniques to combat crime and disorder.

In 1969 Congress authorized $63 Million for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (founded in 1968 and dismantled in 1982). In one single year (Fiscal Year 1973) $1.75 billion was allocated for new police equipment, salaries, personnel, training and innovations in patrol tactics. "Between 1968 and 1981, the federal government spent more than $8 billion on crime through the LEAA while state and local governments spent 25 to 30 times more."[11]

The first scientific studies of police methods to emerge from the newly founded criminal justice departments and private research institutes showed that what most patrol officers were doing was useless for reducing crime or even for increasing the feeling of security of city residents. Lacking experimental evidence of the value of any type of police patrol whatsoever, President Nixon nonetheless tried to appease the swelling "law and order" constituency by the creation of "tough cop" squads, heavily equipped and trained to saturate riotous zones; other funds went for stakeout units waiting in city stores and buildings to surprise burglars and drug dealers. This hard line even further antagonized the black communities who were now terrorized by the SWAT, STRESS and BOSS units which were responsible for the deaths of both police participants and innocent civilians.

As the demographic concentration of blacks in large Northern cities enabled them to elect mayors pledged to police reform and to the elimination of the "tough cop" units, and as national funding for costly programs and expensive gadgetry began to diminish in the mid 1970s, an "officer friendly" strategy was promoted which aimed to improve the attitude of the police towards blacks, and of blacks towards the police. In the final years of the Nixon-Ford administrations, America hesitated between the iron fist and the velvet glove but under President Carter, the latter was made a national priority.

Institutional response of the police

Sceptical of any externally imposed reform, the urban police forces, a homogeneous conservative band of blue, responded to civilian criticism with a defensive collegiality. Underpaid and understaffed, the street patrol overestimated the animosity of the general community (which has always been highly supportive of law enforcement personnel) and even that of the black community. Inward looking, the urban police of working class or lower middle-class background, often related to other policemen, are persuasively socialized into an anti-black, anti-civil libertarian police ethos by three key elements: veteran officers whose recommendation weighs heavily for promotion; the increasingly strong fraternal organizations within the department (some police officers have joined the Mafia-ridden Teamsters union); and the narrow social world in which they evolve, usually limited to other police families within the same European ethnic group. As a result the police "displays a cohesion unmatched by most other occupational groups."[12] How then did the black community, the particular object of antipathy on the part of most Irish-American, Italian or Polish American patrol officers,[13] modify the behavior of this inbred brotherhood?

The police agencies in large cities were attacked sharply from every angle by a concerted black offensive. The strength of this attack was without precedent and differed markedly in its aims from the traditional effort of urban ethnic groups to be represented on the police force. Four points of pressure coexisted: guerrilla warfare in the street; lobbying and litigation on every governmental level by civil rights organizations; the appointment by newly elected black mayors of a cadre of progressive, highly educated black police managers; the hiring of large numbers of black and Hispanic recruits, and female recruits, white, black and Hispanic. From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the black percentage alone almost doubled, reaching 14 percent in the departments of the nation's 50 largest cities.[13] In 1986 there is a black police chief presiding over the departments of five of the ten largest cities.

USA: The Velvet Glove

Whereas in the past a token handful of non-white policemen had been easily rendered impotent by being coopted into the police fraternity, or being forced to keep silent in the face of widespread police brutality towards black citizens, today a broad wedge of politically conscious black and Hispanic "rookies" have split the cohesive police culture into separate, weaker subcultures, each organized into its own distinct police fraternity with divergent corporatist or political aims. The most adamant racists among the ranking officers have resigned from the force or have moved to the more hospitable county and suburban departments.

The consequence of this four-pronged black assault has been the examination and revision of every facet of urban policing. Each component of the hiring and promotional process has been re-weighted to favor "demographics currently fashionable,"[14] that is to say, non-whites and women. Training academies now emphasize service to the community instead of only firearm practice and self-defense. Patrol has been de-motorized, decentralized and de-specialized with the extension of team policing units, mini-precincts and zone command. "Well... the whole climate of the job has changed since [the riots]. People are now promoted mostly on the basis of how well they do a job, not whether they are a certain color. A lot of this change has come about through the activities of civil rights groups. Blacks became united, especially in this job. They became, so to speak, a force to be reckoned with... The department and the mayor [of New York] were afraid of repercussions. Complaints of discrimination might leak to the newspapers... Basically, the department didn't want any waves so a lot of concessions were made."[15]

Community response

For the first time in this century civilians, are being encouraged to participate in crime prevention through tenant patrols, warning networks and neighborhood watch systems. This coproduction of police services by those directly concerned is an urban social phenomenon of great significance. It has allowed the maintenance of a certain level of protection in a period of

fiscal austerity and layoffs (Newark has only 900 police officers today, half of its 1975 level). As a result, there is less outspoken citizen discontent with the general decline of municipal services in cities with declining resources. Moreover, citizen participation seems to have contributed to falling crime rates for certain forms of theft in low income areas.[16]

Community mobilization to fight crime is the most prevalent form of grass-roots organizing today, the only form to survive the activism of the late 1960s or the dampening effect of black mayoralty elections on black militancy in general. We might say that the police relationship with the ghetto, whether hostile or collaborative, is a privileged motor for group activity. Even lower class blacks who have become increasingly passive in the face of severe unemployment and poor housing, have been stimulated by this new style of urban policing to form self-help organizations that improve the security, morale, and sense of efficacy in disadvantaged neighborhoods.

Societal response

During the decade and a half of black civil rights demonstrations, ghetto riots and black electoral victories, and against the background of a growing but more educated preoccupation with rising crime rates, there were also numerous changes in the legal context of policing. These changes were the fruit of national coalition politics and concerted litigation and therefore, are more vulnerable to shifting political winds than are the institutional modifications described above. In the last few years, some of the procedural changes imposed on the police during the 1960s and 1970s have been weakened by more recent legislative or judicial decisions.

Three of the most significant legal constraints on the autonomy and discretion of the police are the *Miranda* rule of 1966; the revision of many local or state deadly force statutes; and the creation, in 1978, of a municipal liability for harms caused by governmental employees, hence by the police. The municipal liability, affirmed in the case *Monell* v. *Department of*

Social Services of the City of New York,[17] allowed an individual whose constitutional rights were denied by brutal or discriminatory police behavior to sue the city government for millions of dollars in damages. Since frequent suits would cause a rise in local property tax rates in order to recover the funds needed for payment of damages, the local citizenry, as well as the local business elite, pressured the police department to modify its practices. *Monell* has produced reform in some of the most recalcitrant Northern urban departments.

These legal and judicial restraints are the political victories of a liberal coalition that no longer has public support. As a consequence of this national change in attitude - which surprisingly grows stronger as the rate of violent crime decreases - serious efforts are underway to emasculate or eliminate the procedural impositions of the 1960s and 1970s.

The *Miranda* rule, which the present Attorney General has branded an "infamous decision," has already been weakened by recent Supreme Court rulings. Similar to the pattern that could be observed when public opposition to mandatory busing or to affirmative action had subsided on the part of those directly concerned by its implementation, the Supreme Court handed down decisions opposing these integrative strategies. The moving force was not the proven inadequacy of the specific reforms imposed nor a fear of racial conflict or violence due to their application, but a sweeping ideological shift throughout the body politic. Thus, in 1984 the Supreme Court introduced two loopholes in the *Miranda* decision even though police opposition had long calmed down and even though studies of its present effect indicate that only a negligeable number of cases are lost because of its violation.[18] The two loopholes - the good faith test and the inevitable discovery test - are sufficiently large as to allow yesterday's abusive practices to pass through.

Today there is no longer a national desire to fetter the police and no longer a national willingness to allow an aggrieved minority to do so either. In 1982 70 percent of the whites and 52 percent of the blacks questioned said that the "Police can't really do much about crime because the courts have

put too many restrictions on the police."[19] Support has increased among members of both races for stiffer sentences, harsher penalties, more systematic use of capital punishment.

Today it would seem that the battle against police malpractice has lost its enthusiastic batallions and its numerous foot regiments. The black community today is now less concerned with police brutality and more with police laxity. As a black city councilman in Atlanta declared, "The police were sort of bullish then and needed to be dropped down a notch. Now they're down two notches and need to be helped up a notch."[20] No longer the recipients of disproportionate police force, the Afro-Americans are still the disproportionate victims of violent and personal crime. Many blacks now fear that the new salt and pepper police departments have so effectively instructed their officers to be courteous community servants that the police will be no match for increasingly brutal criminals.

The result of these conflicting trends and competing pressures may be an even more anarchical patchwork of varied police conduct in the United States. The reformed police departments of black governed cities under extremely strict limitations governing the type of firearm and bullets allowed, the right to shoot a fleeing felon, the manner of apprehending and questioning suspects, will coexist with more numerous unreformed departments, obedient to vague or nonexistent state statutes, with police personnel unbridled by a renewed national indifference.

NOTE

1. Reiman quoted by Ben A. Menke, Mervin F. White, William L. Carey, "Police Professionalization: Pursuit of Excellence or Political Power," in *Managing Police Work: Issues and Analysis*, Perspectives in Criminal Justice, 4, ed. Jack R. Greene (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982), p. 97.
2. The modification of police practice and community opinion have been studied in depth by a research team directed by Dr. Geneva Smitherman whose findings were entitled "Deadly Force and its Effects on Police-Community Relations" (Detroit: Wayne State University, January 1984) and which Dr. Smitherman kindly made available to me.

3. Archives of the Atlanta Police Department made available by the Public Safety Commissioner George Napper.
4. The 1970 poll was part of an unpublished doctoral thesis by W.J. Mathias Jr., "Citizen's Perceptions toward Law Enforcement in the Model Neighborhood Area," (Atlanta: Georgia State University, 1970), p. 72. In 1982 and again in 1983 we conducted our own telephone survey of 600 Atlanta adults and questioned them about police practice and their attitudes towards city government in general.
5. Otwin Marenin, "Police Performance and State Rule: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of Coercion," *Comparative Politics*, 18 (Oct. 1985), P. 120.
6. Stephen Leinen, *Black Police, White Society* (New York: New York University Press, 1984), p. 146.
7. *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: Bantam, 1968), p. 309.
8. See the persuasive study by James W. Button, *Black Violence: The Political Impact of the 1960s Riots* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
9. *Report of the National Advisory Commission*, p. 17.
10. Until the late 1960s, black policemen, few in number, were kept on the lowest rung of the police hierarchy, assigned exclusively to black neighborhoods; in Atlanta, until the 1950s, blacks were only allowed to arrest other blacks and were told to call their white supervisor who would come to arrest a white suspect. It is amusing to note that the Ku Klux Klan protested in court against the hiring of additional black policemen, saying that it was unconstitutional to hire them with such restrictions on their authority.
11. J. Rosche, "Crime as an Issue in American Politics," in *The Politics of Crime and Criminal Justice* eds Erika S. Fairchild and Vincent J. Webb (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985), p. 19.
12. Thomas A. Johnson et al, *The Police and Society* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1981), pp. 163-173.
13. Statistics made available by the Police Foundation, Washington D.C. A survey made by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1975 found that police officers were 10.3 percent of the 332 municipal agencies questioned. Between 1972 and 1981 in those same municipal agencies, there was an increase of 72 % in the number of blacks holding the rank of sergeant or above.
14. John Van Maanen, "Making Rank': Becoming an American Police Sergeant," *Urban Life*, 13, (July-Oct. 1984), p. 158.
15. Leinen, p. 43.

16. This was the conclusion of tenant association presidents, police officers and tenant potrol captains interviewed in Atlanta in 1982 and 1983. Mayor Coleman Young of Detroit has found the same decrease after his reform of the police department, which he called "his most significant achievement" (*New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1984). The same conclusions were found in other cities with black mayors and black police commissioners (see Walter Leavy, "Can Black Mayors Stop Crime?" *Ebony*, 39 (Dec. 1983), pp. 116-122). This decrease goes beyond the nationwide decrease in serious crime since 1982. From 1982-1985 there were 2 million fewer crimes recorded (*International Herald Tribune*, June 10, 1985, p. 2).

17. *Monell* v. *Department of Social Services of the City of New York*, 98 Sct. 2018 (1978).

18. Testimony of Dr. James J. Fyfe (former police officer in New York and now professor of criminal justice at American University) before the Judiciary Commission of the House of Representatives. The *Miranda* rule required the police to warn a suspect (in his own language) of his right to remain silent, to have an attorney present, and that anything said might be used against him. Absent this warning, the suspect's testimony would not be admissable evidence.

19. *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics*, (Washington: US Department of Justice, 1983), Question 2, 46.

20. *Atlanta Journal*, (May 25, 1982).