IV

FROM FOUNDING FATHER TO SACRIFICIAL SON

THE TRANSFORMATION OF JOHN BROWN

In the course of the final assault on the enginehouse of the Harper's Ferry Federal Arsenal in which John Brown had barricaded himself with the remaining members of his raiding party on the morning of October 8,1859, Lieutenant Israel Green struck the old man with his sword before trying to run him through with a savage underthrust that raised him completely from the ground; the blade was deflected and bent double, but the assailant continued, beating his victim on the head with the hilt of his sword. John Daingerfield, one of the hostages, who was "not two feet from Brown at the time", supposed that the old man's skull was split and "did not know till some time later that Brown was not killed".(1) As chance would have it, Lieutenant Green had left his battle sword in the barracks and was armed, at the time of the attack, with only a light dress sword - a detail that no doubt saved John Brown's life and rendered possible the prison coda that was to follow, altering in the process public perception of the meaning of the raid. For it is clear that there are two separate parts to the Harper's Ferry expedition; the first comes to a close when the United States Marines storm the enginehouse on October 18, the second ends in the apotheosis of John Brown, hung from the gallows on December 2. Between these two dates he calmly received a stream of newspapermen and visitors in his cell (Oates (2) cites Coppoc's claim that no less than 800 people visited the jail in a two-day period) and kept up a voluminous correspondence with family, supporters, critics, and the simply curious. The Virginia authorities, by allowing uninterrupted access to the prisoner, and by postponing his execution so that he faced death alone, seemed perversely intent on facilitating martyrdom. His letters, writes Villard, "were a far - for them - more dangerous weapon than the Sharp's rifle they had taken from him at Harper's Ferry".(3) "No theatrical manager," remarked Thoreau, "could have arranged things so wisely to give effect to his behavior and words." (4) Later historians such as Nevins,(5) hostile to John Brown, will begrudge him his unerring instinct for finding and keeping the center of the stage, as if he should have had the common decency to keep passion out of the cold and calculating business of <u>real</u> politics. But as to the nature of the public conversion, there is no question. Immediately after the event the Northern press is almost unanimous in condemning the invasion as misguided if not simply crazy. On the day after Brown's capture Thoreau notes that he has "seen no hearty approbation for this man in any abolition journal".(6) On the day of the execution, however, church bells are rung throughout the North, prelude to a wave of idolatry that was to spread not only by the written word (and song) but by images as well - from nine-color chromos

of his life sold by newspapers as a promotion gimmick to Victor Hugo's imaginative sketch of the gallows scene.

The highly lyric effects achieved during the reprieve which Lieutenant Green unintentionally granted his victim inevitably color our perception of the hero, especially as the "miraculous", "meteor-like"(7) character of John Brown's intrusion into the ongoing debate about slavery tends to rob him of historical density.(8) History books reduce him to a single act that strikes out of nowhere, and the Harper's Ferry raid is treated as an overture to the Civil War rather than as a product of the 1850's. Brown did indeed consider himself as a man marked for a transcendent destiny, but his conception of his role (and the manner in which the acting out of this role was rendered possible by others) must be viewed in the light of pre-Harper's Ferry expectations as to the nature and possibilities of heroism. Leaving aside for the moment the prison sequel - during which Brown, instinctively grasping the new demands that public opinion was making on him, shifts his stance from war leader to solitary martyr - let us see what sort of figure he cut against the background of the 1850's. A number of recent historians (Michael Kogin, George Forgie and Dwight Anderson(9) among others) have argued convincingly that the period prior to the Civil War was lived in the shadow of the Founding Fathers and that however dramatic contemporary events appeared they were inevitably dwarfed by a past incarnate in the towering figures of the Revolutionary pantheon. Anderson has traced the widespread influence during this period of the cult of George Washington as codified in Parson Weems's celebrated Life, and in particular the forming effect the image of Washington exercised on Lincoln's career. Forgie pinpoints the 1850's as a decade in which nostalgic filiopiety is intensified, stifling the nascent Young America movement epitomized by Stephen Douglas and forcing the debate to return to exegeses of the Founders' true intentions.

Accepting, for immediate purposes, the legitimacy of this analysis of the period, how does John Brown fit into the temper of a time so concerned with the applicability of past models? Contemporary portraits of Brown invariably single out the anachronostic quality of his presence as a leading source of his charisma. The newspaperman James Redpath, major architect of the John Brown legend, who had begun mythologizing Brown well before the Harper's Ferry raid, introduces him as the "old Puritan type of Christian". (10) Emerson is quick to claim him as an original settler "fifth in descent from Peter Brown who came to Plymouth on the Mayflower in 1620",(11) and Thoreau adds the Revolutionary note, comparing him to "the best of those who stood on our bridge once, on Lexington Common and on Bunker Hill".(12)

The qualifier "Old" that adheres so naturally to his name simply reinforced the patriarchal element, as did the fact that Brown was constantly surrounded - and seen as surrounded - by his sons, no fewer than three of whom were to accompany him on the Harper's Ferry raid.

If, on the other hand, Brown himself slipped so easily into this role it is because the circumstances of his life had so to speak prepared him for it. Brown's biographers have amply informed us of the multiple failures that marked his pre-Harper's Ferry career - to the extent that some of them (Boyer for instance) are tempted to see in his militant abolitionism a compensatory activity. Perhaps. But we would stress rather the fact that the setbacks which John Brown experienced in the marketplace economy forced him to return to more traditional manual occupations that served to reinforce his image as holdover from a previous age. At certain periods of his life he exhibited the booster mentality of a thoroughbred Yankee entrepreneur. Take for instance his ventures in land acquisitions. Hard up for ready cash, John Brown invested borrowed funds in the Franklin Land Company counting on the coming construction of the Ohio and Pennsylvania Canal to bring about a dramatic rise in land prices. The sequel is a classic American unsuccess story: the canal company modified its route and the recession of 1837 created a credit pinch, with the result that by 1842 John Brown was forced to declare bankruptcy. His career as a speculator (he was even for a brief period a bank director!) was cut short. It is in great part this failure that will lead the Brown sons to stake out claims for Federal lands in Kansas, reverting to the role of frontier farmers in which they will be joined by their chastened father. Brown's subsequent foray into the wool business follows the same pattern: incensed by what he considered the unfair practices of wool purchasers he attempted to protect the farmers' interests by forming a cooperative company that would buy and hold available wool production, thus forcing the merchants to pay a reasonable price. The complexities of the market (and the erratic tariff policies of the Federal government) combined to do him in. A last-minute attempt to bypass middlemen and sell directly on the English market only compounded the financial disaster which ended in liquidation and acrimonious lawsuits. As a result John Brown retreated once again from the deceptive world of marketplace manipulation to a more traditional occupation - that of sheep and cattle breeder. However well-intentioned his try at stabilizing wool price may have been, in economic terms it represented an attempt to create a horizontal monopoly. Land speculation and monopoly building will fuel the post-Civil War economy; in these terms John Brown is a portent of the future, but a portent only since he proves spectacularly unfit for the world of the "moneylenders" and reverts to manual roles.

In yet another domain John Brown encountered defeat.

At the age of sixteen while living in the frontier town of Hudson, Ohio in the house of his father for whom he worked as foreman in the family tannery, Brown, despite his scant schooling, decided to prepare for the ministry, which meant going east to study Greek and Latin at Plainfield Academy in Massachusetts with the idea of going on subsequently to Amherst. There is no doubt as to the genuineness of his sense of vocation; there is no doubt either that in so doing he was conforming to the American pattern of social advancement. Some fifteen months later, however, he was on his way home again, ostensibly because of the inflamed condition of his eyes, in reality because he was illsuited to the intellectual preparation that the ministry required. The humiliation must have been extreme - so extreme, as Boyer points out, that he makes no mention of the incident in his autobiography. For another, such a downfall might have resulted in a rejection of religion; in John Brown's case it only drove him to reaffirm his faith, but in a nonintellectual, resolutely naïve manner. Had he acceded to the ministry Brown would doubtless have been influenced by the liberal interpretation of the Scriptures that was part of the Unitarian current so eloquently personified by Theodore Parker. As it was, he fell back on an extraordinarily literal interpretation - not only did he learn by heart entire pages of the Bible (which he quoted abundantly in his correspondence) but he read his own actions in terms of Biblical *figurae*. He was a Moses whose mission it was to lead God's people out of bondage in Egypt - a term which figures frequently in his correspondence as synonym for the South. (The fact that blacks also read the Bible in this spirit no doubt confirmed him in his ways). Brown habitually criticized the modern approach to the Gospel, witness his letter of 1853 to his oldest son: "I forgot to say that my younger sons (as is common in this 'progressive age') appear to be a little in advance of my older, and have thrown off the old shackles entirely; after THOROUGH AND CANDID investigation they have discovered the Bible to be ALL a fiction."(13) Whatever else he might do John Brown was not one to throw off the old shackles in order to advance into his own age. Unlike other abolitionists (overwhelmingly liberal in religious terms) for whom the emancipation of the negroes was a progressive social issue, Brown had derived his abolitionism directly from the sacred text.

The anachronistic figure that Brown cut, however, far from alienating militant abolitionists, proved to be a decisive factor in the spell that he cast over them. Nevins and Woodward, both relying heavily on James Malin's anti-Brown work, John Brown and the Legend of '56, mistakenly treat the enthusiasm of Brown's Northern supporters as a nineteenth-century form of 'radical chic', a desperate middle-class search for the exotic.(14) In a recent study Jeffery Rossbach(15) argues that the 'objective' intention of Brown's supporters was - through the catalytic effect of the violence that they knew he was prepared to unleash - to eradicate

slave docility and propel black men into the nineteenth century as full-fledged participants in the emerging industrial economy. Although his approach is at times tendentious Rossbach brings us much closer to the true nature of the relationship that bound Brown to the Secret Six, the band of intellectual reformers who financed his arms buying. To begin with, Brown appeared not as exotic but as a familiar figure cut from the same (social) cloth as they were. They, like John Brown, were descended from old New England families, and, with the sole exception of Gerrit Smith who had inherited a fortune in landholdings, they were born of families whose fortunes were in decline (George Stearns is the only one to make good as a businessman). John Brown represents for them a reminder of their origins - brought humanly closer by his evident insolvency. At the same time, Brown presented additional guarantees of reliability for these hesitant conspirators. He was a family man (abolitionism is closely linked to defense of the family as reading H.B. Stowe reminds us); moreover he retained (perhaps the only holdover from his illfated encounter with the business world), an accountant's turn of phrase that calmed whatever doubts may have assailed Sanborn, the chief bookkeeper of the group's funding enterprise. John Brown offered them a unique opportunity to reenter the world of the Fathers, to reestablish contact with the primal sources of national energy (it is in this sense that Brown is literally radical). James Redpath will supply the additional link when, in his portrait of John Brown, he evokes the latter's Indian prowess, a sure sign that a genuine American hero is in the making.

Undoubtedly as well - in the eyes of the Secret Six - John Brown, tough and unwielding, stood for the Act as against the Word - or rather words. Their support for him assuaged their misgivings as to the real hold that their ideas had on national consciousness and behavior. Brown's curt dismissal of politicians, his condemnation of all forms of compromise, his belief in the virtues of insurrection recalled an earlier age when - instead of talking(16) their ideas and engaging in Garrisonian shilly-shallying about moral 'suasion' (as the contemporary term would have it) - men had acted on their beliefs. And this nostalgia was accompanied by a solid dose of the intellectual's anti-intellectualism, which is but another expression of their uncertainty as to their status in society. John Brown, as he appeared in front of his Concord audience, holding up for all to see the chain with which the Missouri ruffians had bound and dragged his son, reassured them that they were indeed in touch with the cruel realities of the world.

An integral part of Brown's public image was his reputation as a Kansas fighter. It was as Captain John Brown, the hero of the Battle of Black Jack, that he toured the East in 1857 and 1858 in quest of support for his Great Plan. Kansas, in the second half of the decade, was the

theater not only of clashes between proslavery border ruffians and Free Soil immigrants; it was as well the seat of conflict between two conceptions of the anti-slavery cause. To Eli Thayer, the wealthy Worcester manufacturer and founder of the New England Emigrant Aid Society, antislavery was business antislavery; he had no quarrel with the slaveholders who remained south of the border. To Thomas Wentworth Higginson, later to figure as Brown's most loyal supporter among the Secret Six, it was a political and moral crusade, the last chance for the nation to make good on its initial promise of equality for all. To Higginson, who tried to raise an army for Kansas, and who held the rank of brigadier general in James Lane's troop, "a single day in Kansas makes the American Revolution more intelligible than all that Sparks and Hildreth can do".(17) This militant minister makes it a point when preaching in Lawrence (Kansas) on a September Sunday of 1856 to choose as text for his sermon the very Biblical verses the Reverend John Martin had preached on his return from the Battle of Bunker Hill. When in January of 1857 Higginson finally met John Brown face to face it produced a shock of recognition.

> I saw in Kansas the history of the past [....] And if I wanted a genuine warrior of the Revolution where could I find him better than in the old Vermonter, Captain John Brown, the defender of Osawatomie... Old Captain Brown, the Ethen Allen, the Israel Putnam of today? (18)

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An autobiography is the record of the manner in which an individual recombines the events of his life in terms of the response he intends to elicit; the autobiography of an historical figure can reveal the attempt to situate and define a public image. In the case of John Brown, unfortunately, the autobiographical record is slim. The account of his Kansas adventures, which he began in the third person, is cut short after only a few pages; we are left with the celebrated autobiographical letter addressed to George Stearn's son Henry but in fact intended for George Stearns himself. Dated July 1857, this letter - which recounts Brown's early life up to the time of his marriage - is designed to build confidence in the writer as a man who can be trusted in a matter as perilous as a direct attack on Southern slavery. The most dramatic moment is the account of young John's encounter with a black boy. While staying "with a gentlemanly landlord once a United States Marshall", (19) he meets a slave "near his own age very active, intelligent and good feeling" to whom he is under obligation "for numerous little acts of kindness". But whereas John is complimented on his smart behavior and quick speech, the black boy, his equal in every respect, is "hardly clothed", "poorly fed", and "beaten before his eyes with Iron Shovels or any other thing that came to hand". There

is no way of knowing whether or not this incident actually took place; true or not, the scene is given as the origin of his abolitionist sentiments, "a circumstance that in the end led him [i.e. John Brown, the text is in the third person] to declare and swear; Eternal War with Slavery". Childhood experience here provides the terrain for fundamental political decisions which are thus assimilated to reactions in a domestic (patriarchal) setting. In his autobiographical letter John Brown adheres to the pattern set down by Parson Weem's Life of George Washington (also written for young readers but aimed through them at their elders) whereby the stories of childhood (apocryphal or not) are seen as sure signs of future greatness.

The autobiography presents as well another curious aspect. While on one hand the author insists on his early ambition "to excel in doing anything he undertook to perform" and on the fact that he habitually expected to succeed in what he undertook, the account itself chronicles a series of losses which cast him in the role of victim. When he was six an Indian gave him a "Yellow Marble" which he lost "beyond recovery"; subsequently his pet squirrel wandered away or was killed leaving him "in mourning" for over a year; finally a ewe lamb, "perhaps" a gift from his father, sickened and died. These incidents - which John Brown sees fit to recall along with the loss of his mother at the age of eight, a loss that was "complete and permanent" in that he never "adopted in feeling" his stepmother - constitute what he refers to as "the school of adversity". Losses are interpreted as elements in a didactic process. Moreover the passage which describes the loss of the marble and the squirrel is followed immediately by the admission that, on occasion, he told lies; reversing the order of reading would suggest that the double loss is chastisement for uttering falsehoods. Could this not be further interpreted as an oblique reference to the punishment administered (in the form of financial ruin) when he abandons the Biblically sanctified profession of sheep and cattle breeder and ventures out into the false world of the moneylender? That such issues are not far from his mind is suggested by the fact that, in the course of a paragraph which discusses the right of minors to own animals, he adds that "older people have sometimes found difficulty with titles" (a reference to the dispute with Chamberlain over ownership of the Westland farm?). Be this as it may, in the context of the autobiography the misfortunes that he endures are treated as part of a plan, of a "much needed course of discipline" by which the "Heavenly Father sees it best to take all the little things out of his hands which he has ever placed in them". The only adversity recorded which is not considered as part of the Almighty's plan is that meted out to the black boy; only in so far as John Brown takes up the cause of the black boy (a boy of his own age and - according to the description given - of like abilities) is revolt legitimized. Here we can refer to another text written by Brown himself, this

time in the first person, in which the 'author' - a black man - makes public confession of his errors. "Sambo's Mistakes",(20) intended for the negro journal Ram's Horn, presents the portrait of a conventional Sambo (given to laughter, good times and ostentatious behavior) who repents of his ways. Incongruously Brown has included in the catalogue of Sambo's shortcomings certain traits that are far more characteristic of his own failings, namely obstinacy and dogmatism, creating thus a composite portrait which suggests in yet another way the extent to which Brown (unlike his contemporaries) has interiorized the image of the black man, experiencing the injustice done them as done to him, confirming the necessity of his/their revolt.(21)

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But what form was revolt to take? Although John Brown as a young boy was disgusted (as he recounts in his autobiographical letter) by what he witnessed of military training, he was not a man to tolerate disorder. On frequent occasions in the course of his career he adopted the stance of a lawgiver setting down in writing the code that was to bind the members of the group of which he was undisputed leader. The "Covenant and Bylaws of the Free-State Volunteers of Kansas"(1856) and the "Articles of Agreement of Shubel Morgan's Company"(1858) - both of which he drew up - go far beyond a mere set of working rules for frontier fighters.(22) Brown elaborates, in both cases, a social contract as if he had felt called upon to establish the charter of a new state. The 1856 Covenant stipulates how officiers are to be elected, creates a court of justice, regulates personal behavior (no "vulgar talk" or alcohol) and specifies how amendments can be adopted. And this is not the first text of this nature. Already in 1850, immediately after passage of the Fugitive Slave Law, Brown, who was then living in Massachusetts, had organized among the black population of Springfield a "Branch of the U.S. League of Gileadites" (no other branch existed or was to exist) for which he wrote an "Agreement" (signed by 44 blacks) and some stirring "Words of Advice". The Gileadites were to band together to rescue fugitive slaves from the law; but John Brown's text hints at something more far-reaching, for after remarking that "personal bravery" always "charms" the American people (and is thus more effective than the spectacle of "the sufferings of more than three millions of our submissive colored population") he goes on to cite the example of "the Greeks struggling against the oppressive Turks, the Poles against the Russians, the Hungarians against Austria and Russia combined",(23) as if he were prefacing a Declaration of Independence for the black nation. In a sense such a declaration was unnecessary; it would suffice simply to interpret the American declaration literally - in the same manner as Brown was accustomed to read the Scriptures.

But to John Brown no literal reading of the United States Constitution could make up for the obvious inadequacies of that document which afforded blacks no basis for protection. Thus - as a part of his preparation for Harper's Ferry - he sent out a call for a Provisional Constitutional Convention which was held under the auspices of the black nationalist Martin Delany in Chatham, Ontario in May of 1858. Brown delivered the keynote address and then submitted for approval his draft of the "Provisional Constitution and Ordinances of the People of the United States", which was adopted article by article (there were 48 of them in all) and signed by the assembled company after administration of an oath "not to divulge any of the secrets"(24) of the convention. This extraordinary document merits fuller treatment. In some respects - for instance separation of powers - it is modelled on the United States Constitution, but in other respects it inclines toward a far more authoritarian régime (the Commander-in-chief of the army - who is not the President - is given broad authority) and some provisions (obligation to labor, prohibition of "unlawful intercourse between the sexes") appear frankly despotic. But it is not the contents that concern us here as much as the fact that Brown, burdened as he was by the material and financial organization of his expedition, should consider such a step a necessary prelude to action. Harper's Ferry was not to be a hit-and-run raid on slave country but the first act of the process of substitution of one system of government for another - in other words a revolution, another one, or rather a return to the true meaning of the first.

Turning now to the Harper's Ferry attack itself, how can one account for the ignominious failure of so grand a design? For failure it was: Brown's expeditionary war, launched on a Sunday evening is over and done with by Tuesday morning. Brown's tactics seem to have been uncertain, badly prepared, and based on miscalculation of both black and white reactions. Villard considers that Brown has hesitated so long between alternative strategies that at the time of the attack he was "without any clear and definite plan of campaign".(25) Other historians (Nevins, Oates) point to the unsuitability of the terrain for guerilla warfare and the lack of any previous reconnoitering or logistic preparation. (Only W.E.B. Dubois approves of Brown as military commander, laying the blame on his men for tardy execution of his orders).(26) It would appear indeed that Brown never arrived at a satisfactory synthesis of the three strategies that he had, at one time or another, envisaged: guerilla warfare, open insurrection, and slave stampedes. Yet however justified these critiques of Brown's leadership may be, they do not provide an explanation of his conduct in the early hours of Monday morning. For at this moment, with several courses of action still open to him, John Brown - who certainly knew from his Kansas campaigns the danger, for a small force such as his, of losing the initiative - inexplicably

vacillates, lingering in the armory when all about him called for a rapid move. On this point all accounts agree.(27)

Shortly after taking possession of the armory and the rifle works on Sunday night, Brown had sent a detachment of six men to fetch Colonel Lewis Washington, great grand-nephew of George Washington, from his plantation five miles south of Harper's Ferry; the party, which returned in the early hours of the morning, had specific instructions(28) to bring back - in addition to the colonel - a pistol presented to George Washington by Lafayette and a sword supposedly given to him by Frederick the Great of Prussia, sword which was immediately appropriated by Brown himself. Washington's sword in hand, Washington's descendant on the premises, and a new Constitution in pamphlet form ready to be distributed: such symbols were signs the significance of which drowned out the desperate messages he received from his second-in-command, Kagi, calling for retreat to the mountains. Brown treated Colonel Washington more as a distinguished visitor than as a hostage, taking the trouble - and time - to send out to the local inn for breakfast, despite the fact that the alarm was by then spreading and the townsmen arming for the counterattack. But there was more to it than this. John Brown was well aware that Harper's Ferry (as well as all the other towns that had figured on his list of possible targets) was Federal ground.(29) As long as he remained there his revolt was a nationwide revolution. Were he to leave Harper's Ferry he would be but a renegade by Virginia or Maryland law. His dealing in traditional symbols (Washington, the Constitution) was a form of fidelity to the heroic image in which he was cast; but it was as well the expression of a fundamental political fact of the moment. The anachronistic return to the past carried with it a modern message that Brown was one of the few to have grasped: slavery would not disappear unless the Federal government was forced to intervene.(30)That intervention was all the more certain the longer he remained in the Harper's Ferry arsenal, reason enough to hesitate before abandoning the enginehouse.

In the hours following his capture John Brown plays out his role to the full, stating that his intention was to arm the slaves(31) and demanding that his constitution be read aloud in its entirety to the assembled company. He seems also to have invited discovery of incriminating evidence, having left in a carpet bag at the nearby Kennedy farm, letters implicating his Northern supporters and maps pinpointing the Southern counties in which the slave population was in the majority.(32) But in the course of the trial and the imprisonment Brown shifts his stance.(33) Abandoning the role of leader of a revolt he denies in his November 2 address to the court - probably his most telling speech in the light of the later legend - that he

never intended "treason, or the destruction of property or to excite or incite slaves to rebellion, or to make insurrection",(34) and he makes no mention either of his Northern supporters or of his plans for excursions further south. The Harper's Ferry raid is no longer the first act in a revolution, but a solitary form of moral witness that requires failure to succeed. By depoliticizing his invasion John Brown gives up the role of Founding Father for that of sacrificial son...only to be resurrected two years later by the armies of the North.

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(3) Oswald G. Villard, John Brown, 1800-1859, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911, p. 538.

(4) The Writings of Henry David Thoreau, 20 vols, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906, vol.IV,p. 442.

(5) Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, 2 vols, New York: Charles Scribner's, 1950,vol.II,chaps. 1,3.

(6) Thoreau, Writings, vol. XVIII, p. 405.

(7) Thoreau, Writings, vol. IV, p. 441.

(8) Nevins - followed by C. Vann Woodward in "John Brown's Private War", The Burden of Southern History, rev. ed. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968 - treats Brown as insane (Nevin's term is 'monomania'). Oates convincingly refutes this line of argument by showing how the affidavits on which Nevins and Woodward base their case, were drawn up when there was question among Brown supporters of trying to prevent the execution by a plea of insanity, and have been read out of context.

(9) Michael Kogin, Fathers and Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975; George Forgie, Patricide in the House Divided, New York: W.W. Norton, 1979; and Dwight Anderson, Abraham Lincoln: the Quest for Immortality, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982.

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(11) Ralph Waldo Emerson, Complete Works, 12 vols, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1888, vol. XII, p. 249.

(12) Thoreau, Writings, vol. XVIII, p. 436.

(13) John Brown to John Brown Junior, Aug. 26,1853, in Franklin B. Sanborn, The Life and Letters of John Brown, New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969. reprint of 1885 edition, p. 46.

(14) Malin himself sounds at times like a Tom Wolfe minus the humour: "Is it merely a strange paradox, or is it a form of practical or even a necessary balancing of social forces, that such a national Legend, grounded in a doctrine of violence, should become to such a degree an escape mechanism for a class of society which would be most injured by its application?" (James C. Malin, John Brown and the Legend of '56, Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1942, p. viii)

(15) Jeffery Rossbach, Ambivalent Conspirators: John Brown, the Secret Six and a Theory of Slave Violence, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,1982.

(16) A remarkable example of contemporary verbal acrobacy is to be found in Joshua Gidding's testimony on the relevance of the "Higher Law" to the "condition of African slavery in this country", given before the Senate Select Commission on the Harper's Ferry Invasion (U.S. Senate Committee Reports, 2 vols, 36th Congress, 1st Session,1859-60, vol.II,pp.152-153).

(17) Higginson article, Tribune, Oct.17, 1856, cited in Tilden Edelstein, Strange Enthusiasm: the Life of Thomas Wentworth Higginson, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p.189. Sparks and Hildreth were contemporary historians of the American Revolution.

(18) Higginson's speech printed in the Liberator, Jan. 16, 1857, cited in Edelstein, p. 196.

(19) The text of the letter is given in Redpath,pp.24-35.

(20) The article is cited in full by Villard,pp.659-61.

(21) For black opinion of John Brown see Benjamin Quarles, Allies for Freedom, New York: Oxford University Press, 1974.

(22) Villard gives both texts (pp. 661-64 and 666-67). "Shubel Morgan" is none other than John Brown himself, who also went under the name of Nelson Hawkins.

(23) "Words of Advice", in Louis Ruchames, ed. A John Brown Reader, New York: Abelard-Schuman,1959,p.76.

(24) The text of the "Provisional Constitution" and the minutes of the Chatham meeting are given in U.S. Senate Committee Reports, vol. I, pp. 45-59.

(25) Villard, p. 427.

(26) W.E.B. DuBois, John Brown, New York: International Publishers, 1972, reprint of 1909 edition,chap.11.

(27) Oates considers that Brown has "mysteriously delayed" (p.293); Boyer refers to his "fatal indecision" (p.4); and Redpath concludes that "the delay was fatal to his plans".(p.251) Osborne P. Anderson, one of the members of the expedition writes in his account of the invasion that Brown appeared "somewhat puzzled". (A Voice from Harper's Ferry, Freeport (N.Y.): Books for Libraries Press, 1972, reprint of 1861 edition,p.36) Brown himself ascribes his delay to "my desire to spare the feelings of my prisoners and their families".(Redpath, p.282)

(28) See Allan Keller, Thunder at Harper's Ferry, Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1958, p.41. Brown knew of the existence of these two weapons in Colonel Washington's house from John Cook, one of his men, who had previously gained entry to the plantation by posing as a door-to-door booksalesman peddling ... a life of George Washington.

(29) This point will emerge in the debate as to whether or not John Brown should have been tried in a State or Federal court, debate which the Virginia authorities foreclosed by their haste in bringing him to trial. Brown's defense counsel will plead that Brown was not a citizen of Virginia and that the events took place outside the court's jurisdiction - from which one can draw the conclusion that the only treason he could have been charged with was Federal treason. See The Life, Trial and Execution of Captain John Brown, New York: Da Capo Press, 1969, reprint of 1859 edition, "The Fifth Day", pp. 84-94.

(30) On this point see Albert Fried, John Brown's Journey: Notes and Reflections on his America and mine, New York: Doubleday, 1978, chap.5, "Black and White".

(31) "He was particularly inquired of ... as to his intending to stampede slaves off, and he promptly and distinctly replied that that was not his purpose. He designed to put arms in their hands to defend themselves against their masters, and to maintain their position in Virginia and the South".(Testimony of Andrew Hunter, U.S. Senate Committee Reports, vol.II, p.62) John Brown does, however, in the course of the long Tuesday afternoon interview with Governor

Mason, on occasion avoid admitting outright that he intended to set off a general uprising among the slaves, but the details that he provides are such as to leave no doubt in his hearers' minds. Hunter finds it "very singular" - as do others - "that he should enter into his plans immediately". (U.S. Senate Committee Reports, vol. II, p.60)

(32) That John Brown foresaw the possibility of failure appears highly likely to his biographers, for instance Oates: ".... even if his invasion failed (as he probably knew it would)". (p.310) Thus the fact that John Brown should have left incriminating evidence where it could so easily be captured is tantamount to an attempt to implicate others in a nationwide revolt. Sure enough, the front page of The New York Times of October 22, 1859 broadcasts the news: "But the most valuable discovery was a trunk belonging to Capt. Brown, containing a great number of highly-important papers, documents, plans and letters from private individuals throughout the Union - all revealing the existence of an extensive and thoroughly-organized conspiracy, whose leaders were Capt. Brown and J.F. Cook....". There follow extracts from the correspondence.

The New York Times also publishes a "Vindication of the Invasion". This document, written in the past tense, Oates takes to be a vindication of the Harper's Ferry expedition, written by Brown "as though the raid had already failed and he was facing a jury and a divided nation beyond".(Oates,p.283) In our opinion - although we agree that Brown half expected to fail - Oates' reading is a misinterpretation; the document more probably refers to the Missouri slave raid and thus dates from the Kansas period (other Kansas papers were found in the same lot). Sanborn is also of the latter opinion (see Sanborn, p.489).

(33) The shift did not go unnoticed. See Andrew Hunter's testimony (U.S. Senate Committee Reports, vol. II, p. 62) and Brown's letter in which he tries to reconcile the two versions (ibid., pp. 67-68).

(34) John Brown's speech to the Court, Nov. 2, 1859, The Life, Trial and Execution of Captain John Brown, p.94.

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1894: ENGLISH WOMEN PROTEST
The Revolt of the Daughters and the New Woman

The 1890s witnessed the birth of the modern movement for the emancipation of middle and upper class English women. This was of course not the first time that middle class women had demanded political, social or economic rights. Nor was it a successful movement, for by the end of the century it appeared to have lost momentum, only to spring to renewed and virorous life early in the new century in the suffragette campaign.

The emancipation movement of the 1890s was the culmination of trends which had been gathering ground for several decades. The growth of business and government, banking and finance, and the development of modern forms of communications created a demand for lower-middle class jobs, particularly in teaching, clerical work and the civil service. The result, as Lee Holcombe has shown, is that the numbers of women in these occupations rose steadily between 1861 and 1891, a rise whose pace was to quicken in the two subsequent decades.[1] During the same period the educational opportunities of middle-class girls improved greatly, many high schools being founded or reformed and the first women's institutions of higher education making remarkable progress against heavy odds. The increased self-confidence brought about by educational change and economic independence was an important stimulus to the women's protest movement. The cynical exploitation of women professional workers, whose hours of drudgery were rewarded by inadequate salaries and poor conditions, probably did more to encourage the movement than to dampen its enthusiasm.

The later nineteenth century witnessed a growing sex imbalance, the result of predominantly male emigration to the colonies and to the United States. In 1891 there were over 300,000 more women in their twenties than men,[2] and a calculation made by Clara Collet, a close student

f women's economic and social problems, suggested that ne woman in six would remain unmarried. In London the atio was one in five and the position was particularly arked among the educated middle class. This sex mbalance increased the exploitation of women in poorly aid jobs of all kinds, but it also meant that many women nwilling or unable to become wives poured their energies nto careers and into the movement for women's emancipation.

The economic demand for the cheap labour of educated omen and the sex imbalance were important causes of the omen's movement, which reinforced the pressures inherent n the continued growth and development of an industrial, rban society. The movement was fostered by other features f the times. There was a great deal of talk in the 1890s bout the spirit of "fin de siècle", which flouted social onventions and feverishly searched for novelty. Men and omen seeking new fashions and forms of living were bound o make relations between the sexes an early target.

The remarkable literary flowering of the 1890s ave a powerful fillip to the women's protest. The most nfluential figure was Henrik Ibsen, whose A Doll's House reated a sensation when first publicly performed in ondon in 1889. It was followed by more plays by Ibsen nd by writers like A.W. Pinero and H.A. Jones, and by he books of many novelists of both sexes. Although many onics were tackled the works shared a common theme; omen's social oppression, their economic demands, their exual needs. The school included major novelists like homas Hardy and George Gissing: its female members, ighly influential in their own day, were almost forgotten ntil their reputations were revived in the 1970s.

Protest was also furthered by an apparently nlikely factor, the bicycle. Although various forms of ycle had been popular among men for some years and many omen tricycled, it was not until the safety bicycle and he pneumatic tyre had been perfected in the later 1880s nd mass produced in the early 1890s that popularity became craze. The sense of freedom made possible by the icycle was unprecedented and its importance difficult to

exaggerate. Certainly it finds an affectionate place in most of the autobiographies of contemporary women, and there were frequent claims during the period of the cycling boom that it had done more for women's emancipation than any other single factor.[4]

It was in this context that daughters revolted and the New Woman was born.

In January 1894, Blanche Alathea Crackanthorpe, the wife of a barrister and the mother of a promising writer, published an article in the Nineteenth Century which quickly became a sensation. It was entitled: "The Revolt of the Daughters". "These are the days of strikes", Mrs. Crackanthorpe began, with a reference to a wave of industrial turmoil which had recently reached a climax in a violent miners' strike. The daughters' demands were presented as modest. They centred round the right of the unmarried girl to be considered as "an individual as well as a daughter". She should be able to make her own errors, travel freely, visit the music hall (with her brother!) and enjoy improved education. Boys were ungrudgingly prepared for a variety of professional careers, while girls were to enter a single profession - marriage. The daughter who asked for a fraction of the expenditure laid out on her brother and who was refused on the ground that a woman should remain in the parental home until called from it by a husband had real cause to protest against her lot.[5] But the conventional thinking behind Mrs. Crackanthorpe's support for the striking daughters was indicated by the reason which she gave for supporting professional training for women: "Marriage is the best profession for a woman; we all know and acknowledge it; but, for obvious reasons, all women cannot enter its strait and narrow gate." She also took the opportunity to denounce the "double standard" of sexual morality then generally accepted, which dictated that before marriage a wealthy man should keep a mistress or visit prostitutes, while a respectable girl saw no more of her lover's body before marriage than his hands and face.[6]

The "hurricanes" and "thunderbolts" which, Mrs. Crackanthorpe wrote, followed the publication of her article,[6] indicated the sympathy with which many readers viewed her case and the opposition felt by others to potentially dangerous changes in social and sexual behaviour. The Nineteenth Century itself printed a number of other articles on the same subject and the series was widely commented on and copied. Emily Harrison, the wife of the writer Frederic Harrison who was no friend of women's freedom, contributed a short story whose heroine told of friends whose parents had inhibited their efforts to paint, study history or (in the absence of an escort) attend economics classes. One mother had given her daughter a novel but had carefully censored a section with a carefully placed bonnet pin.[7]

Mrs. Crackanthorpe contributed a second article attacking the "matrimonial hunt", the target of which was the capture of a husband in a girl's own social class or above it, and pointed out that mothers had themselves contributed to the new ferment by working in a variety of "good causes" unknown to earlier generations. These included "slumming in the East" (social work with the poor in the East End of London), membership of School Boards or Boards of Poor Law Guardians, running clubs for working girls, taking part in organising women's trade unions and similar activities.[8] (Incidentally she, like other educated writers of the time, liberally sprinkled her articles with French phrases: ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte; autres temps autres moeurs; pour tout potage, and so on.)

Two of the daughters were given an opportunity to speak for themselves. The American Alys Pearsall Smith, soon to marry the mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell, claimed the right of a daughter to "belong to herself" in terms which pointed to the influence of Ibsen.[9] It was left to Kathleen Cuffe, daughter of the Earl and Countess of Dysart, to "speak in the name of the average more or less unemployed, tea-drinking, lawn-tennis playing,

ball-going damsel" of the upper and upper-middle class. Lady Kathleen mentioned some common symbols of the revolt, such as the music hall and possession of a latchkey. But her principal demand was the abolition of the chaperon in all normal circumstances. Unmarried women of her class could not visit a friend two or three streets away, walk in the park, attend a tea party, play or concert, or even church unaccompanied, although a young married sister could freely do all of these things. Social work was out of the question, for "who has ever heard of anyone 'slumming' under the protecting care of a chaperon?... Perhaps", she concluded wistfully, "we may even see the day when a chaperon will be as little known as a great auk or other creature of a past era."[10]

Of the articles stimulated by the Nineteenth Century's series one need mention only a short rejoinder which appeared in the Westminster Review. The author, Gertrude Hemery, announced that at the age of 18 she had her own latchkey and was never chaperoned. Purity, she commented, was the result of knowledge rather than ignorance, a belief she intended to put into practice if she became a mother, bringing up sons and daughters without differentiation on grounds of sex.[11]

By this time the revolting daughter was giving way to the more enduring phenomenon of the New Woman, a term often used by modern writers without reference to its origin. In early 1894 the demands of educated women had reached such a pitch that it was fairly common to write in terms of a "new" womanhood.[12] However, the creation of the New Woman as a heroine or bogey figure was the result of an interchange between two prominent women writers in the pages of the North American Review.

The first of these writers was Sarah Grand, as Frances Elizabeth Bellenden Clarke (1854-1943) called herself, apparently oblivious of the fact that another woman using the same name had achieved some notoriety before her marriage to Talleyrand. She struggled as

a writer after leaving her dissolute husband in 1890, but with the publication of The Heavenly Twins in 1893 she achieved a literary sensation and sudden fame. The book dealt with marriages of convenience and ignorance and with venereal disease and its consequences, making a powerful plea to end the double moral standard. Sarah Grand wrote other works of fiction, none of which achieved the success of the earlier book, but she had a long and varied life and in the 1890s in particular she was lionised, interviewed and regarded as a principal feminist authority on relations between the sexes.[13]

The second author was 'Ouida', the pen name of Louise Ramé (1839-1908). She was a romantic novelist of an older generation, whose best-known book, Under Two Flags, had been published as long before as 1867. She now made her home in Italy and her living by writing articles on a variety of topics, among which was a virulent anti-feminism which sought to convict women of being a "drag on the wheel of the higher aspirations" of men, and possessing "a sleeping potentiality for crime" and "a curious possibility of fiendish evil".[14]

In an article in the North American Review in March 1894 entitled "The New Aspect of the Woman Question", Sarah Grand asserted that men understood traditional types of women, whom she referred to as "the cow-woman" and "the scum-woman". But, she added, "the new woman is a little above him". This was the woman who would have to hold out her hand to man and to educate him out of his moral infancy.[15]

In good journalistic fashion Ouida saw her opportunity. Her article "The New Woman" took up the term perhaps carelessly used by Sarah Grand and created a new species. Like Mrs. Crackanthorpe she coupled the rise of the women's movement with the rise of labour, insisting that both were "unmitigated bores":

> "The Workingman and the Woman, the New Woman, be it remembered, meet us at every page of literature written in the English tongue: and each is convinced that on his own especial W hangs the future of the world."

This was a perceptive if bad-tempered sentence, for the history of the twentieth century in every industrial society has in fact largely been written in terms of these two Ws.

Ouida went on to attack the New Woman's alleged lack of humour, her preference for public life, sport and study of medicine to her proper vocation as wife and mother. She compared the New Woman to a farmer who coveted his neighbour's field instead of tilling his own: "The New Woman will not even look at the extent of ground indisputably her own, which she leaves unweeded and untilled."[16]

As soon as the May number of the North American Review reached Britain (the British Museum's copy is dated 11 May 1894) the New Woman became a stock phrase of every journalist and commentator. The Times augustly disregarded the phenomenon, but it made its first appearance in the Daily Telegraph on 12 May, in the Daily Chronicle on the 14th and the Pall Mall Gazette on the 16th. Once Punch took hold of the topic on 26th May it refused to let it go; as late as 10 January 1900 it asked whether the New Woman was living or dead.

The New Woman was largely the creation of the press, but it was a creation easily recognised in the fiction and the social life of the period. The critic Edmund Gosse wrote testily in 1895:

> "Things have come to a pretty pass when the combined prestige of the best poets, historians, critics and philosophers of the country does not weigh in the balance against a single novel by the New Woman...An intelligent foreigner, I suppose, visiting our country in this year of grace, would be more struck with the ebullition of chatter about the New

A Study in Backs.

THE SPORTING BACK.

THE LADYLIKE BACK.

THE HOBBEY BACK.

THE NEW-WOMAN BACK.

Lady's Realm March 1900, p. 643

woman than with anything else."[17]

Dora Montefiore, a socialist and feminist, was one of the few emancipated women ready to accept the title, for the term, she pointed out, had been invented by its enemies. She encapsulated many of the views of advanced women of the period in a poem entitled "The New Woman":

"She is pondering social problems
Which appeal to heart and brain.
She is daring for the first time
Both to think - and then to act...
Centuries she followed blindfold
Where her lord and master led
Lived his faith, embraced his morals;
Trod but where he bade her tread."[18]

Women's movements in England have always had to face the weapon of ridicule. Both men and women have disguised their apprehension and fear by professing to find amusing the prospect of women challenging the existing pattern of relations between the sexes. A period in which women outnumbered men was thought particularly appropriate to characterise the New Woman as manlike, dowdy, flighty, incompetent and so on. Punch's first comment was typical:

"There is a New Woman, and what do you think?
She lives upon nothing but Foolscap and Ink!
But, though Foolscap and Ink form the whole of her diet,
This nagging New Woman can never be quiet!"[19]

As the journalist Hulda Friederichs asked:

"Is there in all this world a creature that has been slandered like her? Slandered, ridiculed, calumniated, scorned, mocked, caricatured, and abused, till you can hurl no more insulting epithet at any girl or woman than to call her a New Woman."[20]

Yet the New Woman like the revolting daughter was much more than the creature and the victim of press and fiction. The mid-1890s were marked by a revolt

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symbolised, not created, by the New Woman. The demand for the parliamentary vote, now nearly a generation old, could easily be contained by flippancy or obstruction in the House of Commons. The employment of middle-class women, though it caused some concern to the conservative, was as useful to employers seeking cheap, docile labour as it was essential to women themselves. But social and sexual revolt was another matter; it threatened, like the later women's liberation movement, to overthrow established institutions of male supremacy. Many real husbands, like a fictional one in a short story of 1896, must have felt that their wives had suddenly jumped "to the middle of the twentieth century!"[21]

Women refused to accept the previous image of themselves as weak and incapable of physical exertion. This was true not only of cycling but of many other forms of sport and recreation, including hockey and golf.[22] Some courageous women, especially cyclists, adopted "rational dress", a kind of knickerbocker outfit which was a shocking, though commonsensical alternative to long, trailing skirts.

Increasing numbers of women took up smoking, a curious but nonetheless potent symbol of emancipation.[23] An amusing case was reported to the Daily Telegraph by a man whose railway carriage was invaded by four young women, one whom produced a "smoking" label which she fixed to a window. His protests were met by the reply that the smoke would be good for him.[24]

The requirement of the wedding service that brides should promise to obey their husbands was questioned by bold spirits. The Young Woman stage a correspondence entitled "Should Brides Promise to Obey?", and though they disappointingly refrained from publishing an analysis of replies, the fact that hundreds of them were received made clear that the subject raised strong feelings.[25] A clergyman reported that some brides,

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"No, thanks; I never smoke before ladies!"

unwilling to say 'obey', promised to 'love, honour and go gay', words with an amusingly changed connotation to a later generation.[26] When married some women insisted on keeping their own first names, being known as 'Mrs. Arabella Smith' rather than 'Mrs. John Smith' as convention dictated.

Objection was voiced to a woman's marital status being public property, a remarkable foreshadowing of the later use of the abbreviation 'Ms' and an even closer approximation to French practice. The journalist Ella Day wanted the term 'Miss' to be reserved for the young; women should be known as 'Mrs.' regardless of whether or not they were married. She asked:

> "Why should a woman be, as it were, branded on the forehead? Why should her luggage, when she travels, proclaim her domestic condition to every railway porter? Why should the announcement of her name at a public dinner or a reception indicate to every ear that she is somebody's property, or is still available for somebody else?"[27]

This type of striving for emancipation, though indicative of widespread feeling, had little chance of triumphing over the overwhelming pressures of convention and respectable opinion of the day. But the movement, amorphous and leaderless as it was, raised issues which were not forgotten. Each generation builds on the shoulders of its predecessor, and the determination and single-mindedness of the suffragette movement owed at least an indirect debt to the courageous and forgotten women who had raised much wider issues in the previous decade.

NOTES

1 Lee Holcombe, Victorian Ladies at Work (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 203-17 and passim.

2 Royal Commission on Population, P.P. 1949, vol. XIX, Cmd 7695, p. 14.

3 Clara Collet, "Prospects of Marriage for Women", Nineteenth Century, vol. 31, April 1892, p. 540.

4 I have discussed this subject in "Cycling in the 1890s", Victorian Studies, vol. 21, Autumn 1977, pp. [illegible].

5 B.A. Crackanthorpe, "The Revolt of the Daughters", Nineteenth Century, vol. [illegible], January 1894, pp. 23-31. I have drawn the reference to a lover's hands and face from a similar comment made by Vera Brittain in Testament of Youth (London, 1933), p.[illegible].

6 B.A. Crackanthorpe, "A Last Word on the Revolt", Nineteenth Century. vol. 35, March 1894, p. 424.

7 E.B. Harrison, "Mothers and Daughters", Nineteenth Century, February 1894, p. 317.

8 B.A. Crackanthorpe, op. cit. (note), p. [illegible].

9 Alys Pearsall Smith, "A Reply from the Daughters", Nineteenth Century, March 1894, pp. [illegible].

10 Kathleen Cuffe, "A Reply from the Daughters", Nineteenth Century, March 1894, pp. [illegible].

11 Gertrude Hemery, "The Revolt of the Daughters. An Answer - by One of Them", Westminster Review, vol. 141, June 1894, pp. 679-81.

12 The writer Robert Buchanan, for example, made three references to New Womanhood in a letter in the Daily Chronicle on 15 January 1894.

13 The first published biography of Sarah Grand, Gillian Kersley's Darling Madame, was published in 1983.

14 Ouida, Views and Opinions (London, 1895), pp. 319, 324. None of the published biographies of Ouida is of assistance in discussing the New Woman controversy.

15 Sarah Grand, "The New Aspect of the Woman Question", North American Review, vol. 158, March 1894, pp. 271-3.

16 Ouida, "The New Woman", North American Review, vol. 158, May 1894, pp. 610-19. An article in the comic paper Judy for 18 April 1894 (p. 186) discusses the New Woman. I have found no other which predates Ouida's.

17 Edmund Gosse, "The Decay of Literary Taste", North American Review, vol. 161, July 1895, pp. 116-17.

18 Dora B. Montefiore, "The New Woman", "Singings Through the Dark": Poems (London, 1898), p. 62.

19 Punch, 26 May 1894, p. 252. Punch was so pleased with this verse (or so short of copy) that it virtually repeated it on 21 September 1895, p. 136.

20 Hulda Friederichs, "The 'Old' Woman and the 'New'", Young Woman, vol. 3, March 1895, p. [illegible].

21 Walter Parke, "How Mrs. Newman Became a New Woman", Atalanta, vol. 9, January 1896, p. [illegible].

22 Marie C. Pointon discusses these and related subjects in her Manchester University M. Ed. thesis "The Growth of Women's Sport in Late Victorian Society as Reflected in Contemporary Literature" (1978).

23 "Should Ladies Smoke?", Lady's Realm, February 1900, pp. 513-18.

24 Daily Telegraph, 1 May 1894.

25 Young Woman, vol. 6, April 1898, pp. 253-4.

26 E.J. Hardy, Love, Courtship and Marriage (London, 1902), p. 91.

27 Ella Dey, 'Letters to the Harassed", Young Woman, vol. 5, May 1897, p. 313.

INTELLECTUALS, PROTEST AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE DONS OF WAR

Stephen Kirby

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reative and critical thinking[1], it is clear that there have been substantial hanges in the organisation and nature of intellectual life in the twentieth entury. During the First World War intellectuals were increasingly involved in upport of, and in opposition to both governments and the state and this trend as continued and intensified. At the same time there has been the development f new technical and scientfic skills of a highly specialist nature which have ontrasted strongly with the more philosophical and generalist skills of earlier enerations of intellectuals. The active involvement of intellectuals in the reat political issues of the day and the distinction between the new scientific ntellectual and the more traditional philosophical intellectual have been xpressed nowhere more clearly than in the contemporary "nuclear debate".

The Intellectual and Politics

The growing involvement of the intellectual in the affairs of the state has been commented upon by many authors. Julien Benda in his book La Trahison des clercs notes that intellectuals such as philosophers, men of religion and artists had traditionally been "strangers to political passion" and had acted as a restraint upon governments, but that from the end of the 19th century they began to play the political game and to introduce "political passion" into their work. This, for Benda, was the "treason of the intellectuals" which finally expressed itself in the support of the "clercs" for the strong state.[2] Florian Znaniecki in his study of the social role of the man of knowledge has also noted that "Kings, [and] war lords ... have been using experts for many centuries", but that the work of "experts" was limited because their role was defined by the interests of their sponsors and the results of their research had to be known in advance to be relevant to the practical tasks of the political leader. The role of technical advisors to governments and politicians has developed rapidly in modern society in response to the need for someone to act as a "guide" in thinking about new political, social and cultural problems. This new kind of intellectual Znaniecki calls the "sage" whose main task is to "rationalise and

In several important studies Noam Chomsky has noted how intellectuals were enlisted in the justification and running of America's wars. John Dewey and his supporters were the willing accomplicies of President Wilson's administration in its effort to enter the First World War. Once in, Dewey and like-minded intellectuals were prepared to engage in "historical engineering" by "explaining the issues of the war that we might the better win it."[4] Dewey had noted the ability of governments to "take hold of human affairs and manage them", and he believed that the central question after 1918 was "whether the intelligent men of the community really want to bring about a better reorganised social order". Chomsky's studies of the Vietnam war revealed the full extent to which the American intellectual community had become absorbed into the state's decision-making structure to the point where Connor Cruise O'Brien's warning that declining standards of scholarly integrity were leading to the development of "a society maimed through systematic corruption of its intelligence" had come to pass in America.[5]

Bakunin was the first to warn of the rise of a "new class" which might use its control of technical knowledge to set up "the reign of scientific intelligence", and Daniel Bell has developed the theme to suggest that as western states move towards a "post-industrial society" so leadership will rest "with the research corporation, the industrial laboratories, the experimental stations, and the universities." Bell argues that "not only the best talents, but eventually the entire complex of social prestiege and social status, will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific communities"[6] These fears were unfounded in so far as the "new class" became either the providers of expert services to the state or the rationalisers and justifiers of the power held by other elites but not power holders themselves, but these studies clearly mark the rise of a new kind of technical or functional intellectual.

Edward Shils has traced these changes in the United States and in "the Western countries" since 1945 and has observed that they took place,

> "not as a result of ideological considerations" ... but because of the increased military and industrial importance of science, changing intellectual interests, new techniques of inquiry and the emergence of new forms and high scale of financial support."[7]

Bell also links the rise and the political role of a functional intelligensia to the military affairs of the state, and he observes that "it has been war rather than peace that has been largley responsible for the acceptence of planning and technocratic modes in government."[8] This process has led to the "disproportionate growth" of the technological sector of the intellectual community and it is characterised by highly specialised training and professional activity, and by "a very attenuated contact with the inherited traditions of humanistic and scientific thought."[9]

The rise of the functional intellectual developed hand in hand with the emergence of new kinds of skills, technology, applied sciences, management and public administration, that reflect the tendency of modern developed states to call upon the talents and the services of the intellectual community. Shils argues that these new "'functional' intellectuals" are integral to a modern economy and are indispensible to a modern military establishment. They are trained to carry out the rational-empirical tasks of the state and are "more specialised and less attached to the literary and philosophical traditions of earlier generations of intellectuals."[10] Jose Ortega Y Gasset made a similar point when he saw in the rise of the middle class to political power in the 20th century the vital role played by the "technicians" such as engineers and financiers, but pre-eminently by the "man of science". Although a specialist, indeed precisely because of his specialisation, the "man of science" knows only his tiny corner of the universe but is ignorant of all the rest [11]

Max Ascoli notes how functional intellectuals have played a role in 20th century democracy when,

> "groups of ... determined men may stand, working through propaganda and pressure, and assuming the representation of society through default of other pretenders. These group badly need the help of intellectual technicians."

The decline of intellectual robustness and independence into political function-

alism and rationalisation and, in addition, the failure to realise "political changes which became possible after the middle of the last century", are explained by Ascoli not just by the rise of the intellectual technician, but also "to a great extent thanks to the softening of intellectual vigor brought about by scholastic pedentary and by journalism"[12] Hofstadter's distinction between "intellect", which refers to the creative and critical tradition of thought, and "intellegence", which is adjustive, manipulative and practical, typifies the division between the traditional and the functional intellectual communities.

Despite the rise of the "functional" intellectuals and despite their integration into daily politics, the older tradition still survives in the work of "self-supporting intellectuals", "the private scholar" and the "independent author". This older tradition is characterised by,

> "... the search for truth, for the principles embedded in events and actions, or for the establishment of a relationship between the self and the essential, whether that relationship be cognative, appreciative, or expressive."[13]

In so far as this tradition relates to the state and society, it is marked not just by the willingness and ability to serve, but also by an inclination to examine the value orientations that are embodied in institutions and expressed in policies. The focus of this tradition is essentially upon those who exercise authority - political, military, social and economic - since they are the "custodians of the central institutional system." The role of this tradition has been both to underwrite the legitimacy of the "system" and also to criticise, elaborate and develop its potentialities. In this way the traditional intellectual "supplies the important function of molding and guiding the alternative tendencies which exist in any society."[14] This function also explains the tension that often exists between members of the traditional intellectual community and those in political authority, a tension that reflects the attempt to resist or condemn authority if it betrays "the highest values", and one that springs from "the constitutive orientation of the intellectuals toward the sacred."[15] Znaniecki, too, comments upon the intellectual tradition that stands in opposition to the "sage" and the "technical expert"; this is the

ambition of the "creator of new knowledge" was never beyond justification and rationalisation to set up new cultural ideals, and beyond the receiving and transmission of doctrines to develop those doctrines and forge new ones.[16]

Anti-nuclear Protest and the Intellectuals

The revival of anti-nuclear protest in Britain, Europe and the United States began in the Spring of 1980 as a response to NATO's decision of December 12th 1979 to "modernise" its theatre nuclear weapons by siting American Cruise and Pershing II missiles in several European countries. However, as the protest movement has gathered momentum, the number and nature of the issues that concern it have changed and there is now protest about all nuclear weapons committed to NATO and the Warsaw Pact and also about developments in Soviet and American strategic doctrines. This debate has provided the most thorough and exhaustive public examination of defence and strategic issues that has ever taken place in Britain, and it addresses both the contemporary situation and the intellectual, political and military developments that have created and maintain it. In the course of that examination it has become clear that intellectuals have played a vital part not only in the protest movement itself, but also in the creation of the weapons, strategies and political conditions that are the subject of protest. Indeed, the central core of the debate may been seen as a confrontation between the "functional" and "traditional" intellectual communities, or at least between the modes of thought and traditions of enquiry that each represents. This article examines the criticisms made by the anti-nuclear protesters of the functional intellectuals and their contribution to the weapons, strategies and political justifications of the nuclear age.

Contemporary anti-nuclear protest is focused primarily on the nuclear weapons and strategic policies of western governments and upon the deployment of American and Soviet nuclear forces in Europe. But the leaders of anti-nuclear protest, like E. P. Thompson, Alva Myrdal, Noam Chomsky, Dan Smith and Mary Kaldor, argue that in order to understand the nature of contemporary nuclear weapons systems and their associated strategic doctrines, it is necessary to

analyse the political, military and scientific developments that have brought them about.[17] Such an analysis shows that in each area 'functional' intellectuals have played a central and crucial role, and their contribution has been particularly marked in the fields of applied nuclear science, strategic theory and in the mobilisation of political support for nuclear defence policies. These contributions have become a focus of criticism for the protest movement.

Applied Nuclear Science

The contribution of scientist and technologists to the Manhatten programme for the production of an atomic weapon is now a mattter of record. A letter sent to President Rooseveldt by Albert Einstein on 11th October 1939 began a chain of events that led to the formation of the US Office of Scientific Research and Development in June 1941, which together with the War Department was given responsibility in early 1942 to produce an atomic bomb. The project was under the directorship of J. Robert Oppenheimer who, apart from his role as director, was assigned the task of separating uranium 235 from natural uranium. Enrico Fermi, along with many other prominent scientists, was also drawn into the project and was given responsibility for the production of a controlled, self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction; a task that he achieved at the Stagg Field laboratory of the University of Chicargo on December 2nd 1942. The hallmark of the Manhatten Project was that Oppenhiemer, Fermi and other scientists were assigned tasks by the goverment for the accomplishment of an end that was given. Neither the end, the atomic bomb, nor the use that the American goverenment was to make of it were questioned by those who provided the means until long after the project had been succesful; and then only by a handful. The majority of the Manhaten scientists were content to meet the rational/empirical tasks set them by state.

To accept, as many of these scientists were to claim, that theirs was simply a technical contribution to a programme authorised by government is to abdicate both emotional and moral responsibility, and to assess the role of the scientist at this level alone is to risk becoming involved in what Chomsky has called a "morass of insane rationality."[18] His comments were directed at other

policy areas but apply equally well to the Manhattan Project;

> "By entering into the arena of argument and counter-argument, of technical feasability and tactic, of footnotes and citations, by accepting the legitimacy of debate on cetain issues, one has already lost one's humanity."[19]

One ought not to be cool, scholarly and objective, nor control elementary human reactions when assessing contributions to a project for the construction of a weapon of unimaginable human destructiveness.

Indeed, after the war there has been just such an "elementary human reaction" from several of the scientist who were involved in nuclear and other weapons programmes. In response to a call by Einstein and Russell the first Scientific Conference on Disarmament and World Security was held in Pugwash, Nova Scotia during July 1957. The Pugwash conferences now have a broad scope but retain the central theme of examining the social responsibility of scientists towards world problems, and this kind of concern can also be found in the editorial policy of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and similar scientific publications and organisations. Nevertheless, the Pugwash scientists remain in a minority and the "functional" scientist and technician continues to make a major contribution to the scientific-military establishment of the modern state. A contribution which is seen by the protest movement to be integral to the development and the continuation of the nuclear arms race.

Lord Zuckerman, a former chief scientific advisor the the British government, said in an address to the American Philosophical Society on November 8th, 1979 that,

> "The scientist and technologists were the ones who initiated the new developments; who without any coherent concern for political values or goals, created new demands; who warned the public about new hazards. They were the ones who, at base, were determining the future. The nuclear world, with all its perils, is the scientists' creation; it is certainly not a world that came about in response to any external demand."[20]

In this analysis the scientific and technological establishment no longer simply contributes to policy goals defined by the politicians but has produced a technological momentum that politicians themselves can no longer control. E. P. Thompson describes the process of weapons innovation as self-generating and

endorses Deborah Shipley's belief that institutional pressures for new systems produce a uncontrollable "weapons creep".[21] The process is evident on both sides of the nuclear balance so that "The men in the nuclear weapons laboratories of both sides have suceeded in creating a world with an irational foundation, on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built."[22] The protest movement argues that those "realities" have been shaped in large part by another type of functional intellectual; the academic military analyst and strategist.

Strategic Theory

Philip Green notes in the preface of his seminal work Deadly Logic that "The growth of the academic literature of military strategy has been one of the major intellectual phenomena of the cold war era in the United States."[23] Indeed, Green's book, published in 1966, marks the end of a ten year period that has become known as the golden age of nuclear strategy in which authors like Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger and Thomas Schelling collectivly became "the vanguard and foremost representatives of a new element in the councils of American government: the Academic Strategists." Green notes that deterrence theorist claim the "mantle of scientific expertise", but that the claim produces "a feeling of strangeness" since, although almost all the works of the academic strategists were invested with a tremendously authoritative and scholarly air, they "produced policy proposals and arguments that one felt absolutly no urge to agree with." Green's lack of agreement arose from the questionable and sometimes absurd assumptions that are integral to all such theorists such as "the casual assumption that the 'rational' response to a nuclear strike on one's cities is a counterstrike on the attackers cities."[24] A more recent example of strategic absurdity is the claim of General James Stansbury that "... an eight hour nuclear war is no longer an acceptable concept"[25] because deterrence requires that America must have the capacity to fight a much longer nuclear war. Clearly any deterrence theory that requires such a capacity can lay no claim to be a theory of rational bargaining

Beyond this, there are several assumptions that generations of academic strategists have shared. Green identifies deterrence theorists as those "who reject both a disarmament strategy and a win-the-war nuclear stategy, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union",[26] and Thompson extends this point to show that for these theorists "The ineuctable condition of bloc antagonism is taken, unexamined, as the premise from which all else flows."[27] This assumption reinforces the effect of the weapons scientist since,

> "Politics is ... walled out by the first premise of deterrence theory - that the two blocs are in a state of perpetual armed hostility and must ever continue to be so. Hence any attempt at a political resolution is postponed, and weapons serve as a substitute."[28]

Thompson argues that deterrence theories lock the superpowers and their allies into a "deep structure of mutual fear", and Raymond Williams assesses the effect of deterrence theory on arms control and disarmament. To maintain weapons equality, deemed vital by deterrence theorists, states persue multilateral and limited agreements which usually accept a "balance" at the level of the most advanced of the participants thereby pushing the arms spiral up rather than down, so that "To a very large extent ... 'multilateralism' is in fact a code word for continued acquiescence in the policy of military alliances and the arms race."[29]

There has also been an important academic contribution to the development of new deterrence theories based upon a capacity to <u>fight</u> nuclear war which first became official US policy in the early 1970s with the Schlesinger Doctrine. That doctrine sought to provide the United States with "selective nuclear response options" so that there could be an alternative to what President Nixon described as the

> "... single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans."[30]

Once again the original policy and the alternative to it rested on the unexamined assumption of implacable opposition of the superpowers at a time when, parodoxically, detente was loudly proclaimed and well established. Detente notwithstanding, the Schlesinger Doctrine was extended even further in the "counterveiling" strategy introduced by Carter and carried on by Reagan.

The development of this strategic doctrine was promoted by the USSR's achievemnet of strategic parity, growing political strains within the Atlantic Alliance, and the percieved "adventurism" of the USSR in the 1970s, all of which led the academic strategists to raise questions about the credibility of America's nuclear guarantee to Europe and questions about what could be done if deterrence failed. "American strategists, displaying a rather clinical and apolitical approach to their subject" decided that either America must reacquire its strategic superiority or that NATO must reinforce the lower levels of its escalation ladder; or that both should be accomplished. In the event the needs of deterrence were deemed to require both even though "[t]he strategic logic of this line of argument is not matched in political logic",[31] for the simple reason that even in the early 1980s the actual state of East/West relations made the prospect of a Soviet invasion of western Europe or a Soviet first strike against the USA highly unlikely.[32]

Nevertheless, the new "deterrent" strategy requires that the US must have the ability to fight nuclear war for at least several days the better to deter the USSR, and its intellectual origins may be found in the work of defence research institutes like the RAND Corporation, but especially in the theories of academic strategists like Colin S. Grey, Richard Pipes, Lawrence J. Korb and Eugene Rostow, many of whom promoted their view through the lobby group <u>The Committee on the Present Danger</u>, and all of whom became advisors to or members of Reagan's administration.[33] The annual bombardment of Congress and Pentagon by defence analysts, consultants and strategists such as these, as well as by research institutes, veterans associations and defence industrial interests, all with their own specialists and experts represents,,for the protest movement, functional intellectualism gone mad.

<u>Political Mobilisation</u>

The transition from the policies of detente, launched by Nixon and handled in a very uncertain fashion by Carter, to those of nuclear rearmament promoted by the Reagan administration owe a good deal to service lobbying and to changing congressional attitudes, but the most significant change was in the American

ublic's view of the need for a more powerful and assertive defence policy. President Reagan's election promise to make "America strong again" was a response to this mood. It is important to note, however, that the mood itself was not spontaneous but was developed after unremitting work by several influential lobby groups each represented by defence intellectuals.

Academic institutions like the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the Hoover Institute and the American Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) were, and are, weighty opponents of detente and were mainly responsible for the view that America's land based ICBMs were vulnerable and should be replaced, and later publicised the case for the introduction of Cruise and Pershing II missiles into Europe. These, essentially academic, institutions not only acted as lobbyist and populisers of new defence policies, but also activly participated in the political process. David Abshire, the Chairman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, was head of the Reagan transition team for a short period and has been a frequent witness before congressional defence committees to advocate strong defence and war fighting deterrence. There has also been a whole host of conservative pressure groups that have worked directly to influence the public and congressional mood on defence. The Heritage Foundation published a 20 volume study "Mandate for Leadership" which was a blueprint for conservative government and strong defence, and it supported its policies with a pool of 1,000 conservative academics who were avilable to give evidence to congressional committees and the media.

Throughout the Carter administration two groups, the Committee on the Present Danger and the American Security Council, were particulary effective critics of defence policy , and many of the academics from these groups have taken posts in the Department of Defense and other defence related agencies of the Reagan administration. The Committee on the Present Danger, founded and supported by such academic luminaries as Eugene Rostow, Richard E. Pipes and Ada B. Bozeman, was a major opponent of SALT II ratification and was the co-architect with Senator Sam Nunn of barganing the Senate's approval for rati-

fication against Carter's willingness to raise defence spending. The American Security Council, another private defence lobby group, was also very successful in influencing congressional and public attitudes about defence, and was judged by an officer of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to have played a "key role" in shaping opinion against the SALT II treaty and for a larger defence effort including new strategic weapons.

To a much less, but still significant, extent intellectuals have been involved in the "nuclear debate" in the United Kingdom, and in one notable event the conflict between the new functional intellectual and the traditional school was demonstrated most clearly. The BBC invited E.P. Thompson, a leading nuclear disarmer and member of END, to deliver the Reith Lectures of 1981, but the invitation was later withdrawn and extended to Professor Lawrence Martin, vice-chancellor of Newcastle University and ex-professor of War Studies at London University. Martin's lectures were critical of the nuclear disarmament movement and supported the British government's case for replacing the independent deterrent and supported NATO's decision to place cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe.

In a reply to these lectures Thompson not only challenges Martin's arguments - these cannot be covered here - but also draws a sharp distinction between his own intellectual approach to defence issues, derived from history, to those of Martin based upon strategic studies. Martin he claims has "acquired the hubris of the academic, but without acquitting himself in any recognisable academic discipline", and the judgement rests as much on the assessment of the new science of strategic studies as it does on Martin's use of its "insights". Thompson argues that "Strategic studies, if they are not admixed with a reputable discipline - of the economist, the political theorist, or the historian - are a non-discipline. They are the apoligetics of military power." Thompson shows that much of Martin's argument rests on simple assertion and that his work reflects none of the reputable disciplines. "Professor Martin" he concludes "is a new kind of intellectual creature. He has prospered as a courtier to the nuclear weapons systems and their defence establishments."[33] A more explicit

condemnation of a 'functional' intellectual who rationalises and justifies the collective tendencies of his party could not be made.

Conclusion

The nuclear debate is sure to engage the public's attention for as long as it takes western governments to deploy the current generation of nuclear weapons. But past experience suggests that once a deployment has taken place public interest and protest will receed. However, the analysis of the anti-nuclear movement suggests that the real object of protest should be not just contemporary governments and nuclear weapons but, more importantly, the insane rationality of those scientists and technologists who produce ever more destructive generations of weapons and the functional intellectuals who's theories and rationalisations have attuned minds so that they have become, in Thompson's words, "habituated to the vocabulary of mutual extermination."

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Intellectuals", The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, (London, Fontana Books, 1977), pp. 314-315.
2. Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intelectuals, (New York, William Morrow, 1928), pp. 29-37. There are extracts from Benda's work in George B. de Huszar, The Intellectuals, (Illinois, Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 217-232.
3. Florian Znaniecki, The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge, (New York Harper Torchbooks, 1968), p. 72.
4. Quoted in Noam Chomsky, Intellectuals and the State, (Het Wereldvenster Baarn, 1978), p. 16.
5. Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969), p. 22.
6. See Daniel Bell, "Notes on the Post-Industrial Society: Part I", The Public Interest, No. 6, (1967), pp. 24-35.
7. Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers, (Chicago, the University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 74.
8. Bell, op.cit., passim.
9. Shils, op.cit., p. 74.
10. ibid., p. 76.
11. See Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Barbarism of 'Specialisation'", in Huszar, op.cit, pp. 176-197. The quotation may be found on p. 177.
12. See Max Ascoli, "Intellectuals and Democracy", in Huszar, op.cit., pp. 298-301
13. Shils, op.cit., p. 16.
14. ibid, p. 7.
15. ibid, p. 17.
16. See Znaniecki, op.cit., Chapter 4, passim
17. See for example E. P. Thompson and Dan Smith, Protest and Survive, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1980), Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament, (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1977), and Mary Kaldor and Dan Smith, Disarming Europe, (London, The Merlin Press, 1982).
18. Chomsky, op.cit., p. 11.
19. ibid, p. 11.
20. Lord Zuckerman, "Defeat is Indivisible", in Lord Mountbatten, Lord Noel-Baker and Lord Zuckerman, Apocalypse Now, (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1980), p. 16.

21. E. P. Thompson, Zero-Option, (London, The Merlin Press, 1982), p. 46.

22. Zuckerman, op.cit., p. 24.

23. Philip Green, Deadly Logic, (Ohio, Ohio State University Press, 1966), p. xiii.

24. ibid, p. xi.

25. Reported in Clarence A. Robinson, "Pentagon Backs Strategic Modernisation", Aviation Week and Space Technology, (October 26th 1981), p. 53.

26. Green, op.cit., p. 5.

27. Thompson, op.cit., p. viii.

28. ibid, p. ix.

29. Raymond Williams, "The Politics of Nuclear Disarmament", New Left Review, No. 124, (November/December 1980), p. 34.

30. Richard Nixon, A Report to Congress: US Foreign Policy for the 1970s - A Strategy for Peace, (February 18th 1970), p. 122.

31. Lawrence Freedman, "Europe and the United States", International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3, (Summer 1982), p. 404.

32. See for example Kenneth Pridham, "The Soviet View of the Current Disagreements between the United States and Western Europe", International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 1, (Winter 1982/83), pp.17-31.

33. See for example Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War", Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1, (July 1977), pp.21-34, and Colin Grey, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory", International Security, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 54-87.

34. E. P. Thompson, "A mid-Atlantic Moderate", in M. Clarke and M. Mowlam, (eds.), Debate on Disarmament, (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 199 and p. 120.

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YELLOW RAGE : NEW PAGES OF ASIAN-AMERICAN LITERATURE

Asian-Americans have only begun to emerge in the last ten years from their ghetto-fortresses and the "protective coloring" of an acceptable stereotype : the submissive, hard-working, law-abiding "model American". A set of circumstances prevailed which allowed for the release, in the early 1970s, of pent-up yellow rage, especially in literary and dramatic form. Undeniably, the most important influence was the example of black writers who stirred racial pride and whose works led to a general raising of ethnic consciousness among all Americans. The war in Vietnam brought to public consciousness the racist structures of American society which were responsible for the disproportionate number of blacks and chicanos who lost their lives in South East Asia.

One of the direct results of this raised consciousness was solidarity among American ethnic and racial minorities and their identification with Third World victims of American foreign policies. The moral problem directly faced by Asian-American soldiers in Vietnam was that of "a yellow man killing a yellow man", while experiencing racism and discrimination on the part of white comrades-in-arms.

A third factor which influenced Asian ethnic consciousness was demographic in nature. Both the Chinese-American and Japanese-American communities were traditionally tightly controlled, both through self-imposed discipline, as well as through behavior control sanctioned by older, respected leaders. These older community members have been progressively losing their moral and economic control as their children and grand-children outnumber them and are more heavily influenced by American values. The arrival of large numbers of new immigrants from Asia, since the abolition in 1965 of immigration quotas based on national origin, has severely disrupted the status quo and equilibrium of these communities. In Los Angelos, for example, the Chinese population mushroomed from 41,000 in 1970 to 153,000 in 1983.[1]

Particularly in the Chinese-American community, these foreign born are resented and cruelly mocked for being backward and ignorant of American habits. They pose a threat to the American born who are desperately seeking a new identity which takes into account their Oriental heritage and the fact of their being a part of a visible minority ; however, they are alienated from the anachronistic immigrant culture of their quaint parents and they feel no bond of sympathy for those strangers from Hong Kong and Taiwan whose dialects they find incomprehensible. The American born Chinese generation lacks self-assurance and feel that culturally they have no recognized existence. But they are not ready to capitulate to the inexorable pressure to assimilate into white society. They have too many accumulated grievances for past treatment.

The Asian immigrants have been the unique victims of certain American racist policies. An 1870 law excluded Asians from the right to become naturalized citizens. Sinophobia led to the first Exclusion Act of 1882 which specifically barred immigration of Chinese workers. All first generation Asians were legally deprived of the right to own property in states which passed Alien Land Bills. The 1924 Immigration Act effectively stopped all immigration from Japan. During World War II over 110,000 Japanese-Americans, in a totally unprecedented way, were kept in internment camps because their loyalty to the United States, as an ethnic group, was put in question.

Despite the exceptional treatment of Chinese- and Japanese-Americans, their experiences as immigrants have much in common with those of European immigrants. Like all American writers, Asian-American writers have, in the words of Irving Howe, "had to make, rather than merely assume, America as their native ground".[2] They have been subjected to American popular culture, to vulgarization and misrepresentation of their native culture, to the "organized forgetting" of their people's history in America, perpetrated by both their elders and by their missionary teachers. They have suffered from a sense of dislocation and a terrible feeling of inadequacy as they tried to identify with the American myths of the founding fathers and the ideal of rugged individualism.

Like the children of Howe's Eastern-European Jewish immigrants, the Chinese- and Japanese-American children "did not come as empty vessels".[3] Their minds were filled with heroic and terrifying stories of the old country.

But these stories of venerable ancestors, of gods and warriors from the Mountains of Jade, when torn from their context and left unexplained, were to become a source of mystery and anguish to American-born Chinese and Japanese children, as well as an ambiguous source of identity. The curious blend of Oriental and Western values and myths is the focus of most Asian-American writers work. They are seeking to define what makes up the Asian-American identity and experience.

Up until 1970 Asian-Americans had published fewer than ten works of fiction or poetry.[4] There was no first generation literature describing the fundamental immigrant experience, the dreams of new arrivals, or their disappointment when confronted with the harsh realities of ghetto life. The Chinese and Japanese did produce newspapers, journals and diaries. Part of the intensive research of Asian-American scholars today is to seek out vestiges of this past. A recent publication relies on the fortuitous discovery of 135 calligraphic poems which were carved or ink brushed onto the walls of the barracks on Angel Island in San Francisco Bay which served as a detention and processing center for Chinese Immigrants from 1910 to 1940. One of these poems conveys the mixture of moral anguish, resentment, and determination which characterizes the immigrant experience.

The low building with three beams
merely shelters the body.
It is unbearable to relate the stories
accumulated on the Island slopes.
Wait till the day I become successful
and fulfill my wish !
I will not speak of love when I level
the immigrant station !
By One From Taishan[5]

The first serious history of Chinese-Americans as told from their point of view is Victor and Brett Nee's oral history of immigration to San Francisco, *Longtime Californ : A Documentary Study of an American Chinatown*.[6] The authors interviewed three distinct communities within Chinatown : the bachelor society of immigrant laundry, textile and restaurant workers which was characteristic of the nineteenth and early twentieth century ; the small- business centered family which emerged in the later twentieth century when female immigration became possible ; and the new working class families which have arrived since 1965.

Frank Chin collaborated in 1974 with other Asian- Americans to edit *Aiiieeeee !* the first anthology of Asian-American Literature presented from a radical point of view.[7] Its polemical introduction serves to divide Asian-American authors of the past into "assimilationists" or true representatives of Asian-American sensibility. The editors characterize a true Asian-American sensibility as that belonging to :

> "Filipino- , Chinese- , and Japanese-Americans,
> Americans born and raised, who got their China and Japan from the radio, off the silver screen, from television, out of comic books, from the pushers of white American culture that pictured the yellow man as something that when wounded, sad, or angry or swearing, or wondering whined, shouted, or screamed "aiiieeeee !".8

That battle cry signaled the emergence of an Asian-American militant personality. Like blacks and chicanos, Chin adopted a once pejorative epithet, "Chinaman", from the name given to all Chinese during the gold rush period, "John Chinaman", which implied that all Chinese were identical and interchangeable. Chin's ideal Chinese-American, the "Chinaman", speaks poetry that has the rhythms and accent to be found in Chinatown, but is distinctly different from the fictional examples of assimilated Asian-Americans like Susie Wong or Charlie Chan.

> I am the natural born ragmouth speaking the motherless bloody tongue. No real language of my own to make sense with, so out comes everybody else's trash that don't conceive. But the sound truth is that I AM THE NOTORIOUS ONE AND ONLY CHICKENCOOP CHINAMAN HIMSELF that talks in the dark heavy Midnight, the secret Chinatown Buck Buck Bagaw. 9

According to the editors of *Aiiieeeee !*, in over 140 years only five serious attempts at literature by Chinese-Americans had been published by 1973. [10] They considered all but one of these authors as assimilationists, "white-washed", justifying the stereotype of the "model minority" who forgets past injustices and tries to make the best of things on white America's terms. These authors can afford to be docile and "respond to racism silently and privately" because they are convinced of the superiority of Chinese culture.; this is, in Chin's opinion, a white stereotype that

serves white supremacy by maintaining Chinese- Americans in a compliant, inferior position. Chin denounces the myth that Asian-Americans have maintained cultural integrity as Asians and can derive some ethnic pride from the high culture of a China of 500 years ago. One of the characters in Chin's first play objects strenuously :

> I am not Japanese ! Tam ain't Chinese ! And don't give me any of that "If-you-don't-have-that-Oriental-culture,-baby, -all-you've-got-is-the-color-of-your-skin" bullshit. But we're not getting into no silk robes and walk around like fools for you ! 11

The editors of *Aiiieeeee !* disagree violently with the notion that this so-called Chinese heritage represents a distinct advantage when compared to "... the abject cultural deprivation long foisted upon Afro-Americans". [12] They disagree with the widely accepted idea that Asians "... have suffered less and are better off than the other colored minorities... that Asians are well liked and accepted in American society..." [13]

A major dilemma for Asian-Americans is created by the ambiguity of their situation as a minority.

> We straddle an awkward middle ground - the buffer between whites and blacks. We're accepted and we're not accepted - "better" than other minorities but not good enough. Though we're included in affirmative action programs, we're not perceived as a "disadvantaged" group... As a group we "out-white the whites" in scholastic achievement, occupational status, and median income levels. 14

Diana Fong imputes Asian invisibility to the fact that the Chinese do not generally consider politics in terms of group goals, nor to they see themselves as a unified group. On the whole, the Chinese-Americans have accepted the American ideology of individualism and have striven to achieve success through scholarship or commerce. She considers, however, the relatively high rate of intermarriage between whites and Asians as an indication of increasing acceptance. [15]

This kind of acceptance through intermarriage is precisely what worries Chin. He is convinced that Asian-Americans as an ethnic group are an endangered species. If Asian-American women "marry out", it is because of low esteem for the Asian minority and because there is no "recognized style of Asian-American manhood". [16] The editors of *Aiiieeeee !* make the point that the stereotype of male behavior for Asians is unlike that of other races.

> The white stereotype of the acceptable and unacceptable Asian is utterly without manhood. Good or bad, the stereotypical Asian is nothing as a man. At worst, the Asian-American is contemptible because he is womanly, effeminate, devoid of all the traditionally masculine qualities of originality, daring, physical courage, and creativity. The mere fact that four out of five American-born writers are women reinforces this aspect of the stereotype. 17

Frank Chin concurs with this opinion. "My shelf is full of books by Asian-American women, and all of them are saying how rotten Asian American men are."[18] *Machismo* and low self-esteem of Asian males are dominant themes in Chin's play, *Chickencoop Chinaman*.

A Eurasian woman passing for a white in *Chickencoop Chinaman* chides a Chinese-American, Tam, for his lack of masculinity.

> I Knew you hated being Chinese. You're all chicken ! Not an ounce of guts in all of you put together ! Instead of guts you have...all that you have is culture ! Watery paintings, silk, all that grace and beauty arts and crafts crap ! You're all very pretty, and all so intelligent. And ... you couldn't even get one of your own girls, because they know... 19

All the characters in this play are struggling to overcome their inferiority complexes as Asian-Americans. Both Tam, the Chinese-American, and Kenji, a Japanese-American, grew up in a culturally mixed ghetto in Oakland, California. They play at being black, imitating black voices and gestures. Kenji's nickname is "Blackjap" and as an adult he chose to live in the black ghetto of Pittsburgh called Oakland, thereby avoiding contact with Orientals. One experience in particular symbolizes for Kenji and Tam a moment of shared masculity and negritude. They kidknapped their childhood

hero, an old black boxer named Ovaltine Jack the Dancer, and after an evening's drive, they finished by urinating with him in the bushes. This is what Tam calls "fakin' blackness for balls". [20]

It is precisely because of the fact that the Asian-Americans as a minority group are considered to be well-integrated, "to have out-whited-the whites" that Frank Chin looks to black writers, and blacks in general, as role models.

> Unlike the Blacks, who have achieved an American dream by being self-begat, having no historical continuity, we haven't made it yet. For the Blacks, their historical continuity was restored late, as represented by *Roots*. They created an identity and culture that was strong enough to keep them together when it became possible for them to be absorbed. 21

Frank Chin's characters envy black men for their sexual assurance but also for having created a black idiom and a black style. Second generation Asian-Americans find themselves in an ambiguous situation ; they denounce "the tyranny of language", of both the root culture and white mainstream culture. They argue that blacks and chicano writers have established their own vernacular modes of expression which are accepted and recognized by their respective communities as well as by white critics. But Asian-American writers are denied the legitimacy of their own dialect because they have been able to assimilate when they desired to do so.

Just as the Chicanos look for *chicanismo* in Aztec legends, so Chin seeks to establish a spiritual link with the first Chinese miners and builders of the transcontinental railroad.

> What Asian-Americans need to write about, if they're to have any pride, are heroes - mythological, larger-than-life, Asian-American heroes who live in the Sierra Nevadas, the Mother Lode, or the mines..." 22

In his search for cultural continuity with nineteenth century immigrants, Chin has unearthed a popular Chinese folk hero, Kwan Kung, the god of war and protector or writers and scholars. The legend of Kwan Kung was told in the epic Cantonese opera, *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, which was performed frequently in all American Chinatowns.

But in its transposition to America, the opera took on a particular Western American character which reflected the living conditions and the experiences of the Chinese immigrants in the mining and railroad camps. In speaking of the fraternal "Oath in the Peach Garden" scene from the Opera, Chin says :

> Nothing charitable, necessarily honorable,
> in any Western sense, passive or timid about it ...
> It encouraged an aggressive self-reliance and trust nobody,
> watch out killer's sense of individuality that reached
> a peak in China with the Cantonese, took to the image
> of what the Chinamans scratching out mountains for gold
> thought of themselves, grew roots in California and
> sprouted a Kwan Kung happy race of people who wanted
> to hear, read and rewrite, only one story, and
> sing and sit through and pass with one opera only. 23

The traditional statue of Kwan Kung which was to be found in every Chinese-American home in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries represented the god sitting on a tiger throne, his left side robed like a scholar and his right side protected by a soldier's armor. This is the image of self-sufficiency that Chin would like to substitute for the effeminate Charlie Chan stereotype.

Because of the exaggerated *machismo* point of view of Frank Chin (undoubtedly a necessary step in his development as a writer), it seems desirable to examine how a woman writer tries to free herself from double bondage. In 1976 a Chinese-American woman published an extraordinary novel that used as its primary symbol of a new kind of Asian womanhood a "female avenger", the feminine equivalent in all ways to Kwan Kung. The new Chinese-American woman is seeking to avenge the wrongs done to her people, but also to liberate herself from the status of wife or slave, to reject subordinate roles dictated by Chinese tradition. The blend of dream, myth and memory which characterizes Maxine Hong Kingston's autobiography, *The Warrior Woman : Memoirs of a Girlhood among Ghosts*, conveys perfectly the ambiguity, confusion and, sometimes, terror which fills an immigrant child's mind.[24] Kingston's story about a childhood spent in a Californian Chinatown is the story of a second generation Chinese-American's struggle to resolve the conflict of values of the two societies of which she is a part ; her experience concerns primarily her efforts to free herself from the weight of the past and her incapacity to do so completely. She describes the enormous relief she felt when, as an adult, she entered a mainstream American society founded on material and rational beliefs. She ironically contrasts the apparent simplicity and utilitarian values of Western culture with the occult notions she associates with her oriental heritage.

> I had to leave home in order to see the world logically, logic
> the new way of seeing. I learned to think that mysteries are
> for explanation. I enjoy the simplicity. Concrete pours out
> of my mouth to cover the forests with freeways and side-
> walks. Give me plastics, periodical tables, t.v. dinners
> with vegetables no more complex than peas mixed with diced
> carrots. Shine floodlights into dark corners : no ghosts. 25

Part of her relief is provided by breaking a conspiracy of silence concerning all things Chinese, in at last being able to separate truth from fiction. "I like to look up a troublesome, shameful thing and then say, 'Oh, is that all ?'... It drives the fear away and makes it possible someday to visit China, where I know now they don't sell girls or kill each other for no reason." [26]

Many Chinese-American children grew up with an obsessive fear of white authorities and immigration officials, owing to the necessity of maintaining a tissue of lies and false identities. The 1882 Exclusion Act did not stop all immigration. The 1906 San Francisco earthquake, in which all immigration records were destroyed, provided an administrative loophole which would allow for a continuous trickle of illegal immigration. Any Chinese who had been residing in the United States at the time of the earthquake could claim he had been born in San Francisco and was therefore an American citizen. He was entitled to bring over foreign born children. In this way the "slot system" racket run by slot brokers enabled numerous "paper sons", sons on paper only, to immigrate to the United States to be reunited with their fictive fathers. "Lie to Americans. Tell them you were born during the San Francisco earthquake. Tell them your birth certificate and your parents were burned up in the fire".[27]

Other restrictive measures resulted in the creation of a primarily bachelor community ; it was illegal for an American citizen (even of Chinese descent), to marry a Chinese person. Anti-miscegenation laws also applied to the Chinese. The Chinese-American community which numbered over 100,000 in 1890 was to steadily decline until the 1943 repeal of the Exclusion Act and

more liberal immigration laws in the 1970s. However, the succeeding generations of Chinese continued to look toward the East, to support large families there with the money they could spare from their earnings. The communist revolution in 1948 had a profound psychological effect on the older population because their seldom realized dream of retiring to China was effectively killed. But the tradition of sending money continues to weigh heavily on second generation Chinese-Americans. Maxine Hong Kingston observes sardonically. "When we overseas Chinese send money, do the relatives divide it evenly among the commune ? Or do they really pay two percent tax and keep the rest ? It would be good if the Communists were taking care of themselves ; then I could buy a color t.v."[28]

The techniques developed to ensure survival and minimize conflicts with the mainstream society also served to consolidate the power of the patriarchal Chinatown establishment known as The Six Companies. The Chinese-American establishment maintained dual stereotypes of Orientals : the fiction of a hard-working, puritanical, law-abiding community with no social problems ; and the survival of Chinese values and culture which were interpreted as "yellow inscrutability" in a "psychologically impregnable" Chinatown.[29] The district and clan organizations regulated all conflicts within the community and used intrigue and flattery to keep white officials at a distance.

The Chinese community, which is marked by class stratifications, was oppressed from inside as well as from outside. The "Uncle Tongs" or "war lords", as the well-to-do members of the Chinatown establishment were called by radical Chinese-American youths, were able to employ helpless illegal immigrants under sweatshop conditions. Racial and cultural pride also contributed to maintain this barrier of silence concerning the abominable living and working conditions and the physical and mental ills which afflict the Chinese-American community. "Don't report crimes ; tell them we have no crimes and no poverty. Give a new name every time you get arrested. The ghosts won't recognize you. Pay the new immigrants twenty-five cents and hour and say we have no unemployment."[30]

In the words of a Chinese-American college activist, "... for *the majority of Chinatown residents,* especially the recent immigrants, it (Chinatown) is a concentration camp where they must fight for a minimum survival means and where their way of life is poverty and degradation."[31]

For the youthful Chinese-American writers, it is as important to denounce the superhuman, but subordinate stereo-type of a "non-militant people with lasting endurance and self-respect (who are able to) take the worst in stride" as it is to reject the negative, racists ones.[32] The desire to live up to popular expectations and the fear of detention, deportation or physical violence have had equally crippling effects ; indirect coercion has prevented the Chinese community from demanding their civil rights and from acting and thinking independently.

The older members of the Chinese-American community, as well as the recent political and economic refugees, are secure in their cultural identity ; they hold the white American "barbarians" and their materialistic culture in contempt. They have no desire to assimilate as they came to America for economic reasons and their thoughts are still turned toward the homeland. The usual term of contempt used by Chinese to refer to whites is *Bok gwai low,* meaning white devil. Maxine Hong Kinston uses the supernatural term, "ghost", to describe the strange, inexplicable (by Chinese standards) beings who interfere in Chinese affairs. Both terms suggest inhumanity and a potential threat to the well-being of the Chinese community. The ambiguous situation of second generation Chinese-American children is perfectly conveyed by the fact that Chinese born parents call their offspring "half-ghosts".

The younger generation of American born Chinese college radicals reject both the stultifying world of their elders as well as the racism of white mainstream society. But they lack the self-assurance of the older community. They are ridiculed and scolded for their ignorance of the Chinese language and Chinese customs. They are also resentful of discrimination in the white world and the wide-spread stereotypes concerning the Chinese, whether they be patronizing or vicious.

In their search for a positive identity, Chinese-American radicals looked to the Black Panthers and the People's Republic of China for ideological models; in emulation of the former, they created the Red Guards

in San Francisco and New York towards the end of the sixties. Their activities were primarily aimed at breaking down the prosperous facade that hid the social, racial and economic problems of the Chinese ghettos.

The Asian-American community seems to be in constant danger of being blown apart. A major conflict portrayed in numerous Asian-American plays is generational stratification and opposition, a problem shared by all immigrants, but which is particularly acute among Asians because of the Confusion tenet of Filial Piety. This principle regulates all relations within the community.

> "You don't even say hello to the villagers."
> "They don't say hello to me."
> "They don't have to answer children. When you get old, people will say hello to you." 33

Traditionally there is little outward show of affection and physical punishment is frequently harsh. Furthermore, each individual is expected to sublimate individual desires for the benefit of the family, clan or community. The notion of filial piety is utterly opposed to the American concepts of individualism and self-improvement. It is no wonder then that first generation parents think of their children as half strangers, uncooth, ill-manered and selfish. Daughters are even more harshly judged as they find themselves torn between conflicting criteria of femininity.

> Normal Chinese women's voices are strong and bossy. We American-Chinese girls had to whisper to make ourselves American-feminine. Apparently we whispered even more softly than the Americans. Once a year the teachers referred my sister and me to speech therapy...34

A conflict expressed in all Asian-American literature is the difference in expectations concerning male and female roles.

> Their brother got toy trucks that were big enough to climb inside. When he grew older, he got a bicycle and let the girls play with his old tricycle and wagon. My mother bought his sisters a typewriter. "They can be clerk-typists," their father kept saying, but he would not buy them a typewriter. 35

Many Asian women in the American context, particularly second and third generation, begin to refuse to be treated in the customary subordinate way. Sisters are jealous of their brothers' unwarranted privileges ; they refuse arranged marriages and begin to desire independence which can be acquired through higher education and professional status.

Probably the most critical dilemma for all immigrants is the linguistic barrier. Parents are held apart from their children and mainstream society because of their lack of fluency in English. Their children, despite many years of instruction in special language schools rarely master their parents' language. The children learn just enough vocabulary and elementary grammatical structures for day-to-day communication with their elders. The adults often find themselves in the humiliating situation of relying on their children to interpret the outside world for them. Communication problems within the Chinese community have been intensified by the arrival of immigrants who do not speak the same dialect as those who came first.

Frank Chin and Maxine Hong Kingston, who both grew up in Northern California, studied at the University of Berkeley and are now in their forties, are part of an anti-nostalgia generation. The war of the sexes plays a part in both their works, though in *The Warrior Woman* the question is rather one of obtaining independence from one's parents while escaping from arranged marriages, and liberating oneself from the burden of tradition.

In terms of the immigrant experience, Chin's first American born ancestors are several generations removed ; he identifies with his grandfather who worked on the Southern Pacific Railway, and all the Chinese sojourner miners and railway workers. Kingston's narrator is one generation removed from her family's Chinese village, which is a source of fantasy and anguish for her. The communist revolution in China had a direct effect on her family.

> So while the adults wept over the letters about the neighbors gone berserk turning Communist..., I was secretly glad. As long as the aunts kept disappearing and the uncles dying after unspeakable tortures, my parents would prolong their Gold Mountain stay. We could start spending our fare money on a car and chairs, a stereo. 36

The situation of the mutilated family, families separated by racist immigration laws, is a theme common to both authors. Fear of deportation and the necessary conspiracy of silence weighs more heavily in the background of Kingston's novel. For both authors, Chinatown is at the same time a place of oppression and a place of refuge. The white world beyond is seen as a haven of escape from community control but also as dangerous and alienating.

Chin is more concerned than Kingston in denouncing sentimentalized Asian culture stereotypes (Charlie Chan, Susie Wong, the Hong Kong Dream Girl) that are to be found in popular American culture. Both authors react violently against the passive "lotus pod" behavior which is sanctioned by tradition. Chin denounces the attempts of mission schools to Americanize and assimilate the Chinese, whereas for Kingston, the public school, with its white teachers, allowed her to achieve and receive the recognition that she was systematically denied in her home. University studies represented a means to economic independence. One of Frank Chin's characters, sacrificed a college education in order to support his family. He only succeeded in demeaning himself in his father's eyes while remaining at the mercy of his father's capricious exercise of authority. The generation conflict that hinges on filial piety is at the heart of their works.

It is interesting to note that both Chin and Kingston looked for alternatives to crippling stereotypes in Chinese folk tradition. They were both to influence a young Californian Chinese-American of upper-middle-class background, raised in the suburbs, who had never experienced first-hand the kinds of conflicts which absorb Fred Chin and Maxine Hong Kingston. David Henry Hwang, in a sense, bridges the generation and gender gaps by drawing inspiration from Kingston's mythical woman warrior, Fa Mu Lan, and Chin's god of war, Kwan Kung. Not unnaturally, both authors chose warriors as salutary antidotes to the harmless lotus pod stereotypes.

Hwang acknowledges his debt to Kingston and Chin in his notes to his first play, *F.O.B.* (an acronym for "Fresh-Off-the-Boat", a disparaging epithet applied to recent immigrants).[37] Hwang's first play throws together three Chinese-American college students whose backgrounds are very different. Dale, the A.B.C. ("American-born-Chinese") of upper-middle class origins is competing with Steve, the F.O.B. of the title, whose father is a rich industrialist in Hong Kong, for the affections of Grace whose parents immigrated to California only ten years earlier and who run a Chinese restaurant. The situation allows Hwang to treat the variety of conflicting attitudes to be found in each socio-economic category, as well as conflicting attitudes concerning sex roles.

Since 1981 Hwang has written four other plays, all of which were produced in New York by Joe Papp's Public Theatre. His second play which is set in 1867 during a strike of Chinese construction workers on the railroad, traces the history of "a strong and hardy and rebellious men who considered themselves warriors, adventurerers or soldiers." [38] Hwang has begun to bridge the cultural gap between the old world and the new world by a fortuitous collaboration. He encountered John Lone, a thirty-year-old actor who was born in Hong Kong and who received a rigourous ten year training in the Peking Opera style. Lone influenced Hwang immensely during the writing of his second play in which the author tried consciously to use Chinese theatre techniques, a certain kind of stylization, applied to a Western style play. Hwang used the real names of the two actors whose roles had elements in common with their real life situations. The character Lone had the ambition to become a professional dancer, but for economic reasons he was obliged to immigrate to America, hence the title : *The Dance and the Railroad*. Hwang concludes in an interview which appeared in the *New York Times*, "What John has made possible is for me to physicalize a relationship between the two cultures." [39]

John Lone has finished directing two one act plays by Hwang which opened at the Public Theatre in early November 1983 and he plays one of the leading roles. The plays suggest more than ever through mythical subjects an oriental attitude toward age and beauty, love and death. *The House of Beauties* relates the relationship which develops between an elderly writer and "the proprietress of a sort of Platonic brothel where old men prepare for death by sleeping next to beautiful young women." [40]

The Sound of a Voice is also inspired by Eastern folk tales and follows the adventures of a warrior who becomes enamoured of the witch he is supposed to kill. Such a plot is reminiscent of Peking opera which "...is complex, mixing myth, legend and history, dealing with such timeless matters as loyalty, filial piety, chastity, justice and righteousness".[41] Hwang

is fulfilling the desires of his elder, Frank Chin, in drawing on a root culture and creating a new expression which is authentically Chinese-American.

Given the quality and diversity of the works by Asian American authors, there seems to be sufficient evidence to suppose that Asian-Americans will mark the eighties in the way that chicano theatre dominated the seventies, and black literature and theatre the sixties.

NOTES

1. "The New Ellis Island", *Time Magazine*, June 13, 1983, p. 14.

2. Irving Howe, "Strangers", in *Celebrations and Attacks : Thirty Years of Literary and Cultural Commentary*, (New York and London : Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979) p. 11.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

4. Frank Chin, *et. al.*, "An Introduction to Chinese and Japanese-American Literature", in *Aiiieeeee ! : An Anthology of Asian- American Writers*, (Washington, D.C. : Howard University Press, 1974, 1983) p. xxi.

5. Him Mark Lai, Genny Lim, Judy Yung, *Island : Poetry and History of Chinese Immigrants on Angel Island, 1910-1940*, (San Francisco : The San Francisco Study Center, 1981)., reviewed by Fred Ferretti, "Calligraphic Cries", *New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1981, P. 24.

6. New York : Pantheon Books, 1973.

7. *Aiiieeeee !*, see note 4 for publication details.

8. *Ibid.*, preface, p. vii.

9. Frank Chin, *Chickencoop Chinaman in Two Plays by Frank Chin*, introduction by Dorothy Ritsuko Mc Donald, (Seattle and London : University of Washington Press, 1981), p. 7. The play was first performed May 27, 1972 at the American Place Theatre, New York City.

10. *Aiiieeeee !*, intro., p. xxi. The Chinese-American authors to whom they are refering are Pardee Lowe, *Father And Glorious Descendant* (1943), Jade Snow Wong, *Fifth Chinese Daughter* (1950), Virginia Lee, *The House that Tai Ming Built* (1963), Betty Lee Sung, *Mountain of Gold* (1967), and Diana Chang, *The Frontiers of Love* (1956).

11. *Chickencoop*, p. 22.

12. Gerald Haslam in *Forgotten Pages of American Literature*, (New York : Houghton, 1970) n.p., quoted in *Aiiieeeee !*, introduction, p. xxiv.

13. *Ibid.*, intro., p. xxv.
In socio-economic terms, according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census and National Jewish Population Survey, on a family income index in which 100 represents the total U.S. national average, the Chinese minority was rated at 112, just after the Polish (115), the Japanese (132), and the Jewish (172).

14. Diana Fong, "America's 'Invisible' Chinese", *New York Times*, May, 1, 1982, p. 27.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

16. *Aiiieeeee !*, intro. p. xxxviii.

17. *Ibid.*

18. Frank Chin, "Frank Chin at Home", interviewed by Forrest Gok, *San Francisco Theatre*, Summer 1977, p. 18.

19. *Chickencoop*, p. 24.

20. *Ibid.* p. 43.

21. "Frank Chin at home", pp. 17-18.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

23. Frank Chin, Letter to Michael Kirby, ed., *The Drama Review*, 22 Oct. - 23 Nov. 1976, p. 11, quoted by Mc Donald in her introduction to *Two Plays*.

24. Maxine Hong Kingston, *The Woman Warrior : Memoirs of a Girlhood among Ghosts*, (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1976).

25. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

29. Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau with Eve Pell, *To Serve the Devil, Colonials and Sojourners*, II (New York : Vintage Books, Random House, 1971). p. 119.

30. Kingston, p. 184.

31. Lu Ling-chi Wang, "Chinatown and the Chinese", a document circulated by Intercollegiate Chinese for Social Action at San Francisco State College during the 1969 San Francisco New Year's Festival, in Jacobs, p. 161.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

33. *Warrior Woman*, p. 203.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 141-142.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

37. David Henry Hwang, *F.O.B.*, in *New Plays U.S.A.*, ed. James Leverett, intro. by Michael Feingold, (New York : Theater Communications Group, 1982). The play was first performed June 8, 1980 at the New York Shakespeare Festival's Public Theater.

38. Eric Pace, "I write Plays to Claim a Place for Asian-Americans", interview with David Henry Hwang, *New York Times*, July 12, 1981, VI, 4.

39. Don Shewey, "His Art Blends the Best of Two Cultures on Stage", interview with John Lone and David Henry Hwang, *New York Times*, Oct. 30, 1983, VIII,6.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

LOUTS AND LAYABOUTS IN THE POST-WELFARE STATE: CURRENT SOLUTIONS TO DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

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Present economic conditions have once again produced a large reserve army of labour. There are two reasons for this: firstly, the world-wide fall in demand for manufactured goods, transport and services, and hence production, and secondly, a recession has always been an appropriate time for profound industrial transformations, often leading to an erosion of industry's need for skilled workers. The decline in employment in manufacturing industry has been dramatic. Between 1971 and 1981, employment in the United Kingdom fell by 25%, and in the London area, by 37% (1).

The world crisis which began in 1973 and which coincided with major developments in information and production technology, is only one example of such restructuring, but it may well prove to be the most profound this century.

Where deskilling and low pay for many, and for millions of others, the perspective of long-term unemployment with 'benefits' increasingly detached from any acceptable relationship with the current average wage (2), have come

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(1) Source: Employment Gazette, quoted in M. WOOD "Creating jobs in London", Worker's Control No. 3/4, 1982, p.9. (I.W.C., Nottingham).

(2) Le Monde 07.07.83 "Les indemnités de chômage pourraient être amputées". As from november 1983, unemployment benefit for a single person will be £27-05 (316F), and for a couple, £43-75 (512F) a week, and what is more, the benefit is unlikely as from now to keep pace with inflation.

to be the major determining elements in many people's day-to-day economic landscape, the reserve army of labour will increasingly be seen as a potential threat to social stability.

All the signs are that there will be no real improvement in employment in the forseeable future, and that long-term unemployment for many sectors of the 'working population', in particular for the young, is inevitably to be the dominant economic reality of the last two decades of the century, if we all survive 1984.

At the present time (3), there are over 1.25M young people under 25 out of work. The official projection for unemployment for 1988 is between 3.7M and 4.2M, although the Trade Unions have always challenged the way the official figures ignore certain categories (for example, married women who do not sign on for benefit) and therefore underestimate the real figure by as much as 30%. Recent calculations (4) seem to suggest that there are between five and six times as many people on means-tested benefits now as there were forty years ago. There is also considerable evidence (5) that the poor are getting poorer. One of the reasons for this is that the rate at which benefits (unemployment, child and supplementary benefits) are increased is based on the increase in the Retail Price Index. The RPI itself is calculated on the basis of information on the changing nature of family spending (how much, and on what?), and this information comes from the annual Family Expenditure Survey. But the FES looks at a cross-section of families, and claimant's and low-wage earner's families do not

(3) James CURRAN "Freedom for youth- to be unemployed", The Times, 08.06.83 referring to figures published by the Cambridge Economic Policy Group.

(4) A. DEACON and J. BRADSHAW Reserved for the Poor.

(5) Analysed by C. GODFREY and J. BRADSHAW: "Inflation and the Poor" New Society, 18.08.83.

have characteristic spending habits. The weighting produced from the FES is therefore to the disadvantage of these families if the price of essential goods increases more quickly than those of non-essentials.

To make these two points is not to indicate that they are in any way surprising. Mrs. Thatcher's monetarist policies were designed to enable industry to cut down its workforce in the most drastic way, to inhibit trade union activity, to facilitate the export of capital, and to redistribute income upwards. It is the government response to the inevitable social consequences of these policies, and in particular as they effect the young, which we propose to analyse here. The predictable social unrest and protest generated must be countered to guarantee the stability of the State, hence measures against 'louts', and measures against 'layabouts'.

The public discourse of the State as transmitted through the media insists on the temporary nature of the crisis, but as for economic recovery, as for putting the 'Great' back into 'Great Britain', one's certainty about its success needs to be tempered with prudence: Harold Macmillan who, as Conservative Prime Minister in the late 1950s coined the expression, and was reelected on the slogan 'You've never had it so good!', said recently:

> "Now we are told that if we tighten our belts, the depression will simply go away. Nobody knows how. We are back in the age of witch-doctors who tried to make the weather by making the right kind of speeches to their constituency." (6)

What is the situation in which young people find themselves in the early 1980s? We will now go on to illustrate some of the parameters which at present define the legal and economic limits of their lives in Britain today.

(6) H. Macmillan at the Carlton Club in the autumn of 1982. Quoted in I. GILMOUR Britain can work (London: Martin Robertson, 1983).

There is little doubt that the age-group between the school-leaving age and the age at which young people 'settle down' is particularly fragile. Figures for the age distribution of crime, to which we will turn later, demonstrate this clearly. Although formal proof of the link is hard to establish, there does seem to be some link between marriage and a gradual reduction in delinquent behaviour. The average age on marriage during the latter half of the 1970s in Great Britain was 23.7 years for men (7), although increasing numbers of young people are now living together for some time beforehand- thus postponing what is becoming a less and less meaningful gesture in the sense that it no longer ascribes new rights nor authorises new behaviours. This development is somewhat akin to payment by credit card, which enables one to acquire goods some time before actually paying for them. It may well be however, that other factors help to reduce delinquent behaviour in the early 20s. Car ownership, a tenancy or a mortgage, and H.P. repayments may all contribute to this.

It is for this reason that the attention of the police and the courts has always been particularly directed at the delinquent activity of the 16-20 age-group, and to a lesser degree that of the 14-16 and 20-22 age-groups.

In the expanding economy of the 1950s and 1960s, relatively little needed to be done for young people in their search for work: it was the period of (almost) full employment and rising wages. But now, the conditions defining the transition from school to employment (or, for many, long-term enforced idleness) are harsh, destructive and empty of meaning. This is particularly the case for the immigrant community. Marie Plakoo, in her study of the riots which occured in many British cities over Easter, 1981 (8) insists on the fact that even before the official

(7) OPCS Monitors FM2 (Marriages). The median age at first marriage for men was 24.1 in 1981 (FM2 83/2 6 september 1983)

(8) Marie PLAKOO The 1981 Riots Mémoire de Maîrise, Université de Tours, 1982. Part III: School and Education, p.58-62.

school-leaving age, a high percentage of children (and in particular, West-Indian children) are being removed from the normal educational process and placed in special (ESN) schools (9), a process of institutional marginalisation which she argues, simply prepares them for what is to come.

The consequence of this is that the young are not only objectively ill-equipped to face life after school and to find work- increasing numbers are coming onto the job-market with neither academic nor technical qualifications- but that subjectively they feel themselves to have already lost out. A study was made of the attitudes of young people (unemployed, black and white) in urban areas in which the 1981 riots took place (10). Some of the reasons which were given for this feeling of hopelessness- which was a characteristic common to both the communities- were 'unchangeable personal characteristics' such as 'not clever enough', 'too young', 'being black', and also 'self-determined personal characteristics' such as 'will-power', and 'determination'. Their environment had already taught them that they were hopeless cases.

It might be argued that, faced with this appalling situation, caused partly at least by government policy, the State has no alternative but to alleviate the possibly dangerous effects of its policies while publicly minimising the causes which lie behind.

Thus, the 1983 budget of the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) is £1,000M, which is to be spent on improving the 'employability' of 16 year-olds, as though the problem was the young people and not the lack of jobs. Since the mid 1970s when the amplitude and permanence of the problem were recognised, a variety of schemes have been advanced. The latest, the Youth Training Scheme (YTS), has

(9) Ibid. p.60-61. ESN= Educationally sub-normal.

(10) "Alienated Black Youth: An investigation of 'conventional wisdom's explanations', New Community Vol.IX No.2 (1981) See: PLAKOO, p.88-90.

just replaced the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) and a variety of other regional and local schemes which had been operating for over five years. The YOP 'processed' 1.8M young people, and the MSC hailed it as a success. It is too early to be certain whether this is the case or not, but the evidence available at the moment suggests that, compared to a matched sample of young people who did not take part in the programme, the YOP youngsters were no more likely to find a permanent job at the end (11).

However, an analysis of YOP and the early stages of YTS suggests strongly that, whatever may be said publicly, the 'success' or otherwise of these schemes needs to be measured by reference to their aims, and the aim of these, and many other schemes (and taking the unemployed teenage population as a whole- individual cases can always be produced to prove anything) the primary aim of all these schemes is to occupy an otherwise inactive and potentially troublesome group.

That YOP was never a coherent strategy for employment is clear from the figures. It is also clear from an analysis of the programmes provided for the young people. Amidst the short-term placements, 'working alongside' workers in industry for from one to three months, there were 'community service placements', 'day release' (to 'draw together and interpret experiences gained during placement') and usually a 'concluding module' ('providing trainees with a period in which they can assess, with the help of the staff, their personal development during the scheme'(12)). One may well wonder whether 'working alongside' means 'training', in which case, why use an ambiguous term when a clear and appropriate one is available? It is also worth noticing that nothing is said about what happens after the'concluding module'.

A very strong normative influence is clear in the various

(11) 'Was YOP a flop?', New Society, 14.4.83

(12) 'Training for Life' Young Men's Christian Association's YOP Scheme Introductory Booklet, 04.78. In Sylvia SAN JOSE The Youth Opportunities Programme Mémoire de Maîtrise, Université de Tours, 1982 (Appendix E4)

educational' modules and their programmes, which demonstrate that YOP was not simply a programme to 'use up' a crucial year of teenager's time and keep them occupied, but attempted to introduce concepts and constraints which their life experience up until then had probably taught them to discard: the appendix to the YMCA programme lists day release module topics (58 in all), of which 'Introduction to a variety of leisure time pursuits: hobbies, sports, passtimes'; 'Money management: pay slips, banking, budgeting, credit, saving, loans, mortgages, flat and house finding, landlord and tenant agreements'; 'Constructive use of leisure'; and 'Socially acceptable behaviour' are from our point of view (p.96§1) the most significant.

Whereas traditionally, long-term unemployment has tended to be associated with middle age and the end of active life, recent growth in long term unemployment is increasingly amongst the young. One indication of this is that the number of industrial apprenticeships has fallen dramatically. The trade unions seem justified in their fears that employers would use YOP and YTS trainees as cheap labour. For example, at a time (november, 1983) when the Coal Board has cut the number of 18 year old entrants from 6,229 to 3,060 p.a. in three years, it is also advertising YTS traineeships at £25 (292F) per week- half the minimum rate for 16 year olds in the industry.

It is worth noting that as Supplementary Benefit for 16-17 year olds is at present £15-80 (185F), they will be working for £9-20 (85F) per week extra. However, if Government plans go through, the difference between SB and the YTS payment should go up to £11-20 (131F), not because it intends to increase YTS, but because it intends to reduce SB to £13-80 (161F) or thereabouts (13).

In April 1983, average manual earnings for men were £143-55 (1.677F) a week. £25 a week is therefore only

(13) Labour Research Vol.72, No.11, November, 1983. p.303.

17% of the average manual earnings for men.

Another illustration of the fact that many programmes are clearly not related to the world of work at all is illustrated by the case of the Job Creation Programme (JCP), launched in 1975, and aimed to 'provide short-term jobs of social value for the unemployed who might benefit from or be willing to undertake such activity' (14). Faced with the daunting difficulties in the present situation of creating jobs in manufacturing, trade or transport, the last three governments have to varying degrees, for different reasons and more or less openly dropped job-creation as a top policy objective. To blame Mrs. Thatcher alone is to demonstrate a remarkable degree of political simplicity, or a very short memory, as the progression of the figures for unemployment show.

Nevertheless, all three governments have recognised the danger in not providing something for the 16-20 year-olds to do, and curiously, the present government has turned to some of the very organisations it was otherwise castrating by the use of cash-limit restrictions and reductions in the rate-support grant.

Local authorities (but also voluntary organisations and community groups) have been called on to provide "employment opportunities" more akin to the Boy Scouts' 'Bob-a-job week' than to an authentic introduction to the world of work. For many of this generation of young people there will be 'no future', in terms of medium-term job-stability, and hence in terms of even a minimum sense of organisation of their own lives and giving their immediate future some coherence and shape.

As long ago as 1977, the Holland Report (15) recognised that youth unemployment was not temporary and cyclical,

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(14) Richard GROVER Work and the Community (London: HCVO, Bedford Square, 1980) p.3

(15) Holland Report (London: HMSO, May 1977) Young People and Work: A Report on the feasibility of a new programme of opportunities for unemployed young people.

but structural and long-term, and that school-leavers 'begin as the unemployed (but) all too easily they can become the unemployable'(16).

The solution has been increasingly to invent marginal, 'socially-useful' activities on the fringes of industry and commerce. It is a strange paradox to hear the same government calling on the one hand for the privatisation of rubbish collection while on the other hand calling on young people to help out in old people's homes and mental hospitals. This new type of 'employment' corresponds to fondly remembered Victorian values which are once more in vogue. Is is good copy, and although it may be expensive, it is much less so than the alternatives.

It is a mistake to associate YTS and the other schemes with 'job preparation' when there are no jobs.

Between 1962 and 1982, the Police Establishment in Great Britain was increased from 78,000 to 121,000. Spending on law and order increased by 200%. The number of prison officers over the same period increased from 6,300 to 17,000. The prison population in England and Wales went from 32,500 in 1968 to 41,800 in 1978 and is well over 45,000 this year. The Director-General of the Prison Service in his Annual Report, 1981, said:

> "The commitment described by Prison Rule 1 to 'assist prisoners to lead a good and useful life' is, under present conditions, simply a pious aspiration"

Young people have been particularly affected. According to the DHSS Report Offending by Young People: A Survey of Recent Trends (October 1981):

> "The number of juveniles sent to Detention Centre and Borstal has risen fivefold since 1965. Less than a fifth of the rise relates directly to increased offending; the remainder is caused by an increased tendency to give custodial sentences for almost every type of offence."

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(16) Holland Report. p.34 §3.13

It is essential when discussing the social reaction to delinquency, or the fear of delinquency, to understand the significance of the difference between the formal procedures of the Criminal Justice system, and the informal procedures (such as the use of police cautioning). In quantitative terms the latter are more significant thanthe formal procedures. In political terms, the formal procedures are the most visible. To illustrate our claim that the system is becoming more and more repressive for young people, we have chosen to present one important example of each, remembering the fact that the Criminal Justice system functions as a whole and that globally, the figures confirm our choice of examples.

Over the last decade, many areas have introduced Juvenile Bureaux, run by the police. Administratively, the JB are placed between detection and prosecution (or cautioning), and were intended to act as filters. The idea behind this was that far too many young people charged with trivial offences were cluttering up the courts. It was argued that such trivial behaviour, on the fringes of delinquency, should be decriminalised by being dealt with before it arrived in court.

The JB can decide either to prosecute, to caution, or to take no further action. However, each police region establishes its own list of what are known as Immediate Charge Offences, that is to say, offences which the police decide are too serious for the juvenile to be given the 'chance' of passing through the JP rather than going directly before the Magistrates. The consequence of this practice appears to have been that the JB have tended to push larger numbers of children and young people into the system than before, over and above the increase which would have been expected due to the increase in juvenile crime (17). Striking enough as this is on its own, the phenomenon appears to be coupled with an extraordinary growth in police cautioning in recent years. There is

(17) J.A. DITCHFIELD Police Cautioning in England and Wales. 1976.

also evidence to suggest (18) that black youngsters are more likely to be sent straight to court (+50%).

POLICE CAUTIONS DELIVERED TO JUVENILES (19)			
	1965	1977	
10-14	16,102	59,831	ENGLAND AND WALES
14-17	14,519	52,091	ENGLAND AND WALES
10-17	207	12,125	METROPOLITAN POLICE DISTRICTS

There is a constant danger then that a) hardening attitudes within the system will increase the severity of penalties despite the fact that much recent legislation in intent and, on the whole, in formulation tends to reinforce the less punitive options open to police and magistrates, and that b) new populations will be drawn into the Juvenile Justice system who were never intended to get there.



(1) Minor offences, but sufficiently serious to be sent to the Magistrates' Court.

(2) Very minor offences, not serious enough to be sent to the Magistrates' Court.

(3) "Potential" delinquents.

This diagram is simply a way of illustrating the table above, and its implications. The difference between the number of cautions (England and Wales) in 1965 and those in 1977 was (59,831 + 52,091 = 111,922) - (16,102 + 14,519 = 30,621) = 81,301.

The question is, was this additional number of cautions administered A. AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR MORE SERIOUS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS on young people having committed minor offences, or B. ON A NEW, NON-CRIMINAL BUT SOCIALLY MARGINAL POPULATION?

Footnotes (18) and (19): see following page.

We can see then that the informal collective attitudes of groups within the system can greatly influence legislative changes and even turn them on their heads (20).

The second example is that of formal change introduced through the political system. The history of the Children and Young Person's Act 1969 is well known (21). An Act which attempted to change the system from a basically punitive one into one where the major preoccupation was the care and protection both of children "in trouble" and children "in need of care or control", it quickly ran up against concerted opposition, and as a result of the change of government in june 1970, a number of important clauses were never applied. By the time there had been a

(18) S. LANDAU 'Juveniles and the Police- Who is charged immediately and who is referred to the Juvenile Bureau', British Journal of Criminology, January 1981, Vol. 21, No. 1.

(19) EUREKA! Journal of the London Intermediate Treatment Association, No.3. Autumn 1982, p.4.

(20) There are many other examples which are highly pertinent to our discussion of social reactions to young people. Modifications in the type of policing- the shift from 'the Bobby on the beat' community policing to hard reactive policing (sometimes called 'fire brigade policing') and the use of 'saturation policing' and specially-trained mobile Special Patrol Groups (SPG), especially coupled with the use of the 'sus' laws enabling a police officer to stop and search an individual on suspicion, was certainly, as the Scarman and other reports have indicated, one of the root causes of hostility to the police and of the outbreak of violence in 1981. The new Police Act 1983 reinforces police powers in this respect. An operation of this kind (codemane: "SWAMP 81") was the spark which set off the Brixton riots (PLAKOO op cit p.21). Saturation policing to combat 'muggings' and the stopping and searching of 1,000 people on the streets of Brixton produced 100 arrests in 4 days. The Head of the local C.I.D. called this 'a resounding success' (New Standard 13.04.81). But another way of looking at the figures is that 90% of the youths stopped and searched were ordinary, law-abiding citizens who had committed no offence whatever.

(21) The most accessible history of the CYPA 1969 is M. BERLINS and G. WANSELL Caught in the Act. Children, Society and the Law (Harmondsworth: Penguin, Pelican, 1974).

further change of government in february 1974, the new Labour government appeared prepared to concede a great deal of ground to the 'blue rinse and purple nose lobby' as the Magistrates' Association is uncharitably known amongst social workers. The Magistrate, the journal of the MA (22) documents the pressure put on the Heath and Wilson governments, and the concessions which were made in favour of a more punitive application of the law.

The journal itself recognised for instance that the suppression of Approved School Orders by the Act resulted in Magistrates escalating their use of Borstal rather than using the non-custodial measures made available to them in the Act, thus creating the impression that crime was getting 'worse' because more youngsters were ending up in Borstal:

> "The most urgent need", said the Magistrate, quoting Commander Peter MARSHALL of the Metropolitan Police, was for more secure accomodation "for the growing hard-core who are resisting remedial efforts and from whom the community is entitled to expect some measure of protection.(23)" (our italics)

The basis of their concern was the rising trend in delinquency after the end of the 1960s. The 'growing' 'hard-core' was perhaps partly the result of over-reaction to what they saw as a 'soft' law, but the trend in crime (as reported, prosecuted and punished) was rising. However, the meaning of 'trend' needs to be made clear. In the table which follows some spectacular changes can be seen in the numbers found guilty of indictable offences, but one needs to remember that various factors determine whether an act

"You realise, of course, that if you didn't report this you could help reduce the crime figures for this month"

PRIVATE EYE 30.07.82

(22) The Magistrate. Nov1974; March, April, and December 1975.

(23) Ibid. November 1974.

will be defined as criminal, and if it is, whether the author will be prosecuted.


THE SUN

BLACK CRIME SHOCK

THE SUN 23.03.83

There are many illustrations of this fact which is usually glossed over when crime statistics are interpreted by the media- and as we have suggested briefly, their interpretation can be seen to have had an important role to play in the public image of crime and the young- especially those from ethnic minorities- over the last ten years or so, a public image which has been part of the context within which recent legislation has been introduced (Criminal Justice Act 1982). This legislation is considerably more repressive than what went before.

The interpretation of criminal statistics then, needs to be approached with caution. To take two examples, any national police force is likely to be judged by the ratio between the number of crimes reported, and the number of cases 'cleared up'. If the police decide to 'concentrate' on a particular type of crime (one only has to think of 'gross indecency between males' in the period leading up to the Wolfenden Committee's Report on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (1958) and the way in which prosecutions increased at that time, or the 'muggings' scare and the use of the 'sus' laws in the period leading up to the riots of 1981), the level of recorded crime can shoot up, delighting Chief Constables and terrifying little old ladies living on their own. The example above appeared by a strange coincidence the week the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill was being severely criticized in Parliament.

In view of the arguments we have briefly presented above, the policy of the police force concerning prosecutions and that of the Magistrates concerning sentence, both

possibly distorted, and certainly amplified, by the media's use of official statistics, may be as useful in understanding the progression of crime set out in the table, as the concept of crime itself.

PERSONS FOUND GUILTY OF INDICTABLE OFFENCES OR CRIMES, ENGLAND AND WALES (CSO, Annual). PER 100,000 POPULATION.

	1966	% INCREASE (8 YEARS)	1974	% INCREASE (4 YEARS)	1978
UNDER 14	1,622	-15%	1,406	-13%	1,240
14 - 16	3,199	+69%	5,418	- 3%	5,259
17 - 20	2,944	+102%	5,962	+ 8%	6,461
21 - 29	1,867	+34%	2,509	+11%	2,802
OVER 30	385	+52%	587	+14%	671

For the 14-16 age group, an annual increase of 8.6% between 1966 and 1974 which falls to a 0.8% decrease up to 1978 is likely to have been as much the result of the selective application of parts of the CYPA as the result of a fall in delinquency in this group. But what is disturbing is the continued increase in crime in the 17-20 and 20-29 age-groups.

It would be surprising if the consequences of long-term unemployment from the age of 16 did not lead to an increased tendency to criminal activity. It would be surprising if harsher legislation, more repressive policing stimulated by scare stories presenting young people as a whole as indolent and delinquent, more systematic prosecution of 'offences' which before would have been passed over, and harsher sentencing, did not create a generation of revolt and bitterness.

If a hard-faced society looks at itself in the mirror, it should not be surprised to see bitterness and revolt staring back.

JRS/1183

The table above is a composite table based on Home Office Criminal Statistics (England and Wales) and published annually in various forms, most succinctly in Facts in Focus (Central Statistical Office, published by Penguin).

RITUAL KILLING ?

François RANNAUD

It may seem paradoxical to discuss the death penalty after it has been abolished in Britain and France, and while the american states which have reactivated it, use it sparingly. Yet it is important, because where it is still in force, the death penalty is the cornerstone of the scale of punishment used in that country and it raises among other issues : the right to punish and the power of the State and its limits. Besides, when the death penalty is rarely applied, the executed men tend to be carefully selected and it is all the more interesting to find out who is executed and for what crime, and to check to what extent the criteria applied for the selection of the executed men are consistent with the alleged justifications of capital punishment : deterrence, retribution, elimination and denunciation.

I have chosen to compare the rate of execution in France in Britain and in the United States at a time when the death penalty was still in force and executions routinely carried out. From 1955 to 1964, excluding executions for political or terrorist offences and convictions by military jurisdictions, 41 prisoners were executed in Britain and Wales (1), 14 in France (2) and 485 (3) in the United States

(1) Home Office Research study N° 51 Life Sentence Prisoners (London : HMSO 1979) p. 3.

(2) Laurence THIEAULT La peine de mort en France et à l'étranger Paris : Gallimard, 1977 p. 124.

(3) National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service Capital Punishment 1978 US Department of Justice Washington DC 1979 p. 18.

The comparison with the population of these countries in the sixties shows that the rate of execution was about 0,30 executions per 1 M population in France, 0,91 hangings per 1 M population in Britain and Wales and 2,67 executions per 1 M population in the United States. The differences are considerable and there is a nine to one difference between the French and the US rates of execution. Within the United States, the differences were striking. Besides the eight abolitionist states, seven other states carried out no executions from 1955 to 1964, out of these 15 states : 5 were in the NE region, 5 in the North Central region, 4 in the West and only one in the South (Delaware). In California alone, 64 prisoners were executed during that period and 54 in Texas. The Southern states accounted for 285 out of the 481 executions carried out by the states, almost 60% (there were also 4 federal executions during that period, two whites were executed for kidnapping, one in 1956 and one in 1963 and two others for rape on a federal reservation in 1957) (4).
The race of the prisoner was also a factor : out of the 485 executed prisoners, 258 were black that is to say 56% of the executed prisoners, while in 1956 the Blacks represented only 12% of the total US population. In the case of executions for rape, 25% of the black prisoners compared to only 4 ,4% of the white prisoners were executed for rape (5).
The US Supreme Court was so concerned by these differences that in 1972 in Furman US Georgia, the supreme court ruled that the death penalty as applied in various states was "arbitrary and capricious", Justice Potter Stewart added that it constituted a "cruel and unusual punishment freakishly imposed on a capriciously selected random handful of murderers" (6).
The arbitrary, capricious and freakish nature of capital punishment is not particular to the United States and can be shown to apply to any state where the death penalty is in

(4) Capital Punishment (1978) p. 7.

(5) id. pp. 18-19.

(6) Kurt Andersen "An Eye For an Eye", Time (January 24, 1983) p. 21.

force. Unless it is a mandatory sentence, always carried out, nobody being reprieved, some of the accused are sentenced to death and others are not, and among the prisoners sentenced to death, some are executed and others not. In the US the "charge and plea bargaining" system is specially unfair : if the defendant pleads guilty on a lesser charge the judge imposes a lesser sentence ; these negociations are akin to "horse trading".
The point to ascertain is to what extent the selection processes leading to an execution are consistent with the alleged justifications of capital punishment. The main justifications put forward to support capital punishment are : deterrence, retribution and denunciation. Deterrence is based on the prevention of crime through the intimidation of potential criminals.
Retribution justifies the execution of murderers because those who are responsible for the death of a person deserve to have their own life taken in return.
Denunciation requires the execution of the criminal to show society's abhorrence of crime.
In Britain death was the mandatory penalty for murder (until 1957) save for the discretion exercised by the police when the decision was made to prosecute for murder or for manslaughter :

> "Murder, which is defined as where a person of sound mind and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonabl creature in being with malice aforethought either express or implied, the death following within a year and a day."
> "Manslaughter, which is defined as the unlawful killing of another without any malice either express or implied." (7)

The definition of murder allows for a lot of discretion, there are no objective criteria : "malice aforethought

(7) MORIARTY'S Police Law (London, Butterworth, 1976, 23 td edition, p. 113)

either expressed or implied" is a very loose definition open to interpretation and the police decision is crucial since the court cannot bring charges other than those selected by the police, the alternative for the court is a verdict of guilty or not-guilty. Otherwise the selection process when a verdict of guilt has been passed on a charge of murder consisted in handing the case over to the Home Secretary who took the decision to execute or not.
The study of a sample of 88 adults convicted of murder between January 1952 and March 1957 in HORS N° 51, p. 22 shows that :

> "older and very young men were less likely to be executed than men aged between 21 and 49 (at the time of conviction). The offender was almost certain to be hanged if his crime involved sex or theft, and fairly certain to be reprieved if he killed his own child or committed the offence in a quarrel after drinking ; his chance of reprieve was a little better than average if he killed a wife, girl friend or mistress. As regards mental health, men who were diagnosed as psychopaths were very likely to be executed."

The execution of psychopaths raises questions : the generally accepted moral considers that abnormality disqualifies retribution ; if a man is not normal and fully responsible he cannot deserve punishment, let alone the maximum penalty ; otherwise he takesthe path leading to the gas chamber.
The Homicide Act 1957 could be regarded as an attempt to restrict the application of the death penalty to "justifiable" cases. It introduced a distinction between capital and other murder and created the offence of manslaughter due to diminished responsibility. Capital crime was defined as any murder by firearm, the murder of a policeman or prison officer on duty and murder in the course or in the furtherance of theft. It looks as if the Homicide

Act largely upheld the selective practice reserving hanging for armed robbers or other professional criminals shooting during a robbery or to escape arrest, while sex murderers were spared by the new law whereas before they had tended to be executed. This was probably due to the creation of manslaughter by diminished responsibility as a separate offence since one may have doubts either about the sanity of such offenders or at least about their state of mind at the time of the offence. Yet the result of this attempt to rationalize the application of the death penalty was short-lived ; neither the supporters of capital punishment, nor the abolitionists were satisfied with it. During the debate on the Murder (abolition of the death penalty) Act 1965, a Labour representative, Mr Siberman asked : "What is the logic of a law which sends a man to the gallows for shooting someone in the breast, but which spares he who has killed with a stab in the back?" (8) and Professor Radzinowicz, criminologist and member of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment from 1949 to 1953 considered that : "The anomalies of this Act in practice contributed powerfully to the abolitionist mood." (9)

These inconsistencies also point to the somewhat artificial and arbitrary nature of any legislation, the aggravating factor in the case of capital punishment is that its effect is irreversible. The death penalty has been abolished in Britain and life imprisonment is now the mandatory sentence for murder, and can be imposed as a maximum sentence for various other offences. The British lifers held on 31 December 1977 included 75% of convicted murderers, about half of them (47%) had not served a custodial sentence before their conviction to life imprisonment at the average age of 29. Besides their average recall rate was 12% (for any offence or even for breaking the conditions attached to their licence), these characteristics do not

(8) THIBAULT, p. 187.

(9) Leon RADZINOWICZ, "Hanging : Has abolition worked ?", Sunday Times, 21 sept. 1969.

correspond to the picture of professional hardened criminals, yet twenty years earlier many of them would have been executed, though the low reconviction rate of this category of offenders makes it difficult to believe that their execution was necessary for the protection of the public.

In France, in his speech to the national assembly during the debate on the abolition of the death penalty, in the summer of 1981, the Justice minister, Mr Badinter stressed the fact that the three men executed under the former government : Christian Ranucci guillotined at 22 in Marseille in 1976, Jérôme Carrein guillotined in June 1977 in Douai and Hamida Djandoubi guillotined in September 1977 in Marseille, could not be regarded as posing a major threat to society.

Christian Ranucci was charged with the murder of a little girl, he was arrested the day after because his car matched the description of a car seen on the spot, he confessed while in police custody but he later denied any involvement in the case and pleaded not guilty, he refused to undergo E.E.G. and therefore his mental health was not properly assessed. He was sentenced to death for a murder which appeared to have been unpremeditated, to the applause of the public crowding the court room. While he was waiting for the decision of the President of the Republic to reprieve him or to allow the execution to be carried out, two other children were kidnapped and later found dead, causing the gutter press to call for drastic action. After his execution, a journalist wrote a book called Le pull-over rouge because an unexplained pull-over had been found in Ranucci's car, which he said was not his and which did not fit him. The author, Gilles Perrault shows that Ranucci was probably drunk and not alone at the time of the crime. If Ranucci's lawyers had done as much research as Perrault before the trial, Ranucci would probably not have been executed and this points to another unfairness, a great lawyer can make

the difference between life and death.

Among the last three prisoners to be executed, the second, Jérôme Carrein was executed for the murder and attempted rape of a little girl, the last prisoner to be executed in France, Hamida Djandoubi was a one-legged Tunisian executed for killing a prostitute. Like Ranucci he was executed in Marseille. In the city of the "French Connection", it is difficult to regard a youngster like Ranucci or a one-legged man as much a threat to the safety of the population or as the "Godfathers" or even as prominent figures of the local underworld.

In France the most recent prisoners executed were often charged with the murder of a child in sexual circumstances. These cases always arouse strong feelings among the population and one of the favourite headlines of the mass-circulation papers is "child killed by monster". The media play a crucial role in these cases, the local event becomes a national event and the parents' feeling of insecurity is spread throughout the country well beyond the reach of the criminal. The media also amplify the intensity of popular feeling.

The death of children does not always result in such an uproar, the gutter press did not display so much indignation about the Morhange talc case in which 36 babies died from contact with accidentally poisoned talc in 1973. Compared to such accidents or to the Thalidomid victims "the challenge of crime" does not look so formidable. The point is that in a criminal case one can point out a voluntary agent, a culprit.

The primary cause of death in France (as in other developped countries) are road accidents (12543 deads in France in 1981) and the first cause of road accidents is careless driving. Despite its frequency, the risk of dying in an accident does not deter careless drivers from driving carelessly because as the saying goes : "accidents happen to others". Yet many supporters of the death penalty believe

in the deterrent effect of the death penalty in spite of the clear absence of correlation between the death risk and the motorists' behaviour. Moreover, Stanford University Psychiatry Professor Donald Lunde is quoted in the American magazine "time" on january 24 th, 1983 as saying "For every person for whom the death penalty is a deterrent there is at least one for whom it is an incentive."

"Such murderers", according to New York University law Professor Anthony Amsterdam quoted in the same article, "are attracted by the Jimmy Cagney image of live fast, die young and have a beautiful corpse."

The death penalty is no absolute deterrent as is illustrated by the Gary Gilmore case. Gilmore put an end to a ten year period without execution in the United States by asking the Utah authorities to execute him : it is sadly ironical that the death penalty was reactivated in the United States at a condamned man's request.

At 35, Gilmore had already spent eighteen years in custody, he was a "State raised convict" who went to reform school at 14 and later served thirteen years in one stretch in maximum security jails for armed robbery. Three months after his release on parole he robbed a motel, shot the receptionist and then robbed a service-station and shot the attendant for a handful of dollars. When sentenced to death he made it clear that he preferred to face a firing squad than another twenty years in prison. The US Supreme Court did not interfere with his execution. Since then, there have been seven executions in the United States.

After the 1972 Furman Vs Georgia ruling, the US Supreme Court nullified all 40 death penalty statutes and the sentences of 629 death-row inmates, but in 1976 in Gregg us Georgia, the US Supreme Court found that the death penalty per se was not unconstitutional and upheld laws

providing guided discretion.Meanwhile the states had drafted new statutes and by the end of 1978, 34 states and the federal government had death penalty statutes in effect, which conformed to the US Supreme Court standards, which require according to Capital Punishment 1978, page 15, that.

"Only specifically defined types of murder are indictable under state capital punishment statutes revised since the Furman decision. Although varying somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the type of homicide most commonly specified in these statutes are murder perpetrated during the commission of another felony : murder of a peace officer, correction employee or fireman engaged in the performance of official duties ; murder by an inmate serving a life sentence and murder for hire."

These statutes recall the British 1957 Homicide Act, limiting the application of the death penalty to some specified murders. They are based on the belief in the deterrent effect of the death penalty in some particular cases either to give policemen special protection or focused on life-sentence prisoners to deter them from committing further crimes while in prison.

One may question the need for special protection for policemen who can defend themselves, specially in the US where they are usually heavily armed, of course one can see the point of view of the police officers' association which wants to get danger money with as little risk as possible. Why granting them an extraprotection denied to the disabled, elderly ladies, shopkeepers or other persons at risk, unless it is another instance of the tendency of government agencies to multiply the privileges for their staff ?

In spite of the Gilmore case, the new statutes are based on the belief in the deterrent effect of the death penalty for lifers, regardless of a lifer's living conditions which to say the least can only be described as "poor" in the overcrowded American prisons. The new statutes merely ensure that a lifer who cannot bear it any longer will not

have to return to this condition if his escape attempt fails. Despite the execution in november 1972 of Claude Buffet (who had asked to be executed) and Roger Bontemps, for taking hostages and killing a nurse and a prison officer in Clairvaux in September 1971, in January 1978, in the same prison, two inmates who had a pistol smuggled in, took several prison officers and an assistant-governor hostage. Both prisoners were subsequently shot by police marksmen. The death penalty can even prove dangerous : in February 1981, a death row inmate in Fresnes, Philippe Maurice who had been sentenced to death for shooting a policeman, had a pistol smuggled in by his lawyer; she would probably not have agreed to do this, if he had not been in such a hopeless situation (given the pressures from the Police Association he was unlikely to have been reprieved) : his attempt failed and he was overpowered after seriously wounding a senior prison officer.

In the United States, after the reactivation of the death penalty, a review of the 445 prisoners under sentence of death on December 31 1978 (10), shows that the new statutes have brought relatively few changes in the death row population by comparison with the 1955-64 sample of executed prisoners quoted above : there is a drop in the percentage of Blacks, 41% as opposed to 56%, but none of the black prisoners is under sentence of death for rape. The only rapist under sentence of death is a White convicted in Florida for the rape of a little girl. The Southern states held 90% of the prisoners under sentence of death on 31 December 1978.

Generally speaking, the picture of American death sentence prisoners in 1978 bears many similarities to the prisoners executed in Britain and France,. men in their late twenties who have been sentenced for murder often associated with robbery or rape. The two main differences are

(10) "Capital Punishment", 1978, pp. 5-6.

the high percentage of Blacks (though if the percentage of inmates belonging to underprivileged groups had been ascertained among executed prisoners in Britain and France, it may have been comparable to the percentage of Blacks). The other difference is the higher percentage of prisoners with previous serious convictions. Among American death row inmates for whom information on past convictions for felony was available, 65% had a record of one or more such convictions. Whereas nearly half of the British lifers held on 31 December 1977 had not served a custodial sentence before their conviction to life imprisonment (which replaced the death penalty in Britain in 1965).

It is worth noting that in spite of the provisions of the new death penalty statutes regarding murder for hire, which are clearly aimed at organized crime, none of the seven men executed since Gilmore were prominent figures of the mafia or of organized crime.

In Britain the restoration of capital punishment has just been debated in Parliament. The main arguments put forward for the restoration of hanging were retribution and denunciation ; deterrence was hardly evoked. During the debate votes for hanging for specific offences other than terrorist offences won considerably less support. Five of the sixmen who were at the time Northern Ireland Secretary, Lord Chancellor, Lord Chief Justice, Chief Constable and Army Commanding Officer in Northern Ireland at that time were opposed to the re-introduction of capital punishment. The reason they put forward was that the IRA would exploit the executions and turn the hanged terrorists into martyrs. Besides, Sir Robert Mark a former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in an article in the OBSERVER (10th july 1983) called "The hidden Cost of hanging" explains that since the extensive safeguards required by a trial which may result in a death sentence apply to all crimes, he prefers

to do without the death penalty and without the extensive safeguards it implies. This statement from an authoritative source is not very reassuring, whereas extensive precautions are taken to prevent justicial errors when they may result in a hanging, the risk of condemning an innocent man is accepted when he is simply likely to be imprisoned...

Shortly before an earlier debate on capital punishment, at the end of the five year suspension period decided in 1965, Professor Radzinowicz of the Cambridge Institute of criminology and member of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-1953 concludes an article in the "Sunday Times" (11) about the efficiency of the death penalty with a question : Are we ready to hang all murderers without concerning ourselves overmuch with distinctions between their cases, and are we prepared to increase the number of executions above any previous level in this century to test the efficacy of capital punishment ?

Since this would increase the risk of making irreversible judicial errors as in the case of Timothy Evans (hanged in the fifties) and because the restoration of a modified system of capital punishment would be no substitute for the money and initiative needed for more effective methods of combatting crime, Professor Radzinowicz advises the abolition of the death penalty.

His argument tends to overlook the fact that the efficiency of capital punishment has already been tested on a very large scale and without discrimination between the various kinds of homicides (or lesser offences) in previous centuries ; it failed : big cities like London and Paris were notoriously unsafe at night and highways were unsafe in daytime too.

Nevertheless, Professor Radzinowicz's opinion applies to the present situation in the US where the trickle of executions

(11) THE SUNDAY TIMES, 21st September 1969, "Hanging : has abolition worked ?"

can have no significant effect on the homicide rate or on the elimination of confirmed felons.

Deterrence, the operation of which has never been proven would clearly require a higher rate of execution than can be tolerated in our societies, this is probably the reason why supporters of capital punishment put forward denunciation as a justification for the death penalty. Former Justice Minister Mr Peyrefitte, in his book (12), quotes Durkheim's justification of punishment (in general, not just capital punishment.)

> "The penalty is less intended for the criminal than for all those who are not criminal and who reinforce their will to live together by communicating in the shared condemnation of the crime and of the criminal."

In other words, punishment, and capital punishment is only more so, is a skilful manipulation of symbol to preserve social cohesion.

In this light, the execution of black rapists makes sense, it was bound to restore the cohesion of the Deep South. The execution of Christian Ranucci in Marseille was highly symbolic too and timely to reassure French public opinion worried by a series of child killings ; unfortunately he was perhaps innocent but what mattered was the timing of the execution not the issues of guilt or responsibility.

Retribution or desert can be ruled out since there are too many discrepancies in the prosecution, trial and punishment of murderers ; moreover retribution is supposed to be based on the prisoner's responsibility. In the context of this principle, it is difficult to justify the execution of psychopaths or other offenders with diminished responsibility . Besides retribution raises the awkward

(12) Alain PEYREFITTE. "Les chevaux du Lac Ladoga", Paris, Plon, 1981, nouvelle édition augmentée in le livre de poche, p. 391.

issue of matching the penalty with the offence and there is no measuring rod for that.
Lastly the use of informers granted immunity clearly contradicts retribution ; these informers are not punished because they have betrayed their friends. What makes things worse is that it is not the occasional offender who can become an informer since he does not have sufficient knowledge of the criminal world. One must have been involved deeply and for a long time to offer useful information about criminal activities. Professional criminals thus tend to be used by the police as was the case for the notorious S.A.C in France or the mafia in the US, as informers, to break strikes or to fight against political or terrorist organisations endangering the State, while amateur offenders are eliminated. The picture of the executed men is that of losers, unsuccessful educationally, occupationally even in their bungled attempt in crime. This may be one of the reasons why they have been "selected" to be executed. Our society values financial success so much that there is some understanding for successful professional criminals. On the contrary the lonely misfit who commits a gratuitous crime or uses a degree of violence out of proportion with the amount of money involved, is likely to be executed.
It is worth noting that if the death penalty has not been reintroduced in Britain, it has not been rejected on humanitarian grounds but because IRA terrorists would have been turned into martyrs and avenged. So far from restoring the cohesion of society it would have been counterproductive. Since they would be avenged, IRA terrorists cannot be used as scapegoats.

Micheal CRONIN THE ABORTION REFERENDUM: CRISIS AND DISSENT IN THE IRISH REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION

The 1979 papal visit to Ireland was a triumph. In Dublin alone over a million people, a third of the Republic's population, attended an open-air mass in the Phoenix Park and masses elsewhere attracted exceptionally large crowds. Apart from the enthusiasm it generated, what characterised Pope John Paul II's visit was the moral and doctrinal conservatism of his homilies. Notably in Limerick, he condemned all forms of sexual behaviour that were contrary to the Church's teaching on the matter and he repeatedly denounced abortion as a modern evil.

The success of the visit led to many calls for spiritual renewal in its wake.(1) It also encouraged a motley of conservative forces in Ireland who longed for the reassertion of an increasingly eroded Catholic teaching on social matters, above all in the area of sexuality where permissiveness was seen as a major threat to an Irish Catholic ethos and the retention of the Church's influence in society. The focus of this conservative renewal was the issue of abortion.

In the Republic of Ireland under the 1861 'Offences against the Persons Act' anyone procuring an abortion or helping someone to procure an abortion is liable to life imprisonment. The three main political parties, Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour, are categorically opposed to abortion under <u>any</u> circumstances. Due to the proximity of England where an estimated 5,000 Irish women have abortions each year,(2) Ireland has rarely experienced the horrors of back-street abortions which were an important factor in the introduction of the 'Abortion Act' in Britain in 1967. Apart from the 'Woman's Right to Choose Group' founded in

February 1980 and the Democratic Socialist Party (which advocates abortion if justified on medical grounds), both numerically small, there is no major political grouping calling for changes in the 1861 Act. Despite the total absence of any moves to introduce new legislation on abortion, the Irish Catholic Doctors Guild set up the Pro-life Amendment Campaign (hereafter referred to as PLAC) in April 1981. The aim of this campaign was to amend the Constitution in such a way as to protect the life of the unborn child, its exponents claiming that without this constitutional guarantee it would be possible for the Supreme Court to make a decision legalising abortion in Ireland.

PLAC was a coalition of a number of groups. Its four principal components were a) the 'Irish Catholic Doctors Guild' (founded in the early seventies to stop the "decline in ethical values")[3] b) the 'Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child', founded in 1980 by the British parent organisation, c) the 'Council for Social Concern' and d) Responsible Society, two ultra-conservative Catholic pressure groups. These were later joined by the Irish Association of Lawyers for the Protection of the Unborn, important in lending credence and respectability to the campaign. PLAC was also to receive the support of two Catholic lay organisations, Opus Dei and the Knights of Columbanus,[4] support that was crucial due to the widespread implantation of these two organisations in the Irish professional middle classes.

The choice of abortion as a theme when there was no likelihood that it would be legalised was significant. A campaign against divorce, homosexuality, contraception for the unmarried, all illegal in the Republic of Ireland, was far less likely to succeed than one which used abortion and the threat of same as its central theme.[5] Thus, while wishing to combat the growing liberalism of Irish society, PLAC indirectly acknowledged its advances. The grouping

sought to reverse a liberal trend in Irish society which in their view was fatal to traditionalist Catholicism, a trend which had been the result of the popularisation of the ideas of the Second Vatican Council through the media and a desire to lessen religious divisions in the light of their murderous consequences in Northern Ireland, ecumenical overtures leading to the removal from the Constitution in 1972 of the article according a special position to the Catholic Church.[6] Already in 1975 the Irish Hierarchy had published a four part pastoral letter entitled 'Human Life is Sacred' which condemned abortion, sterilisation, euthanasia and artificial methods of birth control. Thus PLAC's initiative occurred in the more general context of the concern of the Irish Catholic Hierarchy vis-à-vis the increasing liberalisation of Irish society and the consequent decline in the Hierarchy's influence. The move to amend the Constitution was to have important consequences for the Irish political system. The purpose of this article is to concentrate on two major areas where the amendment made its most significant impact a) the internal politics of Fine Gael and b) the Irish Left.

FINE GAEL AND THE LIBERAL SPLIT

In the November 1982 election Fine Gael won 70 seats as compared to Fianna Fail's 75. Its share of first preference votes jumped from 30.5% in 1977 to 39.1% in 1982.[7] in October 1982 an MRBI poll showed that Fianna Fail and Fine Gael were level in terms of voters' preferences for the first time since the latter was founded.[8] The improvement in the electoral position of Fine Gael was dramatic but hardly surprising. In late 1982 the majority of the members of Fine Gael were new and over half had been recruited in the past two years.

This influx of new members had in part resulted from the extensive reorganisation of the party by its General

Secretary from 1977 to 1981, Peter Prendergast, and the changes in the party constitution at the 1978 Ard-Fheis masterminded by Jim Dooge. Membership cards were introduced, P.R.O.'s and constituency organisers were appointed to each constituency, lay members were given control of the National Executive and thus could overrule decisions by the parliamentary party, party officers were democratically elected and had to be re-elected every year. Women and young people were two groups whose support the party actively sought and this resulted in the election of three prominent Women's Rights' activists in the June 1981 election: Nuala Fennel, Gemma Hussey and Monica Barnes on the party ticket and the promotion of Young Fine Gael which holds its own separate conferences and elects a representative to the party's National Executive.

The reorganisation and rejuvenation had one important implication: it brought pressure on the party to liberalize, pressure which met with strong resistance from the conservative wing of the party, represented notably by Oliver J. Flanagan, Tom O'Donnell and Alice Glenn. They favoured loyalty to the tradition of social and political conservatism which had been embodied by the previous party leader Liam Cosgrave, Prime Minister in the 1973-1977 Coalition government. The election of Garret Fitzgerald as leader of the party after the party's defeat in the 1977 general election was seen as a victory for its progressive, liberal wing; this wing was known as the 'Just Society Wing' after the title of a pamphlet published by Declan Costelloe in 1964 which called for greater social justice in Irish society. The strategy of attracting young people and women and the decision to weight representation according to population, thus strengthening the urban vote, were seen as moves by Fitzgerald to widen and strengthen the liberal base of the party.

It was the vulnerability of this base and the uncertainty and divisiveness of the liberalisation process in Fine Gael that the Pro-Amendment Campaign was to reveal. At the April 1981 Fine Gael Ard-Fheis[9] the Vice-President of Fine Gael, Maria Stack, said that she was in favour of abortion under certain circumstances.[10] Her remarks provoked a controversy and soon afterwards Fitzgerald met a group of Pro-Life campaigners and pledged his party's support for the constitutional amendment. Before the February 1982 election, Fitzgerald again reiterated his support for the Amendment and in October of that year, after long debate, the Fine Gael Ard-Fheis rejected a motion committing the party to opposition to the Amendment, a month before the second general election in 1982.

However, at the Fine Gael Youth Conference in early 1983, Fitzgerald's constitutional amendment was massively rejected and a decision was made to launch a campaign opposing the amendment which would involve street canvassing and leafleting. Meanwhile the wording of the constitutional amendment, which had been approved by the Fianna Fail government during its term of office, was criticised as ambiguous and unsatisfactory by both the Attorney General, Peter Sutherland, and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr. Eamonn Barnes.[11] The text of this wording, which was the one eventually passed by the Dail and Senate, was as follows: "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect and so far as is practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right".[12]

Fitzgerald in April 1983 claimed that there were "fatal defects" in the F.F. wording and that to accept it would certainly have been politically easier and more expedient but "grossly irresponsible and morally unacceptable".[13] His main objection was that the 1861 Act was variously interpreted in cases of ectopic pregnancy and cancer of the

womb to save the lives of the women involved. The legal grounds for doing this were uncertain, however, and could be challenged in the courts. If the Fianna Fail wording was passed and approved at a referendum, parliament could no longer intervene to save the lives of women in these cases by amending the 1861 Act. Fitzgerald later declared his own personal opposition to the Amendment but by that stage his reputation as a liberal leader had been considerably weakened. His indecisiveness and contradictory stances demonstrated both the strength of the conservative forces in the party and the fragility of a liberalism which, while constituting the main attraction of the party for the new younger members, remains somewhat incoherent and lacks the assurance necessary to actively transform the organisation into a party more Social-Democratic than Christian-Democratic in outlook.

Another crucial area of Fine Gael policy which was a victim of the amendment campaign was Garret Fitzgerald's 'Constitutional Crusade'. The aim of this crusade was to change those articles in the Irish Constitution which were deemed to be repugnant to the Unionist population of Northern Ireland, notably articles 2 and 3 where the Republic claims sovereignty over the six counties presently under British jurisdiction. More generally, the purpose of the project was to create a pluralist secular society which would not be beholden to the teachings and beliefs of one church, namely the Catholic Church. This it was felt would encourage Ulster Protestants to consider more favourably the notion of a united Ireland. However, Fitzgerald's backing for the PLAC initiative on three separate occasions soon discredited his 'Crusade' which, with its attempt to resolve the Northern question and to create a more liberal climate in the Republic, was central to party policy (though not all party members were as enthusiastic as Fitzgerald about the idea). The amendment was condemned

by the Church of Ireland Primate Dr. Armstrong, who claimed that it involved the imposition of the moral theology of one church upon all the people and undermined Garret Fitzgerald's constitutional crusade.[14] The Methodist Church, too, was swift to denounce the amendment as sectarian. Another important source of criticism was the influental New Ireland Group, a group of anti-partitionist Northern Protestants whose chairman, John Robb, is a senator in the Irish Senate. They condemned the amendment as an obstacle to reunification and as sectarian.[15] Thus PLAC at once seemed to confirm the worst fears of Northern Protestants about the confessional nature of the Southern state and made largely redundant Fine Gael's tentative moves towards secularism and pluralism.

Though the Irish Catholic Hierarchy was slow to react, when it did, it did so firmly. Both the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Dermot Ryan, and the Bishop of Kerry, Dr. Kevin McNamara, defended the amendment as non-sectarian, arguing that the right to life of the unborn child transcended all religious differences.[16] In Dublin, a pastoral letter written by Dr. Dermot Ryan, called on people to vote for the PLAC amendment. The letter was read out at all masses and contrary to usual practice priests were given strict instructions not to comment on the letter's contents. In rural areas, where the Parish Priest still has a great deal of prestige and influence, the Hierarchy's support for the PLAC amendment was crucial and this was reflected in voting patterns in the amendment. Church support considerably strengthened the conservative wing of Fine Gael[17] and correspondingly weakened its liberal wing, with the exception of Young Fine Gael who continued, despite Church censure, to actively oppose the amendment.

In April 1982 five Women's Right to Choose Group members wrote to various individuals and organisations inviting them to a meeting in a Dublin hotel, with the aim

of launching a campaign against the amendment. The response to the meeting was enthusiastic and in June 1982 the Anti-Amendment Campaign was set up (hereafter referred to as the AAC).

LEFT REACTION

The Left was slow to react, partly because at first PLAC relied mainly on its middle-class members, drawn from the liberal professions, for its propaganda purposes, thus allowing the debate to seem remote and technical; in addition there was also a division in the Women's Movement between those who favoured opposing PLAC on a pro-abortion basis ('The Woman's Right to Choose' position) and those who felt that abortion was too extreme and divisive an issue in Ireland and that the amendment should be opposed on other grounds. This led to a split at the Woman's Right to Choose Group's conference in December 1981.

The Left responded in various ways to the AAC and the nature of this response in many instances pointed both to the general character of the Left and the particularities of the individual parties. What has often characterised the Left in Ireland is its economism and its tendency to relegate women's issues to a secondary position, issues are considered from various points of view but not from the way in which they specifically affect women. The situation is changing, however, with the setting up of a Women's Council in the Labour Party and women's groups in the Democratic Socialist Party and the Communist Party of Ireland. On the other hand, the attitude of the Workers' Party to the amendment was revealing. The party described the Pro-Amendment campaign as sectarian and divisive, as a threat from the New Right. Interestingly it did not treat the campaign as an attack on women's rights, to be rejected on feminist grounds. The party refused to join the AAC although individual members were active in it. This refusal to join

the AAC was justified by one of the party's parliamentary members, Proinsias de Rossa, in the following terms, "I think it is reasonable to run campaigns as the Workers Party because we consider that we are seriously setting about to build a mass working-class party. We are looking to get people to join us on the basis of a clearly thought out political and economic position".(18) His remarks are significant in so far as they show the extent to which the Workers Party seeks to displace the Labour Party as the dominant party on the Irish Left; the strategy being principally to sponsor campaigns and initiatives (e.g. the 'Jobs for All' campaign) which are identified with the Workers Party and with that party alone and hence recruiting members and support in the process specifically for the party. This in part also explains why it was reluctant to form a coalition in 1982 with the other Left non-Labour Party T.D.'s Jim Kemmy and Tony Gregory. The centralist nature of the party organisation facilitates the task of separate identification on various issues, members not being allowed or encouraged, as in other Left parties, to pursue individual initiatives which would endanger party unity.

The Labour Party, somewhat characteristically, in contrast to the Workers Party, allowed their members to decide which position they would adopt vis-à-vis the amendment. The Labour Women's Council affiliated itself to the AAC and its representative on the Administrative Council of the party, Jean Tansey, was a member of the AAC's Steering Committee. Throughout 1982 and 1983, various Labour Party T.D.'s declared their opposition to the amendment and these included four ministers, Dick Spring, Tanaiste and Minister for the Environment (Spring is leader of the Labour Party), Barry Desmond, Minister for Health, Ruairi Quinn, Minister of State for the Environment and Frank Cluskey, Minister for Trade, Commerce and Tourism. (Cluskey, a former leader of the Labour Party, after initially welcoming the PLAC proposal came out against it soon after). Others, such as

Frank Prendergast, supported the amendment. Again the Labour Party proved to be divided and vacillating on a move which it might conceivably have forcefully opposed with tighter party organisation and a more coherent and consistent approach to its alternative social project for Irish society. The Labour Party vote has dropped from 17% of the total vote in 1969 to 9% in 1982, in the same period its vote in Dublin, the country's largest urban centre, has dropped from 93,000 to 50,000.[19] What is more alarming for the Labour Party is that in four constituencies, Cork East, Waterford, Dublin North West and Dublin West, Workers' Party candidates are polling higher than their Labour counterparts. These are all urban constituencies, vital sources of Labour Party support. In constituencies where the Labour Party and the Workers' Party have both run candidates, the Workers' Party's percentage share of the combined Labour Party-Workers' Party vote has risen from 24% in 1973 to 39% in 1982.[20] Thus, for the first time in the party's history, Labour's dominant position is being threatened by another Left-Wing party, which explains why issues such as the amendment are crucial for the party. Seeming weakness or confusion on these issues further reduces the credibility of a party whose alliance with the conservative Fine Gael has, in the eyes of some, seriously compromised its claim to being a genuinely socialist party.[21] The tendency for the party's policies to be reactive more often than initiatory (though Spring's moves in favour of divorce legislation are an exception), as was the case during the amendment debate, further strengthens the impression that now the party is no longer capable of effecting radical change in society, an impression which has been translated into growing electoral support for the Workers' Party.

ORGANISATION

The organisational structure, with its central steering committee and local activist groups, is one which closely

resembled that of the H-BLOCK support groups in 1981 and the Anti-Nuclear groups in 1978-79 (opposed to the building of a nuclear power plant at Carnsore Point in County Wexford). This entailed a considerable amount of freedom of action as there was little centralised control. This lack of control meant that various campaigns permitted individuals and groups from different political backgrounds to work together.

The structure is significant for three reasons. (1) It points to the (relative to other Western European countries) marginal position of the Irish Left, which needs structures and campaigns that will attract as many potential supporters as possible. (2) It indicates the relative weakness of the party tradition in the Irish Left (this is changing to some extent of course with the Workers' Party), which has a tendency to favour single-issue campaigns where the danger of splits is less present than in political parties where structures are tighter and more centralised. The numerical weakness of the Left explains the fear of splits and division and the memory of the fate of certain political parties such as the Socialist Labour Party, which were the victims of numerous internal divisions.[22] (3) It demonstrates the disaffection felt by many young people with the traditional Left parties, a particularly striking example of this was the strength of the Youth Against H-Block group with its predominantly working class membership.[23] However, the notion of a broad-based campaign has not always met with unanimous agreement on the Left.[24] It is felt that the distinctly socialist contribution to these campaigns is obscured in attempts to gain liberal, middle-class support and that the Left is being used to strengthen the credo of Irish middle-class liberalism which, in areas such as economic policy, is considered by certain sections of the Irish Left to be profoundly reactionary. The almost complete suppression of the Woman's Right to Choose position in the final two

months of the campaign and the heavy reliance in AAC propaganda literature on the statements of legal, medical and theological experts rather than on the reported experience of working-class women in general, was seen by critics of the broad-based campaign as symptomatic of its inherent weakness.

CONCLUSION

On September 7th 1983, the eight amendment to the Irish Constitution was approved at a referendum by 841,233 votes for to 416,136 against. There are a number of consequences for women as a result of this amendment. It will now be possible to take legal action against a) women who use certain common forms of contraception such as I.U.O.'s, progesterone-only pills and certain newer types of ordinary pill; b) women who go to England to have abortions; c) doctors who abort a foetus to save a woman's life; d) pregnancy counselling services which give advice on abortion facilities in England. Thus the amendment referendum constituted a serious setback for Women's Rights in the Irish Republic. On the other hand, however, one of the most interesting statistics was the number of abstentions: 1,101,282.[25] It is reasonable to assume that many of those who abstained were more opposed than favourable to the PLAC amendment, as those who felt the amendment was necessary would presumably have voted to ensure it was approved. More importantly, almost one and a half million Irish voters refused to do what the Irish Catholic Hierarchy told them to do, namely to go out and vote for the PLAC amendment. Thus, while the Church and the consertative lay organisations eventually got the amendment they sought, the victory was scarcely comforting. A large section of Irish society had effectively refused to accept Church directives on an issue of private morality. Another fact that was to emerge from the referendum voting statistics was the urban/rural divide; the most consistently high opposition to the amendment occurred in the large

urban centres, while the opposite was the case in rural areas.[26] Lack of AAC presence, the prestige of the clergy, the conservatism of provincial newspapers were contributory factors to the rural vote which both indicated the tenacity of traditional beliefs and values in the Irish countryside and the serious lack of dialogue (often stemming from an absence of understanding or sympathy) between progressive groups in urban centres and rural organisations such as the powerful farming bodies.

Politically, the constitutional referendum served to highlight the divisions within Fine Gael, the major partner in the present ruling coalition in Ireland. Its attempts to liberalise are fraught both with internal difficulties and with resistance from traditional forces in society. However, a closer analysis of the referendum results does show the existence of a liberal urban electorate whose sympathies Fine Gael will presumably attempt to exploit.

Somewhat ironically, the Irish Left benefits from single issue campaigns such as the amendment campaign. Firstly, it allows it to form alliances in various broad-based campaigns with what it considers to be progressive sections of the middle class (even if this is at times problematic), thus widening the potential public for campaigns on other social issues such as divorce and contraception. Secondly, the political consensus which previously existed on a number of matters particularly concerning private morality is slowly disappearing, as the amendment campaign demonstrated, and giving way to a political realignment which would favour, albeit hesitantly, the move towards the secularisation and modernisation of Irish society and consequently, it is argued, socialist politics. Thirdly, due to the hegemony of the two main conservative parties, Fianna Fail and Fine Gael, which get 84.6% of the total vote in the Irish Republic, it is through campaigns such as the AAC that the Left has most

political impact both in terms of publicity and of the tensions it creates in the main parties (particularly Fine Gael), which may in the long run weaken them and favour the Left/ Right polarisation characteristic of other European democracies. Perhaps all parties concerned in the abortion referendum may finally have sympathised with the wry remark of one political commentator when he said, with regard to the Left and the amendment, "All in all, one step forward, one step backward and a step sideways"(27)

FOOTNOTES

(1) The Irish Times, April 13,1983.
(2) The Irish Times, May 12, 1983.
(3) Cane J., & Gordon M., "The Great Abortion Referendum Saga", pp.19-23, Gralton, October/November 1983.
(4) Roche M., "The Secrets of Opus Dei",pp.16-36,Magill, May 1983.
(5) Ibid.
(6) The Irish Times,April 13 1983.
(7) Browne V., "How the Whiz-Kids sold us a Taoiseach",pp.4-16 in Magill,December 1982.
(8) The Irish Times, September 27,1982.
(9) Ard Fheis: The Annual Party Conference.
(10) Browne V., "Oliver Flanagan: The Bitterness Erupts", p.7, Magill, May 1983.
(11) The Irish Times, February 21,1983.
(12) Ibid.
(13) The Irish Times, April 13,1983.
(14) The Irish Times, April 4,1983.
(15) The Irish Times, April 11,1983.
(16) Ibid.
(17) Ibid.
(18) "The Proinsias de Rossa Interview", p.13, Gralton October/November 1983.
(19) Brennan P., "The Fall and Fall of Labour", p.15, Gralton, April/May 1982.
(20) Cane J., "The Numbers Game",Gralton April/May 1982,p.11.
(21) Peillon M., Contemporary Irish Society: An Introduction, p.118,Gill & Macmillan,Dublin,1982.
(22) Boucher D., "The Party's Over",pp.14-16, Gralton, August/September 1982.
(23) "Youth Problems", p.3, Strumpet,January 1981.
(24) "Is there Life after the Amendment?",pp.16-18, Gralton, October/November,1983.
(25) The Irish Times, September 8,1983.
(26) Ibid.
(27) Kerrigan G., A Grand Catholic Mother,p.25, Gralton, October/November,1983.

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